[Information] Développement des Technologies Hypersoniques

Comme ce que j'ai annoncé, le 6ème essai hypersonique Boost-Glide chinois, DF-ZF, a bien eu lieu le 23 Novembre 2015. Pour rappel les zones et les routes aériennes fermées :

Spoiler:

Mon tableau de suivi sur les 6 essais de DF-ZF :

Spoiler:

China Again Tests Nuclear Hypersonic Missile

Citation :

Sixth flight of DF-ZF glide vehicle indicates weapon a high priority for Beijing

BY: Bill Gertz
November 25, 2015 5:00 am

China carried out a sixth flight test of its new high-speed nuclear attack vehicle on Monday designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses or carry out global strikes.

The ultra-fast maneuvering strike weapon known as the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle was launched atop a ballistic missile fired from the Wuzhai missile test center in central China’s Shanxi Province, according defense officials.

The vehicle separated from its launcher near the edge of the atmosphere and then glided to an impact range several thousand miles away in western China, said officials familiar with details of the test.

The DF-ZF flight was tracked by U.S. intelligence agencies and flew at speeds beyond Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound.

Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban declined to comment. “We do not comment on specific PRC weapons tests, but we do monitor Chinese military modernization carefully,” Urban told the Washington Free Beacon.

It was the sixth time the hypersonic glider has been flight tested since last year.

The website China Spaceflight reported Sunday that the test would take place, based on the Chinese government announcement of airspace closures along what would ultimately become the zone used by the glide vehicle during the flight test. The website reported that the airspace restrictions were similar to closures announced prior to an August DF-ZF flight test.

The airspace was closed to commercial and military air traffic between 12:53 a.m. and 1:40 a.m. Beijing time on Nov. 23—the likely timeframe of the test.

China’s most recent DF-ZF test took place Aug. 19, also from Wuzhai, and like Monday’s flight test was judged a success.

U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed the DF-ZF to be a nuclear delivery vehicle for Chinese missiles, with maneuverability and high speeds that would allow it to defeat U.S. missile defenses, currently designed to counter non-maneuvering warheads with more easily-tracked ballistic trajectories.

China also could use the DF-ZF for conventional-armed rapid global strike capability, according to military specialists.

The vehicle is believed to reach speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 10, or 3,836 miles per hour and 7,680 miles per hour.

The high rate of testing for the glide vehicle is an indication China has placed a high priority on the weapon program and that it is making rapid progress.

The Chinese conducted earlier flight tests on June 7, and on Jan. 9, 2014, Aug. 7, 2014, and Dec. 2, 2014. All the tests were first reported by the Free Beacon.

The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command told reporters last summer that hypersonic glide vehicles are new strategic warfare technology and an emerging threat.

“As I look at that [hypersonic] threat, clearly the mobility, the flight profile, those kinds of things are things we have to keep in mind and be able to address across that full kill chain,” Cecil Haney said in an interview in July, using the military term for the process used to target and attack enemy missiles.

Air Force Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, then-deputy commander of Strategic Command, said at the same time that hypersonic missiles offer a number of advantages as strategic weapons.

“It offers a number of different ways to overcome defenses, whether those are conventional, or if someone would decide to use a nuclear warhead, I think gives it an even more complicated dimension,” Kowalski said.

Currently, no nation has deployed hypersonic weapons but “it remains something that concerns us,” Kowalski added.

The annual report of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, made public Nov. 18, stated that China’s hypersonic weapons are in the developmental stages and are “progressing rapidly.” The glide vehicle could be deployed by 2020, and a separate high-technology ramjet-propelled cruise missile could be deployed by 2025, the report said.

The Mach 5 to Mach 10 speeds allow the arms to “strike any target on earth in under an hour,” it stated.

“The very high speeds of these weapons, combined with their maneuverability and ability to travel at lower, radar-evading altitudes, would make them far less vulnerable than existing missiles to current missile defenses,” the report said.

The report said China’s hypersonic weapons, as well as the use of multiple-warhead missiles, are part of China’s efforts to assure its missiles can penetrate U.S. missile defenses.

Nuclear-armed hypersonic vehicles would be part of China’s retaliatory strike capabilities, while conventionally-tipped hypersonics could indicate long-range conventional strikes.

“Alternatively, China may intend its hypersonic program for both nuclear and conventional purposes, or may simply be following the United States in pushing the technological frontier and is not yet certain which it will pursue,” the report said.

China is among three nations that are developing hypersonic arms, along with Russia and the United States.

Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the sixth test indicates Beijing may be seeking a conventional rapid global attack capability similar to the developmental U.S. program called Prompt Global Strike.

Fisher said analysis of Chinese solid fueled space launchers indicates the new Kuaizhou-2 launcher could be used with China’s anti-satellite missiles and also could boost the DF-ZF to intercontinental ranges.

“It is possible that Kuaizhou-2 could become the basis for China’s first intercontinental non-nuclear armed Prompt Global Strike delivery vehicle,” he said, adding the booster “could likely carry multiple DF-ZF derived hypersonic maneuvering precision strike warheads.”

China also is building and deploying sophisticated surveillance satellites that could be used for the precision global strike weapons.

With some 138 satellites in space by 2030, “this means that an intercontinental [Prompt Global Strike] launched from China against U.S. targets could benefit from multiple target location updates,” he said.

Since China has refused to negotiate limits on its strategic weapons and remains highly secretive about all its arms programs, “the safe course for Washington would be to avoid any further delay in developing its own Prompt Global Strike capability to deploy if China does the same.”

Je pense que j'ai suffisamment de matière pour écrire un rapport d'une cinquantaine de page sur ce programme, vous pensez que je pourrai le vendre à un prix unique très concurrentiel : 199 € TTC ?

Henri K.

US officials confirm sixth Chinese hypersonic manoeuvring strike vehicle test

Citation :

Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
26 November 2015

Key Points
The sixth Chinese test of its DF-ZF hypersonic manoeuvring strike vehicle was "successful"
China may be planning such warheads to perform non-nuclear precision strike missions

A sixth test of China's hypersonic manoeuvring strike vehicle, the DF-ZF (previously designated the WU-14), took place on 23 November, according to US officials.

China had signalled that this test was imminent on 18 November when it issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) covering the same areas as its fifth test on 19 August 2015.

US officials said the latest test achieved a speed of "beyond Mach 5" and was called a "success", according to a 25 November 2015 report in the Washington Free Beacon .

Previous tests occurred on 7 June 2015, 2 December 2014, 7 August 2014, and 9 January 2014. Only the 7 August 2014 test was called a "failure" by US officials.

As with previous tests, this one was launched from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre in Shanxi Province, where China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) tests most of its long-range missiles.

The key advantages of a boosted hypersonic manoeuvring vehicle are that it can radically change its trajectory to avoid missile defences and has 'gliding' capabilities that give an extended range over that of a conventional ballistic missile warhead.

While a hypersonic manoeuvring strike vehicle could be nuclear armed, it is also likely that China plans such warheads to perform non-nuclear precision strike missions, such as arming a next-generation anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).

It is likely that the DF-ZF test vehicle is being launched by a booster based on the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile and could arm a future version of this missile. However, it could also arm a version of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) DF-26. Both the DF-21 and DF-26 use 'first-generation' warheads that could be succeeded by a more manoeuvrable DF-ZF-based hypersonic warhead.

Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options ihs.com/contact

To read the full article, Client Login
(340 of 500 words)

Henri K.

Opening Remarks of Chairman Rogers

Citation :

Dec 08 2015
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

WASHINGTON - Today, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, made the following remarks on the hearing titled “Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign Developments:”

"I call this hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee to order and I welcome our panel of distinguished guests to our hearing “Prompt Global Strike: American and Foreign Developments”.

Testifying today we have:

• General C. Robert Kehler, USAF (Ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

• Mr. Tom Scheber
Independent Consultant

• Dr. James Acton
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment

I want you to know that we appreciate the time you put into being here today.

General Kehler, if I bet you money two years ago that we’d be able to get you to sit in that chair again, what would my odds have been?

Sir, we greatly appreciate your lifetime of service to our nation, that of your family, and your continuing service.

We are here today to assess where this country stands in developing prompt global strike capability.

Since before the Administration of President George W. Bush, this country has been examining a conventional prompt strike capability.

In fact, the first non-nuclear strategic strike programs were started during the Clinton Administration.

And during the incumbent Administration, the foundational defense policies, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review have cited the need to have a prompt, non-nuclear strategic strike capability.

It doesn’t get more bipartisan than to be supported in the Clinton, Bush and Obama Administrations.

Yet where are we? Instead of real military capability, we have a plan to test this capability again, at only an intermediate-range, in 2017.

If we’re lucky, we may have a military capability in the 2030s.

To make matters worse, we’re not the only ones developing this military capability.

According to Bill Gertz of the Washington Free Beacon, China has conducted six tests of a ballistic missile launched hypersonic glide vehicle.

Mr. Gertz previously reported that this system has undertaken “extreme maneuvers” and that this frequency of tests is “an indicator of the high priority placed on developing the weapon by the Chinese.”

Mr. Richard D. Fisher of the International Assessment and Strategy Center reports, in a letter that I will submit for the record, that this is but one of many systems the Chinese are developing, along with companion space capabilities.

Mr. Cooper and I had the Intelligence Community come to brief us in March of this year and my eyes were opened.

We have invited them back today to brief all subcommittee Members at the conclusion of this open hearing.

I am greatly worried that the United States stands the risk of losing the next arms race to Russia and China.

In fact, I’m worried we aren’t even in the race yet—we’re still trying to tie our shoe laces in the starting block."

La vidéo live de cette séance est très intéressante pour comprendre le positionnement des Etats Unis face aux programmes de développement des armements de projection globale et rapide.



Henri K.

L'Amiral Cecil Eugene Diggs Haney, Commandant de l'USSTRATCOM (United States Strategic Command), confirme lors de son intervention vendredi dernier au CSIS (the Center for Strategic and International Studies), que les 6 tests hypersoniques Boost-Glide chinois ont tous été terminés avec succès, et que la Chine avance très rapidement pour déployer opérationnellement ce type d'armes de nouvelle génération.

Citation :

It recently conducted its sixth successful test of a hypersonic glide vehicle, and as we saw in September last year, is parading missiles clearly displaying their modernization and capability advancement.

Citation :

China continues to make significant military investments in their nuclear and conventional capabilities, with their stated goal being that of defending Chinese sovereignty,

Pour ceux qui sont courageux, voici son discours en entier, qui dure un peu près 1h.



C'est toujours mieux que de lire des conneries sensationnelles des "journalistes" à 2 x 10^-18 centimes...

Henri K.

Ne sais pas trop quoi penser...

China’s Shenlong space plane is part of growing space warfare program: Gertz

Citation :

BY BILL GERTZ on JANUARY 25, 2016 in BILL GERTZ, CHINA, THE CHINA CHALLENGE

China’s military space program is getting a boost from a recent reorganization within the People’s Liberation Army.

A Chinese military expert disclosed earlier this month that a Chinese space plane known as the Shenlong will likely be deployed with the newly formed Strategic Support Force, the PLA’s new high-technology warfare unit.

China announced in late December the launching of a significant reorganization within the PLA that includes the renaming of its missile forces as the Rocket Forces, and creating the Strategic Support Force that is designed for high-technology warfare, including space, cyber and electronic warfare.

A Jan. 8 report in Hong Kong’s Tung Fang Jih Pao quotes official military commentator Song Zhongping as saying the Strategic Support Force will be made up of an Internet Army, an Aerospace Army and Electronic Warfare Troops.

Song went on to say that the new force would be equipped in the future with the Shenlong space plane that is capable of traveling in both space and air. The plane is said to be China’s version of the Pentagon’s experimental X-37B space plane.

The Shenlong – Divine Dragon – employs high speed with maneuverability and radar-evading stealth features. It will be capable of long-range flight.

Space weapons platform

According to Song, the unmanned Shenlong is being developed as space weapons launch platform, as well as for surveillance, intelligence and early-warning missions.

It was the first time an official Chinese military representative linked the Shenlong to China’s growing space warfare capabilities.

Adm. Cecil Haney, commander of the US Strategic Command, said last week that China is developing a range of space warfare arms.

“The ability of adversaries to conduct hostile operations in space presents a multifaceted space challenge, and potentially threatens national sovereignty and survival,” Haney said in a speech to the Center for New American Security.

“This is a particular concern to me as the combatant commander responsible for space, to include how critical our space capabilities are to my foundational nuclear deterrent mission, in addition to my other assigned missions,” the four-star admiral said.

Haney said China’s military is equipped with advanced directed energy weapons that can blind satellites, and in September launched a rocket carrying 20 micro-satellites — a record number for China – that could be use for space warfare.

China also conducted the sixth successful test of a new hypersonic strike vehicle capable of traveling up to 10 times the speed of sound.

The congressional US-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned in its most recent annual report that “China is pursuing a broad and robust array of counter-space capabilities, which includes direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers and directed energy weapons.”

Military analysts said the disclosure that the PLA plans to use the Shenlong for its Strategic Support Force highlights the buildup of PLA space warfare capabilities.

The PLA also is working on rapid global strike weapons, including hypersonic glide vehicles to deliver nuclear or conventional weapons, anti-satellite missiles and other weapons, and missile defenses.

“This confirms my longstanding assessment that Shenlong was always a military program and that space warfare is a principle mission of the new Strategic Support Force,” Rick Fisher, a China military affairs analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said of Song’s comments on the Shenlong.

The Shenlong has been under development since 2007 and at least one test of the plane, launched beneath the wing of an H-6 bomber, took place five or six years ago.

“One reason China did not perform a full orbital test [of the Shenlong] may have been fear of losing their spacecraft if it landed in another country,” Fisher said.

Fisher believes it is very likely the PLA will launch an operational Shenlong for both civilian and military missions. The plane is a key test bed for China’s plans to develop larger space planes that could be built in the early 2020s.

Capturing enemy satellites

“Space planes are attractive militarily because they are reusable, can be configured to perform passive or active military missions, such as capturing and returning an enemy satellite,” he added.

David M. Finkelstein, a China analyst with Center for Naval Analysis, says China’s government has been vague about the new Strategic Support Force.

However, the force appears to be the center of key high-technology capabilities the PLA needs to wage modern warfare. They include cyber, space, electromagnetic, precision strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The force may also include China’s growing special operations warfare forces, and its unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles and electronic counter measures forces.

“These capabilities and units reside at the heart of what the PLA refers to as ‘informationized local wars’ which the PLA’s new military strategy has identified as the type of modern warfare that the Chinese armed forces must be able to prosecute, and which, from an operational perspective, this entire reorganization is meant to facilitate,” Finkelstein wrote in a recent CNA report.

China’s military, widely criticized for its secrecy, has set off alarms in western and Asian governments with its development of space and other high-technology arms and concerns about the weapons likely will persist until Beijing is more open about its new weaponry.

Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books. Contact him on Twitter at @BillGertz

(Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Ne sais pas trop quoi penser… by Gertz

Citation :

[…] China’s military space program is getting a boost from a recent reorganization within the People’s Liberation Army.[…]

[…].

Déjà, une traduction de l'article en français pourrait aider.
Ensuite on y confirme que l'espace est en passe d'être un potentiel champ de bataille : « L'avion Shenlong qui est capable de voyager dans l'espace et de l'air est dit être la version chinoise de l'appareil spatial expérimental X-37B étasunien. ».
Les Tinois auraient-ils oublié les limitations du Traité de l'espace ?

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Les Tinois auraient-ils oublié les limitations du Traité de l'espace ?

Pour ma culture personnel, les Chinois ont enfreint quel article du Traité en question ?

Henri K

Henri K. a écrit:

[…] Pour ma culture personnelle, les Chinois ont enfreint quel article du Traité en question ? […]

L'article laisse entendre (sauf erreur de traduction, ou interprétation abusive) que leur intention pourrait être d'y déployer des systèmes de combat… Mais Gertz est peut-être trop pessimiste…

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Henri K. a écrit:

Ne sais pas trop quoi penser… by Gertz

Citation :

[…] China’s military space program is getting a boost from a recent reorganization within the People’s Liberation Army.[…]

[…].

Déjà, une traduction de l'article en français pourrait aider.
Ensuite on y confirme que l'espace est en passe d'être un potentiel champ de bataille : « L'avion Shenlong qui est capable de voyager dans l'espace et de l'air est dit être la version chinoise de l'appareil spatial expérimental X-37B étasunien. ».
Les Tinois auraient-ils oublié les limitations du Traité de l'espace ?

Les US ont oubliés ces limitations depuis fort longtemps. Il est fort logique que les compétiteurs ayant les moyens copient la façon US (programme star wars date de 1983 tout de même)

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Les Tinois auraient-ils oublié les limitations du Traité de l'espace ?

La vraie question serait: Les "Tinois" l'auraient ils oublié si les US ne c'était pas permis d'utiliser le droit international comme P.Q. ???
On peut gifler 1 fois 1000 personnes, mais on ne peut gifler 1000 fois 1 personne...
D'ailleurs, pour la 1ere fois, les "Tinois" viennent de menacer les US de sanctions si ils livrent des armes à Taiwan. Pareil, exit le droit international. L'aurait-il fait si les US le respectait ?? Je ne pense pas, le souci vient de l'occident et de sa croyance en sa "Suprématie". Un point de vue. Si la puissance dominante ne respecte aucune règle, comment et pourquoi attendre que les autres la respecte ?

MoiMoi a écrit:

mais on ne peut gifler 1000 fois 1 personne...

Bien sûr que si, ce n'est pas ce que nos médias font tous les jours ?

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

MoiMoi a écrit:

mais on ne peut gifler 1000 fois 1 personne...

Bien sûr que si, ce n'est pas ce que nos médias font tous les jours ?

Henri K.

Pas faux Henri, pas faux.... Mais la Chine est un pays, non une personne !

Citation :

[…] Les US ont oublié ces limitations depuis fort longtemps. […] La vraie question serait : Les "Tinois" l'auraient-ils oublié si les US ne s'étaient pas permis d'utiliser le droit international comme P.Q. ??? […] pour la 1ere fois, les "Tinois" viennent de menacer les US de sanctions si ils livrent des armes à Taiwan. Pareil, exit le droit international. L'auraient-ils fait si les US le respectaient ?? […] le souci vient de l'occident et de sa croyance en sa "Suprématie".[…]

Ce n'est pas une simple affaire de "croyance" ; ce serait même plutôt le contraire : l'Occident n'y croit plus et se sait menacé. La "domination occidentale" (constatée jusqu'à la fin du XXème siècle) étant désormais déchue, on assiste à ses derniers soubresauts… sous la forme d'un bras-de-fer entre volontés de puissance…

Citation :

[…] Il est fort logique que les compétiteurs ayant les moyens copient la façon US (programme star wars date de 1983 tout de même) […]

Finalement c'est peut-être là que se trouve la réponse à notre questionnement précédent « quoi penser […] »…  (de l'article de Gertz) ?
Forts de leur souvenir d'avoir poussé les Soviétiques, par le biais de l'IDS - ou SDI-, dans une course aux armements qui a (au moins en partie) mis à genoux l'Empire du même nom (précipitant la chute de ce dernier), les Étasuniens doivent aujourd'hui redouter (avec juste raison) de subir le même sort.

Henri K. a écrit:

Bien sûr que si, ce n'est pas ce que nos médias font tous les jours ?

Henri K.

Suite à un problème de santé, ceci est mon dernier post ici, je dois modérer le temps que je passe à mes recherches et surtout arrêter tout partage, trop consommateur en temps et en effort. Je garde un peu l'upload sur Youtube mais je ne sais pas encore pendant combien de temps.

Si dans le passé vous avez senti d'avoir été "agressé" par mes phrases, sachez que ce n'est pas volontaire. Je me rend compte depuis longtemps que ma perception de la Chine et celle que vous avez "appris" via les médias en Europe se divergent très fondamentalement, pas parce que les faits sont différents, mais parce que l'usage et l’intérêt sont différents. Je m’efforce depuis mon retour en France de vouloir vous révéler une autre face de la vérité, mais force est de constater que c'est un effort en vain.

Peu importe, cela n'a plus aucune importance désormais. Les 2 seules choses que je vais vous dire, la première c'est de garder toujours un esprit critique et ouvert, ne croyez pas tous qu'on vous dit, y compris ce que je vous ai dit, car rien n'est gratuit. Si vous avez accès à certaines informations gratuitement, il y a toujours un but derrière, vous connaissez maintenant le mien, mais connaissez vous celui des médias ?

La 2ème est de bien prendre soin de vous.

==================================================

La Chine a procédé son 7ème essai hypersonique Boost Glide le 22 Avril 2016 depuis le centre de lancement spatial TSLC.



Un article de Jamestown qui contient un tableau de comparaison entre les USA, la Russie et la Chine, pas si mal, quelques erreurs par ci par là mais acceptable :

Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Development

Citation :

Publication: China Brief Volume: 16 Issue: 7April 21, 2016 05:30 PM Age: 5 days
By: Erika Solem, Karen Montague

China’s military is reorganizing itself to be a more modern, effective force. On January 1, 2016, the Second Artillery Force (第二炮兵部队) (responsible for China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile arsenals) was reorganized into the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF; 火箭部队), elevating it to a service (军种) fully on-par with the Navy, Army and Air Force (Sina, January 1). As China streamlines its military and works to improve the quality of its personnel, several cutting edge projects are in the works to provide the People’s Liberation Army with advanced weapons. One of these is the PRC’s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), called the DF-ZF in China and designated by U.S. defense officials as the Wu-14. The development and testing of this new class of hypersonic weaponry in China has been extremely secretive. However, its eventual operational deployment will represent a significant improvement in the PLARF’s conventional and nuclear arsenals, as it has the potential to penetrate even the strongest layered anti-missile defenses of the United States and its allies.

Hypersonic Arms Race

In addition to China, the United States and Russia are pursuing various iterations of HGVs and all three have developed prototypes of this high-tech weapon. The X-51A, Yu-71, and DF-ZF are the current HGV prototypes for the U.S., Russia and China, respectively. This new class of weapons has prompted each nation to adopt different approaches, with each model using a different engine, fuel type, and delivery method, but all HGV weapons’ core characteristic is sustained and controlled Mach 5 (3,836 mph) flight (See Table 1). [1]

Table 1: China, Russia, and U.S. HGV Names and Launch Platforms

Country

HGV Name

Launch Platform

Engine

China (PRC)

Wu-14 / DFZF

DF-11,15,16,21, 26 Variants

Single-or Two-Stage Solid-Propellant Rocket

Russia

Yu-71

SS-19 / Yu-100N

Two-Stage Liquid Fuel

United States

X-51A Waverider

B-52 bomber

Scramjet

Karen Montague & Erika Solem

The Potomac Foundation, April 2016

The variation in each country’s testing of their respective HGVs provides a glimpse into their motives for pursuing this costly technology. It is speculated that the United States hopes to improve the speed of its Prompt Global Strike capability (which would enable to hit a target anywhere in the world with a conventional warhead in less than an hour), while both Russia and the PRC want the ability to pierce U.S. missile defenses. The competition between the three countries is resulting in both a new arms race fueled by ambiguous goals and a lack of transparency on all sides.

U.S. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Developments

To understand China’s progress toward an operational HGV, an examination of the U.S. military’s hypersonic projects is important. The United States has been researching and developing hypersonic technology since the early 2000s under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Force Application and Launch from Continental United States (FALCON) Project. Since then, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, Boeing, and many others have collaborated on the X-51A Waverider HGV. The Waverider uses a B-52 bomber as a launch platform, is intended to be capable of Mach 5+ speeds, and is equipped with a scramjet engine that uses high speed to pressurize the air-to-fuel mixture, allowing more efficient combustion and greater speeds. The first Waverider test took place on May 26, 2010, and set a record with a 200-second burn, beating out the 12-second burn of NASA’s X-43 in 2004 (Edwards Air Force Base News, May 26, 2010). In contrast, Chinese media reports that its military has the capability to launch its HGV from a variety of types of ballistic missile models. Among these are the DF-11B, DF-15B, DF-15C, DF-16, DF-21C, DF-21D, DF-26 (rumored), and the M-20/DF-12 (Sina Military, June 18, 2015). When comparing HGV technology, the U.S.’s delivery method and intended range appear to be more ambitious. However, the U.S. program has had a much lower test launch success rate (25 percent), compared to China’s 83 percent. Despite its recent advances with its HGV program, the United States has not conducted a Waverider test in the past two years, which makes the Chinese program appear more advanced. (See Table 2)

Table 2: China, Russia, U.S. HGV Testing Records

Country

Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Test 4

Test 5

Test 6

China

9-Jan-14

7-Aug-14

2-Dec-15

7-Jun-15

21-Aug-15

23-Nov-15

DF-ZF

Success

Failure

Success

Success

Success

Success

Duration

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Speed

Mach 10

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Mach 10

> Mach 5

Russia

27-Dec-11

13-Sep-13

Sep-14

26-Feb-15

---

---

Yu-71

Failure

Failure

Failure

Failure

---

---

(Yu-70)

Duration

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

---

---

Speed

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

---

---

U.S.

26-May-10

13-Jun-11

14-Aug-12

1-May-13

---

---

X-51A

Success

Failure

Failure

Success

---

---

Duration

3.5 Minutes

9 Minutes

(3 Controlled)

Crashed After Separation

> 3.5 Minutes

---

---

Speed

Mach 4.88

Mach 5

---

Mach 5.1

---

---

Karen Montague & Erika Solem

The Potomac Foundation, April 2016

China and its Goals for the DF-ZF

China has conducted six DF-ZF tests in the past year and a half. Although frequency does not determine test quality, it does demonstrate that China is dedicated to the successful development of this technology. Its 10th Research Institute (also known as the “Near Space Flight Vehicle Research Institute”), which is under the China Aerospace Science Industry Corporation (CASIC) 1st Academy, is the sole entity responsible for the development of HGVs. [2] This unique concentration of the entirety of the program into the 10th Research Institute seems to have facilitated a remarkably quick development of China’s DF-ZF. Unlike the United States, China is assumed to be using a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) transporter erector launcher (TEL) as the delivery method for all of its HGV tests. This design launches the boost-glide vehicle into the atmosphere along a trajectory similar to a traditional ballistic missile. After the vehicle reenters the earth’s atmosphere, it boosts itself back into the upper atmosphere. It then performs a pull up maneuver to control speed and altitude before gliding into its target (Next Big Future, August 1, 2015). The up-and-down trajectory of the HGV is believed to be able to confuse current ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems as the projectile’s erratic course prevents the system from locking onto its target. Countries in East Asia with BMD available to intercept a Chinese HGV include Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, each with U.S.-supplied PATRIOT-3 (PAC-3) batteries, along with India, Pakistan and Russia, each of whom has its own indigenous BMD, as well as BMD purchased from other countries. The DF-ZF’s unpredictable flight path and ability to be launched from a variety of missiles, each with different range capabilities, shows that China’s goals for its HGV is to evade ballistic missile defense systems that threaten its ability to launch a successful offensive or defensive strike.

A major concern about China’s HGV program is that the technology could be applied to both conventional and nuclear weapons. [3] The wreckage of China’s second (and failed) HGV test indicates that it was conducted using a liquid-fueled launch platform. This test contradicts the many reports that China is using the DF-21 solid-fueled rocket as a launch platform. However, it warrants special attention because it is the only one that has public images of its components (Arms Control Wonk, September 3, 2014). This is important because liquid-fueled launchers are associated with China’s nuclear program. The use of a liquid-fueled launch platform such as the Long March-4C (speculated to be used in the second test) indicates that China may be developing the DF-ZF for both conventional and nuclear use. An alternative explanation for the use of liquid fuel could be to compensate for the weight of the glider during acceleration to hypersonic speed. However, this explanation likely complements—rather than displaces—the theory behind intended nuclear use (Carnegie Endowment, November 21, 2014). [4]

China’s primary goal for the HGV is to have it travel fast enough while making use of the HGV’s unique flight characteristics to evade BMD systems. China has expressed its frustration with deployed U.S. BMD in the Western Pacific for over a decade due to the perception that such a system would degrade China’s limited nuclear deterrent (MOD, May 26, 2015; MOD, December 9, 2011). Further adding to China’s unease, other regional powers such as Japan and South Korea have also invested heavily in ballistic missile defense, making any sort of larger-scale engagement in the region quite challenging for China’s missile forces (CRS, April 3, 2015). Most of China’s HGV tests have attempted to travel distances up to 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles) and have been launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, located in Shanxi province (China Military Online, December 12, 2014). The intended distance of these tests is a strong indicator that China is either less advanced in its HGV development than the United States or is focused on addressing regional threats. If China successfully designs an operational short-range HGV, it will have a better chance of delivering successful missile strikes against its regional adversaries. Given China’s strategic focus on regional security issues—particularly on developing the ability to defeat Taiwan militarily—a shorter-range HGV addresses China’s more immediate needs.

Since the Taiyuan launch center is used primarily for testing new missiles, once development of the DF-ZF is complete, it likely will be relocated to PLARF bases that house compatible launchers. Because China’s DF-ZF appears to be regionally focused, there is a strong possibility that it would be placed under the jurisdiction of the 52nd Base command. The 52nd Base command covers a majority of the Eastern coast of China and it is likely that the DF-ZF will be placed directly in the 807th brigade headquarters, the 817th brigade headquarters, the 818th brigade headquarters, the 819th brigade headquarters, and/or any PLARF bases that house the HGV compatible DF-11A, DF-15B, and DF-21D. There are also specific locations under Base 53’s command on the southeast coast of China, which could also be strategic for the use of a DF-ZF in a regional strike (AusAirpower.net, January 27, 2014). The DF-11A and DF-15B are able to reach Taiwan, while the DF-21 is able to reach Taiwan, the Philippines, southern Japan, South Korea and North Korea. (See Image 1) Furthermore, it is reported that a glide vehicle extends the weapon’s range by 500–1,000 kilometers, but it is unclear if this distance is accounted for in the Chinese tests or choices of launch vehicles (Tencent News, November 27, 2015). If the additional distance was not accounted for in published distances, the HGV could have the ability to cover even the farthest parts of the South China Sea and potentially the Second Island Chain, which includes Guam.

Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Applications

One major application of a hypersonic glide vehicle could be to deliver a “decapitating strike,” which is an attack on an adversary’s command-and-control centers. An example would be to strike the U.S.’s military bases in Asia, hoping to render American forces vulnerable and incapable of an immediate retaliatory response. If conducted successfully, this approach causes an opponent to be unable to retaliate with its own weapons. Some aspects of Chinese strategy already emphasize these tactics, for example, network attacks to paralyze an opponent’s communications at the outset of a conflict. The DF-ZF could provide “hard” kill capability against hardened infrastructure or leadership facilities to complement cyber-attack “soft kills” against infrastructure. As China’s research into HGV technology progresses, a number of other strategic roles could be developed. Extended range, possibly through the use of scramjet engines (which take advantage of high speeds to compress air for combustion and greater propulsion), could give Chinese missile units the ability to destroy the assets of countries in range.

The DF-ZF does not currently use a scramjet engine like Boeing’s X-51A. However, the PRC recently announced that it is now the second country to possess this technology. Since the announcement, there have not been reports of scramjet engines being tested in the DF-ZF (Sina Military, October 9, 2015). Since scramjet engines, when successful, have the potential to travel very long distances, they are optimal for obtaining rapid global strike capability with HGVs. The majority of U.S. tests using scramjets, for example, have attempted to travel around 3,800 km, supporting the idea that the U.S. is aiming for a very long-range strike with their weapons. [5] China’s own interest in scramjets was demonstrated in 2015 when the Chinese government gave the developer of its scramjet, Wang Zhengou, an award at the 2nd China Aeronautical Science and Technology Conference, which indicates that China highly values the development of this technology (Tencent News, October 8, 2015). Although up to this point China has been testing to obtain hypersonic speeds over short distances (a function that a scramjet engine is not optimal for), their recent attainment of scramjet technology will allow them to expand the goals of their HGV development.

Yet, with or without a scramjet engine, if the PRC expands its targets to include countries outside of the East Asian region, attaching a HGV to one of its SRBMs would extend the reach of this weapon to MRBM and ICBM ranges. When conducting a conventional prompt global strike, there is the potential for other nations to associate that ICBM with a nuclear strike, which could escalate the conflict (Congressional Research Service, February 24). Because SRBMs give off a different radar return than ICBMs, using one to reach the same striking distance would not seem as threatening and would ameliorate this perception problem. The PRC’s use of a DF-21 as an HGV launch vehicle requires the use of specific locations and firing circles, many of which are well known and monitored by the United States. Since missile launch preparations are very rare, it might be possible to detect HGV-equipped DF-21s before launch.

Conclusion

Based on an analysis of China’s HGV development, the authors speculate that the PRC’s main priority for the DF-ZF is to bypass regional BMD. Of all the launchers currently deployed by the PRC, based on the assumed intent and estimated range capabilities, the DF-21 seems to be the most likely launch platform for the HGV. Unlike the DF-31, which is a liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-21 is a solid-fueled medium-range ballistic missile, which means quick preparation times compared to liquid-fueled. It also has a reported range of at least 1,500 km (932 miles), meaning it can reach all of the countries in the East Asian region. In 2001, it was reported that the solid fueled DF-21 takes anywhere between 10 to 15 minutes to prepare. [6] Since technology has advanced immensely over the last 15 years, it is very possible that it now takes even less time to prepare. The newly released DF-26 is the next generation of the DF-21 and has a longer range. It is speculated that China will use the DF-26 as a launch platform for the DF-ZF in the future (IHS Jane’s 360, November 26, 2015). No matter the type of launch platform, an HGV can extend the reach of any missile by at least 1,000 km. If the DF-ZF truly does have the capability to bypass ballistic missile defense, it has the potential to deliver a devastating conventional or nuclear strike to any country. Even the threat of its use could be sufficient to make an adversary consider Chinese demands.

There are clear symbolic and military benefits for the nation that successfully develops a hypersonic weapon. The DF-ZF, though impressive, still has a long way to go before it can truly threaten the security of the United States and its allies. Therefore, China will continue frequent testing of the DF-ZF as a display of its military’s power and advancement. Although in its current form the applications of the DF-ZF are constrained to East Asia, it is likely that China will continue to expand the range and capabilities of this weapon. Given the recent increase in investments in BMD by nations such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the DF-ZF is a potentially destabilizing capability. If China is able to complete development of the system and operationalize it over the coming years, the DF-ZF system could further erode the U.S. military’s deterrent in Asia. In the future, it will play an important role in calculating the relative balance of power in the region.

Erika Solem is a Ph. D. Fellow at the Potomac Foundation where she supports the research efforts on the "China’s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She is a first year Ph. D. student at George Washington University with a focus on Chinese Space Policy and Defense. She has extensive experience both living and studying in China.

Karen Montague is a Research Fellow at the Potomac Foundation, where she assists in war gaming and simulation development efforts and supports the research efforts on the "China’s 21st Century Strategic Arsenal" project. She earned her B.A. in International Studies from Texas A&M University in 2011 and M.S. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University in 2013.

Notes

1. The U.S. and Russia are also developing a new class of ballistic missiles. This class would have the same high-speed, low altitude and weaving characteristics of an HGV, allowing it to travel above Mach 5 speeds and evade BMD. Most recently, Russia has developed a hypersonic missile that can be launched from a nuclear-powered submarine (RT, March 17). Currently, China has not announced or demonstrated research into this class of missiles; all three countries seem to be prioritizing development of the glide vehicle.

2. Mark Stokes with Dean Cheng, “China’s Evolving Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. Interests” Project 2049, April 26, 2012. .

3. Paul J. Waltrup, Michael E. White, Frederick Zarlingo, and Edward S. Gravlin, “History of Ramjet and Scramjet Propulsion Development for U.S. Navy Missiles,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, Volume 18, Number 2 (1997).

4. Although China has been shifting to the use of more solid-fuel boosters for its missiles, all of the observed Chinese HGV tests are speculated to have been launched from boosters using liquid fuel. The main use of liquid fuel in China’s missile program is associated with the delivery of nuclear weapons on ICBMs. It is also possible that China is using liquid fuel in tests to obtain higher speeds, as liquid-fueled missiles have a speed advantage over solid fueled missiles.

5. James M. Acton, “China’s Offensive Missile Forces”: Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission April 1, 2015. .

6. Wendy Frieman, “The Arms Control and Ballistic Missile Defense Costs of a Chinese Conflict,” in The Cost of a Future Conflict, Andrew Scobell, ed. 2001. p. 166.

http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/_CB_16_7_3.pdf

Bien à vous,

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Suite à un problème de santé, ceci est mon dernier post ici, je dois modérer le temps que je passe à mes recherches et surtout arrêter tout partage, trop consommateur en temps et en effort. […]

J'ai toujours été admirative de cette profusion d'informations inédites. Mais Et diffusées simultanément sur des forums voisins (ici, par exemple) et le site origine. Tout en étant bien persuadée que cela exige un temps de travail considérable pour son analyste et auteur…

Citation :

Si dans le passé vous avez senti d'avoir été "agressé" par mes phrases, sachez que ce n'est pas volontaire. Je me rends compte depuis longtemps que ma perception de la Chine et celle que vous avez "apprise" via les médias en Europe divergent très fondamentalement, pas parce que les faits sont différents, mais parce que l'usage et l’intérêt sont différents. Je m’efforce depuis mon retour en France de vouloir vous révéler une autre face de la vérité, mais force est de constater que c'est un effort en vain. […]

Pas si vain que ça. Même si nous sentions était perceptible un a priori un peu trop systématiquement favorable aux thèses tinoises, leur confrontation avec les autres principes fut loin d'être dénuée d'intérêt.

Citation :

[…] rien n'est gratuit. Si vous avez accès à certaines informations gratuitement, il y a toujours un but derrière, vous connaissez maintenant le mien, mais connaissez-vous celui des médias ? […]

Les sources du savoir ne sont pas uniquement celles des médias ; pour le valider (le savoir) il convient de croiser un maximum de sources. Et de toujours rester prudent dans ses conclusions…

Citation :

[…] garder toujours un esprit critique et ouvert, ne croyez pas tout ce qu'on vous dit, y compris ce que je vous ai dit […]

… et dans ses certitudes…

DahliaBleue a écrit:

[...] d'informations inédites. Mais diffusées simultanément sur des forums voisins

Pouquoi le Mais ?

Citation :

Pas si vain que ça. Même si nous sentions un [...]

Le "nous" me dérange, personne n'est mandaté sur ce site pour parler en mon nom, au nom de celui des autres, je doute aussi. Personnellement, grand amateur de géopolitique et donc grand lecteurs de "news" de différentes origines géographique, les rares prises de positions d'Henry, comparé à la propagande anti-russe, anti-chinoise, anti-syrienne et autres ne sont que peu de choses et surtout sans comparaison.

Henri K. a écrit:

Suite à un problème de santé, ceci est mon dernier post ici, je dois modérer le temps que je passe à mes recherches et surtout arrêter tout partage, trop consommateur en temps et en effort. Je garde un peu l'upload sur Youtube mais je ne sais pas encore pendant combien de temps.

Merci pour ce travail et surtout que j’espère que ta santé s'arrangera ! En tout cas, je déplore cette perte d'information qui va en découler, pour moi en tout cas. Jusqu'à maintenant, sur les sites / forums francophones ou anglophones, je n'ai pas trouvé de source plus factuelle et prolifique que toi !
Je te souhaite que ces soucis de santé ne soient que temporaire.

MoiMoi a écrit:

Citation :

[…] d'informations inédites. Mais diffusées simultanément sur des forums voisins

Pourquoi le Mais ?

Critique valable. J'avais hésité avec la conjonction "et"… à cause de "inédites" (abusivement perçue comme "exclusive"). J'édite.

Citation :

Citation :

Pas si vain que ça. Même si nous sentions un […]

Le "nous" me dérange, personne n'est mandaté sur ce site pour parler en mon nom, au nom de celui des autres, je doute aussi.

Accordé. Et il n'y a même plus de webmaster pour en endosser la responsabilité. J'édite aussi dans un sens plus neutre.

Henri K. a écrit:

Un article de Jamestown qui contient un tableau de comparaison entre les USA, la Russie et la Chine, pas si mal, quelques erreurs par ci par là mais acceptable :

=45313&no_cache=1#.VyBhJeafcsZ]Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Development

Spoiler:

Henri K.

Je tiens à ajouter une « analyse » complémentaire sur un point non abordé dans l’article :
Ils partent du principe qu’à cause de la courte portée du DF-ZF, il n’est pas en soi une menace pour le sol américain. Je ne suis pas d’accord. Pourquoi je pense cela :

Un ICBM a 3 phases : poussée (décolle), intermédiaire (il voyage), de rentrée (atterrissage imminent).
En phase de rentrée, la chose est super rapide, avec les ICBM récents il y a plusieurs ogives manœuvrables et il y a des leurres. Un patriot US ou un S400 russe déployés sur la zone à défendre n’éviteraient pas un armagedon.
Dans les 2 premières phases, vitesse beaucoup plus lente, peu ou non manœuvrable, pas de leurres externes, là un patriot ou un S400 peuvent se « faire plaisir ».

Voilà pourquoi les russes et chinois n’apprécient guère le déploiement du bouclier US à leurs frontières, là ou leurs ICBM sont le plus vulnérable. Un gros pourcentage de missiles seraient abattu.
Le DF-ZF permettrait de réduire à néant ou presque les infras nécessaires au bouclier installés au Japon, Corée. (Europe du nord et de l’est pour les russes, Alaska pour les deux)
Suite à cela, les DF-31 et DF-41 pourraient facilement voyager jusqu’au mainland US. Resterait « juste » les Arleigh Burke ayant survécu au DF-21D,  DF-ZF eu autres pour tenter une interception quand elle a encore de bonnes chances de réussir.
Le Iskander Russe peut jouer le même rôle mais il est bien plus limité : portée réduite (du au Traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire) qui oblige a le mettre à portée de tir de systèmes équivalents (500km) et trop court pour atteindre certains éléments du bouclier, vitesse et potentiel de survie bien moindre. Reste les plateformes navales qui ne sont pas limitées en portée par les traités et permettent donc vu les techno de contourner le fameux traité. Je pense notamment au fort connu* Kalibr Russe, qui est lui-même un "game changer". Connu*: pour ceux ou celles qui suivent même de loin les OP en Syrie.

Donc, même avec cette portée réduite, un HGV Russe ou Chinois serait un «game changer» même s’il ne peut directement atteindre le sol US.
Je ne suis pas et de loin stratège militaire et encore moins dans le domaine balistique mais voilà ce que j’en pense. Si ça se trouve, mon "analyse" vaut Zéro, d’où les guillemets

henri ! en espoirs de te lire de nouveau très rapidement bon rétablissement

Henri K. a écrit:

Si dans le passé vous avez senti d'avoir été "agressé" par mes phrases, sachez que ce n'est pas volontaire. Je me rend compte depuis longtemps que ma perception de la Chine et celle que vous avez "appris" via les médias en Europe se divergent très fondamentalement, pas parce que les faits sont différents, mais parce que l'usage et l’intérêt sont différents. Je m’efforce depuis mon retour en France de vouloir vous révéler une autre face de la vérité, mais force est de constater que c'est un effort en vain.

Peu importe, cela n'a plus aucune importance désormais. Les 2 seules choses que je vais vous dire, la première c'est de garder toujours un esprit critique et ouvert, ne croyez pas tous qu'on vous dit, y compris ce que je vous ai dit, car rien n'est gratuit. Si vous avez accès à certaines informations gratuitement, il y a toujours un but derrière, vous connaissez maintenant le mien, mais connaissez vous celui des médias ?
Henri K.

bonsoir
ne croyez pas cela. même si je n'interviens pas souvent je me suis beaucoup intéressé à vos articles. et pour le reste…

CAST : Nouvelle méthode pour refroidir à Mach 20

Citation :

Dans un article publié le 11 Août 2016 par l'Institut CAST (China Academy of Space Technology), filiale du groupe aérospatial chinois CASC et spécialisé dans la conception générale des engins spatiaux, on apprend qu'un chercheur chinois de cet institut et son équipe ont fait de "percée technologique" significative dans le...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/cast-nouvelle-methode-refroidir-mach-20

Henri K.

Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique ?

Citation :

L'analyse de deux "Notice To Airmen" (NOTAM) effectives le 17 Août 2016, de 00h55 à 06h00 GMT, semble suggérer que la Chine pourrait procéder à un essai de drone hypersonique à l'Ouest de son territoire...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/nouvel-essai-du-drone-hypersonique

Henri K.

Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique au 26 Août ?

Citation :

Tout comme le NOTAM A2088/16 que j'ai analysé dans l'article "Nouvel essai du drone hypersonique ?" il y a une semaine, le NOTAM A2166/16 a piqué ma curiosité ce soir pour la même raison, qui mènerait potentiellement à la même conclusion, à savoir un nouvel essai d'un drone hypersonique chinois...

http://www.eastpendulum.com/nouvel-drone-hypersonique-26-aout

Henri K.

La schizophrénie "Hypersonique"

Citation :

L'interprétation de 5 nouveaux NOTAMs, valables le 5 Septembre de 01h00 à 08h00 UTC, semble suggérer qu'un essai de drone hypersonique a de nouveau eu lieu.

Pour en savoir plus : http://www.eastpendulum.com/la-schizophrenie-hypersonique

Henri K.

La Chine développe son propre drone hypersonique D-21 ?

Citation :

Un nouvel essai hypersonique semble avoir eu lieu en Chine ce matin. Et si ces essais multiples depuis Septembre 2015 sont ceux d'un "D-21" à la chinoise ?

Pour en savoir plus : http://www.eastpendulum.com/schizophrenie-hypersonique-phase-ii

Henri K.