[Information] Conflits dans la Mer de Chine Méridionale

Pour ceux que cela pourrait intéresser... Ce soir sur ARTE
Mer de Chine, la guerre des archipels
http://www.programme-tv.net/programme/prog-tv/7457341-mer-de-chine-la-guerre-des-archipels/#serie-header

Les images vues dans 2 reportages télévisés, l'un de CCTV-7 et l'autre de la chaîne TV de l'armée chinoise, confirment que la marine chinoise déploie les missiles Sol-Mer YJ-62, les SAM HQ-9 ainsi que les CIWS LD-2000 aux Paracels.





Henri K.

Le croisseur USS Chancellorsville CG-62 vient de terminer une opération dans la mer de Chine méridionale et retourne au port de Yokosuka. Les médias US ont diffusé une série de photos dans laquelle on voit que les méchants Chinois ont suivi les soldats US de près.

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Reconnaissez vous le navire chinois qui est dans ces photos ? En tout cas les marins US ont sorti le livret d'identification.

Henri K.

qu elle que photo en plus ici
http://military.workercn.cn/282/201603/31/160331092848147_2.shtml

On apprend un peu plus sur comment le croiseur américain USS Chancellorsville a été accompagné par 2 navires chinois dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

Il y a donc non seulement un destroyer de Type 052C, mais aussi la frégate 575 Yueyang de Type 054A. Un peu étonnant la phrase que j'ai souligné en orange.

Patrolling Disputed Waters, U.S. and China Jockey for Dominance

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By HELENE COOPERMARCH 30, 2016

ABOARD THE U.S.S. CHANCELLORSVILLE, in the South China Sea — The Navy cruiser was in disputed waters off the Spratly Islands when the threat warning sounded over the ship’s intercom: “Away the Snoopie team. ... Away the Snoopie team.”

As the sailors of the “Snoopie team” went on alert and took up positions throughout the ship, a Chinese naval frigate appeared on the horizon, bearing down on the cruiser Chancellorsville last week from the direction of Mischief Reef. More alarming, a Chinese helicopter that had taken off from the frigate was heading straight for the American cruiser.

“This is U.S. Navy warship on guard,” Ensign Anthony Giancana said into his radio from the ship’s bridge, trying to contact the helicopter. “Come up on Frequency 121.5 or 243.”

Ominously, there was no response.

Here in the hot azure waters off the Spratly and Paracel Islands — which encompass reefs, banks and cays — the United States and China are jockeying for dominance in the Pacific. From Mischief Reef, where China is building a military base in defiance of claims by Vietnam and the Philippines, to Scarborough Shoal, where the Chinese are building and equipping outposts on disputed territory far from the mainland, the two naval forces are on an almost continuous state of alert.

Although the South China Sea stretches some 500 miles from mainland China, Beijing has claimed most of it. Tensions have risen sharply, and the topic is expected to dominate President Obama’s meeting in Washington this week with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping.

America’s goal is to keep the South China Sea, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, open to all maritime traffic. But administration officials are increasingly worried that tensions will only worsen if an arbitration panel in The Hague rules as expected in the coming months on a 2013 case brought by the Philippines, which has accused China of making an “excessive claim” to most of the sea.

At the Pentagon two weeks ago, the day before a meeting of Mr. Obama’s national security team to discuss Chinese expansion in the Pacific, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was talking with Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., the commander of the United States Pacific Command, in the reception area of Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter’s office.

“Would you go to war over Scarborough Shoals?” General Dunford asked Admiral Harris, in a conversation overheard by a reporter. If Admiral Harris responded, it could not be heard.

The White House and the Pentagon have made it clear that they do not want a war with China over a group of uninhabited islands.

But neither does the White House want to cede the South China Sea to China, which is what administration officials fear will happen if Beijing continues on its current course. James R. Clapper, Mr. Obama’s director of national intelligence, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month that by early next year China would “have significant capacity to quickly project substantial military power to the region.”

That could mean that other countries might eventually need Beijing’s permission to traverse the heavily trafficked sea.

And so for the moment, the Obama administration is sending Navy patrols through the Spratlys and other disputed island chains in the region, to drive home the message that the sea is free to all. Some 700 American patrols have gone through in the past year, Navy officials say. Three weeks ago the aircraft carrier John C. Stennis and four other American warships sailed into the South China Sea for routine exercises, meant to convey the message, Pentagon officials said, that the United States is the dominant military power in the region.

Aboard the Chancellorsville last week, the minutes — and the tension — stretched out as the Chinese helicopter pilot refused to answer. The helicopter kept circling and eventually flew back to the Chinese frigate, which then continued toward the American warship. At the helm, Capt. Curt A. Renshaw, who had skipped his morning shower to race up to the bridge when the Chinese helicopter approached, huddled with his officers.

The day before, Captain Renshaw had warned the entire ship over the intercom that the Chancellorsville would be transiting through the Spratlys, and told the crew members to be on their toes and alert to trouble. He had been expecting the Chinese to show up — Beijing, in recent months, has taken to shadowing American warships that have dared to enter the South China Sea.

On a stand near the captain’s chair, a copy of “Jane’s Fighting Ships” was open to Page 144: “China Frigates.”

“You’ve ever been shadowed before?” Captain Renshaw asked Ensign Kristine Mun, a navigations officer. He turned to Ensign Niles Li, one of several officers who speak Chinese, and wondered aloud at the Chinese helicopter’s refusal to answer the radio message.

Finally, when the Chinese frigate was six miles away and clearly visible to the naked eye on the horizon, the ship-to-ship radio crackled with the sounds of accented English. “U.S. Navy Warship 62. ... This is Chinese Warship 575.”

And so began an elaborate diplomatic dance.

“This is U.S. Warship 62. Good morning, sir. It is a pleasant day at sea, over.”

No response.

“This is U.S. Warship 62. Good morning, sir. It is a pleasant day to be at sea, over.”

Henri K.

Prevent the Destruction of Scarborough Shoal

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by Guest Blogger for Elizabeth C. Economy
March 28, 2016


Boats at Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea are shown in this handout photo provided by Planet Labs, and captured on March 12, 2016. The head of U.S. naval operations, Admiral John Richardson said the U.S. military had seen Chinese activity around Scarborough Shoal in the northern part of the Spratly archipelago, about 125 miles (200 km) west of the Philippine base of Subic Bay. (Courtesy Reuters/Planet Labs).

Captain Sean R. Liedman currently serves as the U.S. Navy Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, he was the commander of Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing Eleven operating the P-8A and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. He has twice served in the Air Warfare Division on the Chief of Naval Operation’s staff and also as the executive assistant to the deputy commander of U.S. Central Command. The conclusions and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government.

Reuters reported on March 19 that the U.S. Navy had observed Chinese maritime survey activities around Scarborough Shoal that may be a precursor to reclamation activities similar to those executed by China on seven other maritime features in the Spratly Islands located more than three hundred and fifty nautical miles to the south. The U.S. response to China’s island building campaign in the Spratlys has been confined to calls to “halt the expansion and the militarization of occupied features” and maritime and aerial freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) to preserve freedom of access to the high seas and international airspace. However, the case of Scarborough Shoal is different as an arbitration case remains ongoing, and the United States and its allies and partners in the region should be prepared to use a broader range of the tools of statecraft to prevent similar ecological destruction and occupation of Scarborough Shoal by the Chinese.

On the heels of the Chinese seizure of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys in 1995, a U.S. State Department press briefing outlined the elements of a South China Sea policy that remains in place today. The briefing stated that the United States:

“strongly opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and urges all claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing actions,”
“has an abiding interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea,”
has “a fundamental interest” in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea,
“takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls, and cays in the South China Sea” and,
…would “view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).”
Therein lies the policy conundrum for the United States; while it continues to assert that it takes no position on the legal merits of any of the multitude of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, it also opposes the use or threat of force to resolve competing claims and any restrictions on maritime activity that are not consistent with UNCLOS. The Chinese seized Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in June 2012 in a strategic move that the Wall Street Journal labeled “Putinesque.” China employed a hybrid strategy of diplomatic ruse backed up by paramilitary forces that included the use of fishing vessels, China Marine Surveillance vessels, and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels to coerce the Filipinos into departing the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese have exerted de facto sovereign control over Scarborough Shoal ever since through the constant presence of China Marine Surveillance vessels that have resorted to ramming and using water cannons to eject any non-Chinese registered fishing vessels from the area. While no shots have been fired, Chinese behavior during the seizure and subsequent patrolling of Scarborough Shoal clearly violated the first and fifth U.S. policy principles listed above.

In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings at the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea’s Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to request rulings on fifteen submissions regarding UNCLOS disputes in the South China Sea. The PCA ruled in October 2015 that it has jurisdiction over seven of the fifteen submissions, including three key submissions regarding Scarborough Shoal:

“China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal”;
“China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal”;
“China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal”;
A PCA ruling is expected on those three submissions sometime during the summer of 2016. Allowing China to dredge, reclaim, and occupy Scarborough Shoal prior to the PCA ruling would completely undermine the first, second, and fifth policy principles outlined above and the broader U.S. principles of adherence to the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes through international mechanisms. In December 2014, China stated its policy position of “three no’s” in regards to the Philippines’ PCA filing: no acceptance of the filing, no participation in the proceedings, and no implementation of any findings. However, the PCA found that China’s non-participation does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 9 of Annex VII to UNCLOS which provides that: “Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.”

Finally, Scarborough Shoal has not been developed or reclaimed to date and remains a pristine part of the South China Sea ecosystem. China’s reclamation activities on the seven maritime features in the Spratlys have been labeled the “quickest rate of permanent loss of coral reef area in human history” with widespread environmental damage that is “irrecoverable and irreplaceable.” What is at stake at Scarborough Shoal is not simply preservation of an important regional ecosystem; the ecological destruction of Scarborough Shoal would constitute a gross violation of Article 145 of UNCLOS, which addresses the protection and conservation of the marine environment, and would further enable bad behavior around the globe with regard to international marine environmental protection law.

To date, the Chinese have incurred little strategic cost from their reclamation and occupation campaign in the South China Sea as the United States has sought to secure and preserve Chinese cooperation on broader strategic interests such as climate change, the desired denuclearization of Iran and North Korea, cyber theft, and fair trade and monetary policies. It is now time for the United States and regional allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea to accept more friction in their relationship with China and raise the cost/risk calculus for further Chinese expansion and occupation in the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal.

A strategy to prevent reclamation activities on Scarborough Shoal should begin with public diplomacy pronouncements that the United States will not permit the wanton destruction of Scarborough Shoal, backed up by private diplomatic communications that there could be serious consequences such as revoking the invitation for the Chinese to participate in RIMPAC 2016 and other regional security cooperation fora and exercises. If China fails to heed those diplomatic warnings and commences reclamation activities on Scarborough Shoal, there are a variety of non-lethal, covert means that the United States and its allies could utilize to disable the dredgers that the Chinese have employed in the Spratlys, including fouling the “cutter suction” mechanism or disrupting the continuity of the “floating sediment pipe” that delivers the dredged ocean bottom and coral fragments ashore.

Failing to prevent the destruction and Chinese occupation of Scarborough Shoal would generate further irreversible environmental damage in the South China Sea – and more importantly, further irreversible damage to the principles of international law. Finally, it would further consolidate the Chinese annexation and occupation of the maritime features in the South China Sea, which would be essentially irreversible in any scenario short of a major regional conflict.

Henri K.

Un article de l'US Naval Institute qui dit que la Chine serait en train d'installer un radar OTH (Over The Horizon) sur le récif de Cuarteron, dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

New Possible Chinese Radar Installation on South China Sea Artificial Island Could Put U.S., Allied Stealth Aircraft at Risk

Citation :

By: Sam LaGrone
February 22, 2016 3:19 PM • Updated: February 23, 2016 7:23 AM


A Jan. 24, 2016 image of Cuarteron Reef in the South China Sea with what is likely a high frequency radar array. CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, DigitalGlobe Image used with permission.

This post has been updated to include additional comments from the Department of Defense.

A possible new Chinese radar installation in the South China Sea could put American and allied stealth aircraft at risk as part of a wider detection network similar to U.S. efforts to find Russian bombers in the Cold War.

Late January satellite imagery from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and DigitalGlobe show the installation of what’s likely a high frequency radar installation the Chinese disputed holding of Cuarteron Reef near the Philippines.

The imagery from DigitalGlobe shows a field on the island with 65 foot-tall poles in a field on reclaimed land on the reef – China’s southern most holding in the region – that are similar to other maritime HF radars, Greg Poling, head of the center’s Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative told USNI News on Monday.

“Why would you have 20-meter poles spread across this features if it’s not high frequency radar? ” Poling said.
“Maybe a giant tarp?”

It’s unclear from the imagery if the site on Cuarteron is operational but the Department of Defense issued a statement to USNI News late Monday that lines up with some of CSIS’ conclusions.

“‎Commercial imagery indicates that China is constructing a new radar system on Cuarteron Reef a disputed feature in the South China Sea. This is part of a growing body of evidence that China continues to take unilateral actions which are increasing tensions in the region and are counterproductive to the peaceful resolution of disputes,” DoD spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban told USNI News late on Monday. ‎
“We discourage all claimants from unilateral actions. We encourage them to clarify their territorial and maritime claims in accordance with international law and request they commit to resolving their disputes through the use of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms, such as arbitration.”

The Washington Post first reported the installation early Monday afternoon.


A Jan. 24, 2016 image of Cuarteron Reef in the South China Sea with what is likely a high frequency radar array. CSIS, DigitalGlobe Image used with permission.

Bryan Clark, a maritime analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), said that while a high frequency radar on the island could have some law enforcement value – like similar radars the U.S. uses to detect drug runners in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean — it’s likely an HF radar on Cuarteron has a secondary military use to detect stealth aircraft.

Similar U.S. and Russian radars can detect surface targets at ranges well over the horizon – 80 to 200 miles. However Chinese and Russian versions could also notice the presence of low observable aircraft, Clark said.

“If I’m China, this is what I want to install so I can monitor maritime and aviation contacts,” he said.
“It’s got a nice dual use. It can find other aircraft that would be hard to find with traditional early warning radar frequencies.”

China has already installed similar radars on its coastline that are used to detect the presence of stealth aircraft.


A Jan. 24, 2016 image of Cuarteron Reef in the South China Sea with what is likely a high frequency radar array. CSIS, DigitalGlobe Image used with permission.

A possible HF array on Cuarteron could feed what its detects back to mainland China through data links to provide information to radars capable of better targeting stealth aircraft less real estate to scan and then route that data to anti-air warfare missile systems.

The setup “gives you some indications and warning that there are stealth aircraft in the area,” Clark said.

In particular, U.S. stealth aircraft – like the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bomber and Lockheed Martin’s F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter – are optimized against the high end of the radar spectrum.

Higher frequency radars – on their own — can tell when a low observable or stealth aircraft is in its range but do not have the fidelity to lock weapons. However — as reported by USNI News in 2014 — Russia and China both are perfecting lower band radar that could successfully target low observable aircraft working in conjunction with an HF early warning system. The radars could also provide information to Chinese fighters a general idea where to intercept an adversary.

In addition to the U.S., Australia and Japan are in the process of acquiring F-35s.

The U.S. used a similar idea when it create the Distant Early Warning line to detect Russian bombers starting in the late 1950s.

“It’s the same idea as the DEW Line,” Clark said of an HF array on Cuarteron.
“You could look at this as extending the range of their early warning radars.”

Chris Carlson, a retired U.S. Navy captain and analyst told USNI News that the installation on Cuarteron was much smaller than other similar mainland arrays and its unclear how well the secondary function of the radars would work at the size seen in the images released on Monday.

Additionally, given the location near the Philippines, the alleged HF installation on Cuarteron could also monitor U.S. aircraft movements in the country at long range — all in a package with which China can claim for civilian law enforcement uses, Clark said.

“They can say this is for fishery enforcement and maritime domain awareness and that’s what China will probably claim,” he said.

Beijing has repeatedly said the new installations on the reef, also home to a lighthouse completed in October, are to provide “better public services and goods for the international community,” according to a Monday press briefing with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying.

Last week satellite imagery of Woody Island in the Paracel chain near Vietnam revealed more than 30 mobile anti-air warfare missiles had been placed on the island – raising questions on China’s peaceful intent in the region.

Beijing implicitly defended the move of the HQ-9 system to Woody Island – confirmed last week by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

“The Chinese side is entitled to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” Hua said later in her Monday briefing.
“China’s deployment of limited defense facilities on its own territory is its exercise of self-defense right to which a sovereign state is entitled under international law. It has nothing to do with militarization. It is something that comes naturally, and is completely justified and lawful. The U.S. should view that correctly instead of making an issue of that with deliberate sensationalization [sic].”

La localisation du récif de Cuarteron, il se situe encore plus au sud du récif de Fiery Cross, où on peut trouver une piste de 3 000 m de longue.

Spoiler:

Qu'en pensez-vous ?

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Qu'en pensez-vous ?
Henri K.

si vis pacem para bellum

La Chine déploie ses oreilles et ses yeux..

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[…]
Qu'en pensez-vous ? […]

Citation :

[…] si vis pacem para bellum
La Chine déploie ses oreilles et ses yeux…

« […] La partie chinoise est en droit de sauvegarder sa souveraineté et ses droits et intérêts maritimes territoriaux » (dixit Hua, lundi).
« Le déploiement par la Chine des installations de défense limitées sur son propre territoire est l'exercice de son droit de légitime défense à laquelle un Etat souverain a le droit en vertu du droit international. Cela n'a rien à voir avec la militarisation. C'est quelque chose qui vient naturellement, et c'est totalement justifié et légitime. Les Étasuniens devraient voir cela correctement au lieu d'en faire tout une affaire avec un sensationnalisme délibéré. [sic] ».

Comme les Soviétiques autrefois se percevaient comme encerclés, les Tinois se sentent menacés (par la Puissance maritime) ; ils se donnent donc les moyens de répondre à la menace.
Jusqu'à quel point croient-ils eux-mêmes à cette menace, à court terme ?

3 bâtiments de la marine japonaise arrivent à la Baie de Subic aux Philippines

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Henri K.

Citation :

3 bâtiments de la marine japonaise arrivent à la Baie de Subic aux Philippines […]

Effectivement, ça confirme ce que nous apprenions par ailleurs

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La Chine inaugure un nouveau phare sur le récif de Subi le 5 Avril 2016. Le faisceau du phare est visible à 22 nm avec une périodicité de 5 seconds. Le phare est équipé d'un système AIS et d'une station VHF, pour fournir les services de localisation, de guidage et des informations de sécurité maritime aux navires qui naviguent dans la zone.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2016-04/06/c_1118537248.htm

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La dernière image satellite que j'ai sur le récif de Subi, elle date du 12 Mars 2016. On voit que les gros travaux sont presque terminés, la piste de 3000 m prend forme.

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La localisation du récif de Subi, dans les Spratleys

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La réaction de Mark C. TONER, porte-parole du Département d'État des États-Unis (équivalent du ministère des affaires étrangères) est... plus que marrant ??

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/04/255529.htm#CHINA

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QUESTION: China has begun an operation with the lighthouse on the Subi Reef in the South China Sea. Do you have any comment on that?

MR TONER: Aware of the reports. You’re talking about on the Subi Reef?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR TONER: Yeah. Well, this is, of course, a disputed area of the South China Sea, and I just would say that constructing new facilities in these areas risks exacerbating or escalating what is already a tense situation. So we’d urge China to focus on reaching an understanding with other claimants, as we often have, on acceptable behavior in these disputed areas.

QUESTION: Well, does that mean that you think that the lighthouse should be taken down?

MR TONER: Well --

QUESTION: One of your – I mean, I don’t know --

MR TONER: I think we have --

QUESTION: I’m not aware of the --

MR TONER: I think what we – sorry.

QUESTION: Do you know – do you know that a lighthouse has been constructed?

MR TONER: No, no. I said we’ve seen reports stating that they will begin operating a lighthouse.

QUESTION: Right. Okay. One of the reasons that you guys have taken an interest in this is – this area and expressed your concern about what the Chinese, and indeed the other claimants, are doing in terms of unilateral actions is for the protection and safety of maritime shipping zones. Now, it seems to me that a lighthouse is not an inherently provocative thing. It’s, in fact, there to be a safety measure. So I mean, do – should no lighthouses be allowed in the South China – on disputed areas in the South China Sea, even if they help with maritime safety?

MR TONER: No, but it’s unclear to us whether this is in the interest of maritime safety.

Henri K.

Citation :

La Chine inaugure un nouveau phare sur le récif de Subi le 5 Avril 2016. […]
La réaction de Mark C. TONER, porte-parole du Département d'État des États-Unis […] est… plus que marrant[e] ?? […]

Citation :

[…]
MR TONER : No, but it’s unclear to us whether this is in the interest of maritime safety.

[…]

Ce n'est pas tellement que sa réaction (ou sa réponse, ou son commentaire) soit "marrante" : elle dénote simplement de l'embarras…

Apparemment la position officielle des États-Unis sur ce sujet n'est ni claire ni arrêtée. Ce qui ne devrait pas nous surprendre de la part de l'Administration actuelle qui patauge copieusement, en particulier dans le domaine des Affaires étrangères. Les exemples abondent (Libye, Syrie, Ukraine, Turquie, UE).

L'une de mes sources chinoises m'indique ce matin que le remblaiement au récif de Scarborough a commencé. La triangularisation dans la mer de Chine méridionale, si les travaux se terminent, sera complétée.

Il est temps ensuite de créer une ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) dans cette zone à l'intérieur des 3 "piliers" - Les Paracels, les Spratleys et le Scarborough.

La localisation du récif de Scarborough :

Spoiler:

Henri K.

Citation :

[…] le remblaiement au récif de Scarborough a commencé. La triangularisation dans la mer de Chine méridionale, si les travaux se terminent, sera complétée.
Il est temps ensuite de créer une ADIZ […] dans cette zone à l'intérieur des 3 "piliers" […]

… et ainsi les joueurs de Go auront marqué définitivement leur territoire.

Pentagon: China deploys 16 fighter jets to disputed South China Sea island

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By Corey Dickstein
Stars and Stripes
Published: April 13, 2016

WASHINGTON — The Chinese have now deployed the largest number of fighter jets ever to Woody Island, one of the disputed South China Sea islands that they claim is their territory, a U.S. defense official said Wednesday.

China moved 16 Shenyang J-11 advanced fighter aircraft to Woody Island on April 7, said the defense official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly. He said such a large deployment was “unprecedented,” though it’s not the first time China has sent fighter jets to Woody Island, the largest landmass in the Paracel Islands, which are situated in the hotly disputed South China Sea region.

Positioning military aircraft on the island seems to contradict Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vow not to militarize the South China Sea, a statement he made while visiting Washington, D.C. in February.

U.S. officials have said such deployments, alongside the aggressive buildup of manmade islands throughout the South China Sea, threaten stability in the region. They have repeatedly called for China and other countries that claim disputed territory in the South China Sea, a key international shipping route, not to militarize the land in the area.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter is now in the Philippines, where he will visit bases that the United States considers critical to countering Chinese aggression in the region. The bases are about 100 miles east of the contested Spratly Islands, where China has used some 2,000 acres of landfill to bolster once-submerged reefs into islands.

Carter said the United States will invest in and deploy rotational American troops to the Philippines bases.

“It is important for all of the nations – China, the Philippines, Vietnam, others – not to engage in any unilateral steps of reclamation, of building, of militarization,” Secretary of State John Kerry said in February. “The fact is that there have been steps by China, by Vietnam, and by others that have unfortunately created an escalatory cycle.”

Woody Island has been under Chinese control since the 1950s, but it is also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam. China first built a runway capable of handling various military aircraft, including advanced fighter jets, in the 1990s. It expanded the runway in 2014.

The Pentagon has confirmed smaller-scale deployments of Chinese fighters to Woody Island in the past, including in November 2015 and more recently in February.

New information obtained by Pentagon officials suggests China could be further building up its military on Woody Island.

Satellite photos taken by ImageSat International appear to show a fire control radar system present on Woody Island, which would allow China to use the surface-to-air missile systems it deployed there in February. The imagery shows the surface-to-air missile systems on the east side of the island, with several missiles in firing position.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters in February that China was “deploying necessary, limited defensive facilities on its own territory.”

dickstein.corey@stripes.com
Twitter: @CDicksteinDC

Depuis Woody Island, le rayon d'action effectif des J-11BH et des J-11BSH de la marine chinoise couvre la totalité du ciel de la mer de Chine méridionale, avec un temps en air conséquent.

Spoiler:

Ils disposent bientôt 3 pistes opérationnelles de 3 000 m au récif de Subi, au récif de Fiery Cross et au récif de Mischief dans les Spratleys, pour étendre le champ d'intervention d'au moins 800 km sur la quasi-totalité de l'Indonésie et la moitié du péninsule Indochine jusqu'à Singapour et au détroit de Malacca.

Henri K.

Le 19 avril l'USAF (six avions) est passée dans les alentours de l'île Huangyan (récif de Scarborough je crois). La chine a formulé les protestations habituelles par la voie du ministère chinois de la Défense nationale:

http://french.xinhuanet.com/2016-04/26/c_135312576.htm

DahliaBleue a écrit:

MoiMoi a écrit:

[…] Une future base militaire à n'en pas douter. Une fois les infras prêtes, à la première provocation US ou autre [cela] déclenchera le déploiement d'avions de chasse / bombardiers. Je me demande si on verra des VLS installés dessus (pour des missiles sol-air / sol-mer) et du CIWS.

Pour la partie militaire, ils feront tout de même sans doute comme les Russes avec leurs S400 en Syrie : attendre une excuse qui justifie un déploiement défensif. Vu les agissements US, faudra à mon avis pas attendre longtemps, juste que les radars, potagé, casernements soient prêt. Les [Amé]ricains enverront un destroyer, un B52, la Chine dira : "oh mais non" et déploiera la composante militaire… […]

Le scénario est donc déjà connu , et la pièce quasiment jouée ! Aucune surprise à en attendre !

En effet, c'était prévisible, l'US Navy a encore envoyé un destroyer de la classe  Arleigh Burke (USS William P. Lawrence le 9 mai) dans les 12 nautiques du récif de Fiery Cross. Conséquence: le ministre de le ministère de la Défense nationale a déclaré que la patrouille justifie encore plus la construction par la Chine d'équipements de défense dans la région."

"Incident 'further justifies building of defense facilities'
Beijing expressed "resolute opposition" on Tuesday to a patrol by a United States warship in the South China Sea near Yongshu Reef in the Nansha Islands.
The Ministry of National Defense said the patrol only further justified China's construction of defense facilities in the area."

=> Source officielle du ministère de la défense chinoise: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-05/11/content_4655778.htm

Les US sont tout de même sévèrement "burné" (surtout stupide en fait) étant donné qu'il y a un exorcise dans la "même" zone (post https://forummarine.forumactif.com/t6044p300-information-entrainement-et-exercice-de-la-pla-navy) et que du coup le destroyer US a été fraichement accueilli "The Defense Ministry said China has dispatched vessels and aircraft, including two fighter jets and three warships, to identify the US vessel and warned it to leave."

MoiMoi a écrit:

En effet, c'était prévisible, l'US Navy a encore envoyé un destroyer de la classe  Arleigh Burke (USS William P. Lawrence le 9 mai) dans les 12 nautiques du récif de Fiery Cross. (...)

Cela se reproduira sûrement, vu que les Américains ont trouvé un nom à ce genre de déploiement : FONOP (Freedom Of Navigation Operation). D'habitude, quand ils donnent un nom à un type d'exercice ou d'opération, les Américains ont l'intention de les reproduire et ont édité un guide pour les réaliser.

Subi Reef le 20 mai, beaucoup de hangars en construction en bord de piste (en bas)....
Reste pas mal de taf à faire sur ce récif, mais ça avance, inexorablement...

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Fiery Cross le 21 avril :

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Pour ce rendre compte de la taille (avoir une échelle), sachez que les 2 petits navires le long de la piste sont un navire de ravitaillement 904B et une frégate 054A :

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Paracels: Zhaoshudao (Tree Island) subit aussi quelques aménagements :

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Je me demande bien ce qui se passe sur l'île juste à l'ouest de celle-ci car Google l'a censuré :

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Selon l'alerte de navigation chinoise MSA-2016-14163 / 琼航警0048 publiée par l'Administration de la sûreté maritime de Haïnan, un exercice naval aura lieu du 5 au 11 Juillet 2016 dans le Sud-Est de l'île de Haïnan.

On peut visualiser ici la zone associée qui sera interdite aux navires non cernés, elle représente environ 106 000km² et englobe la quasi-totalité des îles Paracels, contrôlées entièrement par la Chine depuis 1974 mais revendiquées encore par le Viêt Nam et le Taïwan, et dans les années 50' par la France qui avait envoyé des troupes débarquées sur certains îlots.

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La zone de l'exercice naval chinois du 5 au 11 Juillet : selon certaines sources chinoises, les trois flottes enverront un nombre important de navires de guerre pour y participer.

A noter qu'en Septembre 1958, le chef de l'état du Viêt Nam du Nord avait accepté la souveraineté de la Chine dans les Paracels, et ce jusqu'en 1974 quand Viêt Cong finit de conquérir tout pays. La Bataille des îles Paracels en 1974 entre la marine chinoise et la marine vietnamienne du Sud a permis à la Chine d'affirmer sa présence sur l'ensemble de ces îles jusqu'à présent.

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Phạm Văn Đồng, premier ministre du Viêt Nam du Nord en 1958, envoie une lettre à son homologue chinois et notifie que le Viêt Nam du Nord accepte la déclaration de souveraineté de la Chine dans la région.

Cet exercice naval de la marine chinoise qui survient avant la tombée du verdict de la Cour d'arbitrage de La Haye le 12 Juillet, bien que la Chine ne reconnaît pas les compétences de cette Cour dans l'affaire, a suscité quelques réactions notamment côté américain, qui pensent qu'il s'agit d'un message envoyé aux pays de la région.

J'ignore si la Chine veut envoyer un message à quiconque avec cet exercice naval, sachant que depuis 2012 la marine chinoise mène souvent des exercices d'envergure dans la région à partir du mois de Juin jusqu'en Septembre, mais personnellement je penche plutôt vers l'hypothèse que les flottes chinoises vérifient leur capacité à protéger et à escorter les SNLE de Type 094 pour entrer dans le Pacifique de l'Ouest, en empruntant le détroit de Bashi.

L'incident qui a eu lieu en Août 2014 entre un P-8 de l'US Navy et un avion de chasse J-11BH de la marine chinoise est directement lié à l'accès des SNLE chinois dans le Pacifique de l'Ouest. Et les sources internes chinoises indiquent que toute la partie à l'Est de l'île de Haïnan est souvent sujet de rencontres peu amicales pour la marine chinoise, sans donner plus de détails.

Quoiqu'il en soit, la diffusion sélective des informations de certains médias fait que l'on a oublié de mentionner aussi que, depuis le 21 Juin, le Viêt Nam a entamé une vaste opération de sondages sous-marins dans la mer de Chine méridionale pour une durée indéterminée, annoncée à travers la notification HYDROPAC 1862/16. Cette zone se trouve justement entre la zone de l'exercice naval chinois et les îles fortifiées chinoises dans les Spratleys.

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L'exercice chinois (en jaune), l'opération vietnamienne (en rouge), et les Spratleys

Le mois de Juillet s'annonce très festif, dans tous les sens du terme...

Henri K.

En faisant mon suivi journalier de NOTAMs ce matin, deux entre eux nous apprennent peut-être un peu plus sur le contenu de l'exercice naval chinois qui aura lieu du 5 au 11 Juillet autour des îles Paracels, dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

Le NOTAM A1606/16 interdit l'accès aérien à une zone 97 000km² sous le plafond de 28 000m, du 8 au 10 Juillet. Cette zone se superpose pratiquement avec celle en mer que j'ai parlé hier. On peut les voir ici :

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En jaune la zone aérienne délimitée par le NOTAM A1606/16 sous 28 000m d'altitude, en blanc celle de MSA-2016-14163 / 琼航警0048 sur mer

Le NOTAM A1607/16, quant à lui, ferme quelques couloirs aériens et déroute d'autres vols sur la même période que l'A1606/16 :

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Le NOTAM A1607/16

L'élément qui a attiré mon attention est sur le plafond de 28 000m d'altitude. Il est bien plus élevé que n'importe quel avions de chasse chinois peut atteindre, il est donc logique de penser que non seulement les forces aériennes vont participer à l'exercice, mais des missiles Sol-Air et/ou Surface-Air vont être tirés.

Mais, lesquels ?

L'exercice est à priori mené par la marine chinoise, même s'il n'est pas exclus que les autres forces d'armées comme l'armée de l'air ou l'armée de terre puissent y participer, mais les seuls points "à terre" qu'on voit sur les zones de l'exercice se situent sur les îles Paracels, et c'est la marine qui s'occupe de leur défense. Il faut donc orienter la question sur les missiles Surface-Air de la marine chinoise, à savoir le H/HQ-7, HQ-9, H/HQ-9, H/HQ-10, HQ-16 et HQ-61.

Les seuls qui sont capables d'atteindre, ou presque, les 28 000m ce sont le HQ-9 et H/HQ-9.

J'en déduis donc que du 8 au 10 Juillet, la marine chinois va procéder à des tirs réels de HQ-9 depuis les îles Paracels, et/ou de H/HQ-9 depuis les destroyers de Type 052C et Type 052D.

Le média Fox News a publié un article en Février cette année qui dit que la Chine a déployé les batteries de HQ-9 ainsi que les missiles de défense côtière YJ-62 sur Woody Island, qui détient la plus grande installation chinoise sur les îles Paracels. On peut donc imaginer que c'est là où les missiles partiront.

L'information du déploiement et cet exercice de tir me poussent d'avantage vers l'hypothèse que la marine chinoise continue à sécuriser l'accès vers la zone de patrouille de ses forces de dissuasion nucléaire dans le Pacifique de l'Ouest, à travers le détroit de Bashi. Les HQ-9 déployés à Woody Island constituent une excellente défense anti-aérienne sur un poste avancé et protègent le départ des SNLE chinois depuis la base de Sanya, situé au Sud de l'île de Haïnan, des regards indiscrets notamment de l'US Navy en provenance des Philippines.

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La portée oblique de HQ-9 à 200km (en rouge) oblige les forces ASW aériennes américaines à contourner la zone, et à parcourir une plus grande distance donc moins de temps en air, pour pouvoir détecter le départ des SNLE chinois depuis la base de Yalong. En vert la route de navigation possible d'un SNLE de Type 094.

Le plafond limité à 28 000m me laisser penser également que l'une des priorités de ces tirs est pour évaluer la couche haute du domaine de vol du missile (la zone JORQ sur le schéma en bas), donc non pas pour contre les cibles volant à basse altitude comme les missiles de croisière en phase terminale, mais plutôt les engins de reconnaissance comme les HALE et les spécifiques...

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Domaine de vol d'un missile SAM

On attendra bien évidemment les publications officielles pour confirmer tout ceci.

Henri K.

100 Navires de guerre chinois dans un exercice en mer de Chine méridionale

http://www.eastpendulum.com/100-navire-de-guerre-chinois-mer-de-chine-meridionale

Henri K.