[Information] Conflits dans la Mer de Chine Méridionale

Intéressant cette fouille archéologique, dommage qu'il n'y ait pas de traduction.

Henri K. a écrit:

La fouille archéologique de l'épave d'un navire marchant de la dynastie Song continue, il a été découvert et repêché dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

[…]

marchant… à la voile ?

Les journalistes de CCTV ont suivi un navire de la marine chinoise qui ravitaille les 3 îlots des Spratleys avant le nouvel an chinois.

1ère étape : le récif Mischief



2ème étape : le récif de Fiery Cross



3ème et dernière étape : le récif de Subi



Henri K.

La mer de Chine méridionale vue par les Japonais :

China’s Activities in the South China Sea (22 December 2015)

http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_20151222e.pdf

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

La mer de Chine méridionale vue par les Japonais :
China’s Activities in the South China Sea (22 December 2015)
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_20151222e.pdf […]

Très intéressante étude. Même si l'emploi des caractères (police) gras et rouge est un peu… agressif (pour les yeux, et pour la pensée…
Et tout en anglais.

Installation de missile HQ-9 chinois sur l'ilot de "Woody Island" ?
http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/02/17/pekin-degaine-des-missiles-en-mer-de-chine-meridionale_1433922

2 choses :

J'ai lu ça dans le texte français -

Citation :

Il s’agirait d’un système chinois de défense aérienne de type Hongqi-9, susceptible de frapper un avion civil ou militaire, un navire ou un autre missile dans un rayon de 200 kilomètres.

Ensuite j'ai vu cette photo à la source sur le site de Foxnews -

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/02/16/exclusive-china-sends-suface-to-air-missiles-to-contested-island-in-provocative-move.html



Et... et bien... voilà...

Pour rajouter aussi ce que j'ai lu dans les différents forums, à propos le fait que les Américains annoncent qu'ils vont envoyer encore plus de navires faire de la FON dans la mer de Chine méridionale, et que "les îlots ne nous empêcheront pas de le faire", les internautes chinois ont répondus : "Plus vous venez, plus il y aura des îlots fortifiés. Et, ce n'est pas vos navires qui nous empêcheront de remblayer les récifs, non plus..."



Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

[…] dans les différents forums, à propos [du] fait que les Américains annoncent qu'ils vont envoyer encore plus de navires faire de la FON dans la mer de Chine méridionale, et que "les îlots ne nous empêcheront pas de le faire", les internautes chinois ont répondus : "Plus vous venez, plus il y aura des îlots fortifiés. Et, ce n'est pas vos navires qui nous empêcheront de remblayer les récifs, non plus…" : tele: […]

On comprend à cela qu'il s'agit bien d'assouvir une revendication (fondée ou non).
Tant que ça reste au niveau d'un dialogue de forumeurs (qui, a priori, ne sont pas des porte-paroles officiels) ça ne prête pas trop à conséquences. C'est du niveau conversation du Café du Commerce…

Henri K. a écrit:

2 choses :

J'ai lu ça dans le texte français -

Citation :

Il s’agirait d’un système chinois de défense aérienne de type Hongqi-9, susceptible de frapper un avion civil ou militaire, un navire ou un autre missile dans un rayon de 200 kilomètres.

Ensuite j'ai vu cette photo à la source sur le site de Foxnews -
[...]

Et... et bien... voilà...

[...]
Henri K.

MoiMoi a écrit:

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Le scénario est donc déjà connu , et la pièce quasiment jouée ! Aucune surprise à en attendre !

En effet.

Tu vois DahliaBleue, le scenario se déroule et en effet, si ce déploiement est confirmé, cela n'est pas une surprise

Si, en plus, il fallait prendre en compte l'avis des "forumeurs", on ne serait pas sorti de l'auberge! En général, ils sont les premiers à réclamer des mesures radicales, voire extrêmes, puis à s'insurger sur leur exécution! Dans le cas évoqué...Viens voir de quel bois je me chauffe! , qu'ils soient chinois, inuites ou hottentots, ils seraient les premiers à "chouiner" sur les conséquences de l'éventuelle réplique.
Il est facile de se la jouer Matamore derrière son écran de PC, beaucoup moins quand on se prend les pêlots sur la tronche. Heureusement qu'il existe des gens raisonnables dans les états-majors et les services diplomatiques. Cela dit, j'ai constaté que les populations toujours soumises au service militaire obligatoire, telles que, sauf erreur, les russes et chinois, deviennent beaucoup plus mesurées, après l'avoir effectué (d'autant plus que sa durée est longue). Le "va-t'en-guerre" existe, à très petite échelle, chez le militaire, mais fait flores chez le civil qui n'a jamais (encore) foutu les pieds dans un caserne. Deux ou trois tours de cour au pas de gymnastique, avec un flingot à bout de bras, sac au dos, quelques corvées de chiottes et de patates, plus des tours de garde sous la pluie glaciales, ont fortement tendance à, heureusement, calmer les volontés belliqueuses et velléitaires.

L'exemple des forumeurs montre simplement une partie de l'opinion générale. Globalement on connait la suite de l'événement, comme dirait quelqu'un : "Tu fais ta guerre, et moi la mienne".

Ce que moi je constate, est surtout qu'il y a beaucoup de pays qui parlent beaucoup et qui ne font pas grande chose, et les plus grands parlent peu et continuent à avancer dans du concret : l'un sur les FON, l'autre sur les îlots.

En fin de compte, c'est ça qui est important : le faire, pas le dire...

Si je dois rajouter une philosophie que je crois dur comme fer, que ce soit au niveau diplomatique ou dans les affaires, c'est bien : "La vérité n'existe que dans la portée du canon".

Et j'aime particulièrement la phrase d'un diplomate chinois qu'il a dit à un général de l'armée : "Ce que vous n'arrivez pas à obtenir avec vos fusils, ne rêvez pas qu'on y parvienne avec nos salives."

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Et j'aime particulièrement la phrase d'un diplomate chinois qu'il a dit à un général de l'armée : "Ce que vous n'arrivez pas à obtenir avec vos fusils, ne rêvez pas qu'on y parvienne avec nos salives."

Henri K.

Cette réponse date, très surement, du temps où la Chine n'avait pas, encore, accédé au statut de seconde puissance économique mondiale et première, en termes de dettes.
De toute manière, la Chine, qu'elle soit impériale ou communiste, n'a, quasiment, jamais eu de volonté expansionniste - si ma mémoire est bonne, dans des temps très reculés, il y avait eu une tentative de "débarquement" au Japon, anéantie par l'arrivée d'un cyclone -.
Elle souhaite juste qu'on ne vienne pas l'enquiquiner, ce que, nous, les européens, n'avons cessé de faire, durant plusieurs décennies, et ces ilots, sans intérêt, ne sont qu'une occasion de le rappeler.

Henri K. a écrit:

[…] En fin de compte, c'est ça qui est important : le faire, pas le dire[…]

Ce qui relativise évidemment l'importance des palabres diplomatiques dont nous avions précédemment signalé l'hypocrisie.

Citation :

[…] Si je dois rajouter une philosophie que je crois dur comme fer, que ce soit au niveau diplomatique ou dans les affaires, c'est bien : "La vérité n'existe que dans la portée du canon". […]

Cette maxime (méconnue) doit avoir le même sens que « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure. »

Citation :

[…] Et j'aime particulièrement la phrase d'un diplomate chinois qu'il a dite à un général de l'armée : "Ce que vous n'arrivez pas à obtenir avec vos fusils, ne rêvez pas qu'on y parvienne avec nos salives."[…]

En cela, ce (sage) diplomate connaissait bien la maxime précédente.

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Citation :

[…] Si je dois rajouter une philosophie que je crois dur comme fer, que ce soit au niveau diplomatique ou dans les affaires, c'est bien : "La vérité n'existe que dans la portée du canon". […]

Cette maxime (méconnue) doit avoir le même sens que « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure. »

Cette maxime, méconnue comme tu dis, est avant tout allemande : Otto von Bismarck, 1862.

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

[…] Cette maxime, méconnue […] est avant tout allemande : Otto von Bismarck, 1862.[…]

C'est sans doute une traduction libre de Macht ist Recht, ou encore de Diplomatie ohne Waffen ist Musik ohne Instrumente

Mais qui rejoignent bien celle de « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure ».

DahliaBleue a écrit:

C'est sans doute une traduction libre de Macht ist Recht, ou encore de Diplomatie ohne Waffen ist Musik ohne Instrumente

Mais qui rejoignent bien celle de « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure ».

Non.

Henri K.

Citation :

[…]  "La vérité n'existe que dans la portée du canon". […]

Citation :

[…] C'est sans doute une traduction libre de Macht ist Recht, ou encore de Diplomatie ohne Waffen ist Musik ohne Instrumente : scratch:[…]

Citation :

[…] Non.[…]

Alors je n'ai pas dû la traduire correctement.

"Die Wahrheit existiert nur in der Gewehr".

Elle est de toute façon moins usitée que « La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure » ; à moins qu'elle n'ait pas le même sens ?

Citation :

Non. […]

Deux autres citations possibles, avec un sens voisin (surtout la seconde) :

• Es reicht hin, eine Behauptung mit Sicherheit auszusprechen, um sie für die Wahrheit aussprechen zu dürfen.
  
• Lügen können Kriege in Bewegung setzen, Wahrheit hingegen kann ganze Armeen aufhalten.
  

Quelques réactions côté chinois :

Le porte-parole du Ministère des affaires étrangères dans la conférence de presse hebdomadaire : "Je ne connais pas la situation en détail, mais je tiens à souligner que les îles Paracels font partie intégrante du territoire chinois, la Chine a le droit de déployer des installations défensives sur son sol, il n'y a donc rien à voir avec la militarisation que vous mentionnez."
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1341284.shtml

Le Ministre chinois des affaires étrangères, qui est en discussion stratégique avec son homologue australien actuellement à Pékin, rappelle la légitimité de la Chine de déployer de manière limitée mais nécessaire les installations défensives sur son sol. Il demande au média étranger de ne pas oublier de communiquer également sur les nouvelles installations facilitant la navigation dans la mer de Chine méridionale, comme les phares, les stations de prévision météo locales, les refuges aux typhons pour les navires de pêche...etc, qui sont mis à disposition de l'ensemble des pays de la région.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1341214.shtml

Le Ministère chinois de la Défense précise dans un communiqué que : "Les dispositifs défensifs sur ces îles existent depuis plusieurs années, la spéculation de certains médias de l'Ouest n'est qu'un ancien refrain de la menace chinoise".  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-02/17/c_128728061.htm

Henri K.

Satellite Images: China Manufactures Land at New Sites in the Paracel Islands

Citation :

A new helicopter base is seen for the first time at Duncan Island in the South China Sea.

By Victor Robert Lee
February 13, 2016

Spoiler:

Satellite images show dredging and land filling by China at two new sites in the South China Sea, both in the Amphitrite group of the Paracel Islands, approximately 15 kilometers north-northwest of China’s military base at Woody (Yongxing) Island.

Also newly visible is a helicopter base under construction at Duncan Island, another site in the Paracels, suggesting that Beijing may develop a network of bases in the South China Sea to support anti-submarine warfare helicopters, such as its recently deployed ASW Z-18F.

Spoiler:

The most recent dredging, which began sometime after December 2, 2015, is creating new terrain on the reef adjacent to North Island, held by the PRC since 1950. 5.5 kilometers northwest of North Island, at China-occupied Tree Island, a cutter suction dredger can be seen expanding a port area and piping sediment onto a new area of land fill. A series of satellite images indicates that the dredging at Tree Island began sometime after October 18, 2015.

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

North Island and Tree Island are both part of wide and shallow reef complexes extending for more than eight kilometers each, and they offer much larger surface areas for exploitation than those available at Woody Island, China’s main installation in the Paracels and the location of China’s first airport in the South China Sea (called the East Sea by Vietnam and the West Philippine Sea by the Philippines).

Woody Island, which hosts two harbors, numerous radomes, and many new buildings adjacent to an airfield that was significantly expanded in 2014-2015, is crowded and small compared to the installations, including runways, being built by China at Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratlys, where continuous stretches of curved and straight reef 10 and 14 kilometers long, respectively, have been buried under sand. And China’s new base under construction at Fiery Cross Reef, though only roughly the size of Woody (three square kilometers), already appears to be more sophisticated; extensive structures, likely to serve as water capture reservoirs and fuel bunkers, have been dug into the coral substrate at Fiery Cross and covered with a protective layer of sand, as seen in imagery from January 8, 2016.

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

The Paracels, all of which are claimed by Vietnam, Taiwan, and China, were partially occupied by Vietnam until 1974, when China took control of the Crescent Group in a battle with Vietnamese forces. China has since controlled all of the Paracels, although the archipelago continues to be disputed. Recently in the news due to the passage of the destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur near Triton Island, at the southwest extremity of the Paracels, this quadrant of the South China Sea is also where China briefly positioned its oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in 2014, resulting in vigorous protests from Vietnam that its sovereignty had been infringed.

In addition to the ongoing expansion of its facilities at Woody Island, China pulled sand from the sea bottom to increase by 50 percent the area of Duncan Island in the Crescent Island group of the Paracels, expanding a protected harbor there and currently building a helicopter base on the island, with eight designated landing zones in place and four others likely to be completed soon.

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

This new helicopter base, apparently reported here for the first time, could signal a step-up in China’s ASW capabilities across the South China Sea. A network of helicopter bases and refueling stops scattered across the South China Sea, using no more than the bases China is already known to be building, would make almost any coordinate in the sea reachable by a helicopter like the Z-18F within two hours. (The Z-18 parent of the Z-18F is reported to have a ferry range of 1,600 km, combat radius of more than 500 km, and maximum speed of 336 km/hour.) By hopscotching between bases, the helicopter fleet would be unconstrained by fuel range or limited numbers of ship-borne landing berths, creating a continuous and contiguous web of surveillance and response capability.

Such a web would have utility beyond anti-submarine warfare, and would probably reshape surface ship and aerial combat strategies in the region.

Spoiler:

The recent developments at Tree, North, and Duncan islands indicate that Beijing is augmenting its position in the Paracels, which have been overshadowed of late by China’s epic construction projects in the Spratlys.

The images presented here, of new dredging and land fill at North and Tree Islands in the Paracels, may appear to show insignificant small spots of beige sand surrounded by a vast expanse of blue sea, but this is precisely how China started its swift conversion of Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross reefs into large, artificial islands housing multi-purpose bases with far-reaching strategic implications.

Victor Robert Lee reports on the Asia-Pacific region and is the author of the espionage novel Performance Anomalies.

Henri K.

China's HQ-9 Missile Placement Underlines Pentagon Focus on A2/AD

Citation :

By Aaron Mehta, Defense News 3:45 p.m. EST February 19, 2016

WASHINGTON — When unveiling the Pentagon’s fiscal 2017 budget request, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter highlighted the challenge presented by China as one of “our most stressing competitors.”

“We're making all these investments that you see in our defense budget that are specifically oriented toward checking the development of the Chinese military,” Carter said Feb 2.

Two weeks later, China has now set up a pair of HQ-9 air defense systems on Woody Island, part of the Paracels chain of islands in the South China Sea. The move is the latest in a series of Chinese actions to assert dominance in the region, including rapid growth of a series of artificial platforms in the Spratley Islands, territory claimed by five other neighbors, including nearby Vietnam.

The weapons' placement also comes after the US has conducted a series of “freedom of navigation” exercises near the Spratleys, which officials have said explicitly are being done to prove to China that the territory remains in international waters.

Ben FitzGerald of the Center for a New American Security agrees that the HQ-9s by themselves “won’t impede” American capabilities in the region, but adds that the deployment “confirms the Pentagon’s concerns that this is an emerging concept that will be replicated throughout the region, which would impose significant operational challenges on US Forces.”

China’s actions “certainly support the rationale” that the Pentagon is right to focus on the Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) challenge, FitzGerald added.

The Pentagon’s fiscal 2017 request included around $3 billion in A2/AD technology development as part of the third offset strategy championed by Carter and Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work. It also features a heavy focus on taking existing munitions, such as the Tomahawk weapon, and adding new capabilities.

Such technologies would be key in defeating systems such as the HQ-9 in the event of a direct conflict, with US forces either needing to launch weapons while staying out of the roughly 125 mile radius of the system’s missiles or relying on stealthy planes such as the F-35 joint strike fighter to penetrate the protected airspace.

While that range is not devastating to American capabilities, the deployment of the system, along with its “advanced radar capabilities for targeting, again support the Pentagon’s narrative of challenges associated with competitors possessing precision weapons,” FitzGerald noted.

Robert Martinage, a former undersecretary of the Navy now with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, says the weapon placement is not a game-changer in and of itself, but “it could be the canary in the coalmine, a harbinger of what’s to come.”

If China expands its deployment of advanced defenses, Martinage said, it would have “significant operational implications” for the US and its allies. In peacetime, it could lead to China painting US planes with radar, increasing the risk of an incident; in a combat situation, it would put nearby assets at direct risk.

It also includes political impacts, Martinage added, noting it is “just another step in [China’s] game.”

“Little incremental provocations ... ultimately lead to where they want to go, which is asserting their sovereignty over most of the South China Sea,” he said. “The question is, What do we do about it? I think we continue to do the freedom of movement navigations. But beyond that there’s not a whole lot we can do. It’s a little of a fait accompli, and the question is what’s next.”

Henri K.

J'ai pissé de rire tout à l'heure en regardant le Daily Press Briefing du département d'État du 18 Février, notamment l'échange entre le journaliste d'Associated Press Matthew Lee et John KIRBY, porte-parole du département d'État et ancien contre-amiral de l'US Navy, autour des sujets de la mer de Chine méridionale.

C'est juste extra... Notamment le point de vue qui dit que déployer des missiles SAM (je ne sais plus si je peux qualifier un SAM défensif...) c'est de la militarisation, mais envoyer un destroyer s'y frotter c'est "juste" de la FON.

Et bien sûr, le passage où KIRBY s'est trouvé un peu coincé et n'a rien mieux trouvé que de rétorquer avec : "Tu te sens bien de parler pour le gouvernement chinois".

C'est juste extra...

http://video.state.gov/en/video/4762948416001

Citation :

QUESTION: South China Sea. A couple of questions. Yesterday, several senior officials, including Secretary Kerry, yesterday said placing the missile in South China Sea by China – they implied that China didn’t live up to its commitment not to militarize South China Sea. And he also mentioned when President Xi Jinping – when he was in the Rose Garden with President Obama, made the commitment, no militarization in South China Sea. However, when you go back to the transcript, the Chinese president didn’t mention South China Sea as a whole; he was specifically referred to Spratly Islands per se. So do you make distinction between the Spratly Island Chinese president make, and the islands that – where China placed the missiles?

MR KIRBY: I think that’s a lot of dancing on the head of a pin. And it isn’t just President Xi’s comments that lead us to the view that China has said that they don’t intend to militarize. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said as much in his meetings with Secretary Kerry, and they were specifically talking about the South China Sea. So I know we often go back to President Xi’s comments, but those comments have been echoed by other Chinese leaders, too, with respect to the South China Sea. So I think we’re on pretty firm ground in terms of being able to say that the Chinese have said one thing and, yet, appear to be doing another. And as the Secretary said yesterday, we see no indication that that sort of effort, this militarization effort, has stopped. And it’s doing nothing, as we’ve said before, to make the situation there more stable and more secure. In fact, it’s having quite the opposite effect.

QUESTION: But Mark yesterday, he said – he answered to Matt’s question, he said – will the U.S. send any warships and fighter jets to South China Sea – “it’s not militarization but freedom of navigation.” Why can’t the U.S. send commercial ships to South China Sea to exercise freedom of navigation instead of sending warships? And how do you define militarization?

MR KIRBY: Okay. All right, let’s take this one piece by piece. First of all, having a ship, whether it’s a warship or otherwise, sail in international waters to get from point A to point B, or even just simply demonstrate that you can do that in international waters, is a far cry from putting missile systems or artillery pieces hard on a beach that have a semi-permanent or if not permanent presence. That’s different. And who exactly are these pieces of artillery designed to shoot at? Who?

A ship – a Navy ship operating in international waters is completely within international law. We have – our Navy has a fundamental obligation to represent our interests around the world and to support freedom of navigation, and will continue – as the Secretary has said and I believe Secretary Carter has said, we’re going to continue to fly, sail, and operate in international airspace and international maritime space as needed to do what we need to do to protect our national interests in that part of the world as we do in any other part of the world. That is a far different exercise of military – of the military instrument of power than is the emplacement on basically fabricated territory of artillery pieces.

QUESTION: But that Woody Island – that island in the south where the missiles are, actually it’s a natural island.

MR KIRBY: Okay, so it’s a natural island. I’m not going to dispute geography with you. But putting surface-to-air missile systems there, I don’t know how you can look at that and say that’s not militarization. Now what do – now what some people say is, well, it’s self-defense. Self-defense against who? What’s the purpose for it? And – okay, so it’s clearly a militarization of a piece of beach that prior to didn’t have military weapons systems on it.

QUESTION: But the Chinese defense minister was arguing that, first of all, those missiles, those weapons have been on that island for years. And secondly, China actually regard that island as their territory. So it’s just --

MR KIRBY: They regard – they seem to regard quite a bit as their territory, as I understand it.

QUESTION: But talking about where the missiles are on that particular island, China regard it as its sovereignty. And it’s just like the U.S. has right to put weapons on Guam.

MR KIRBY: Yeah, but you have to make these decisions in place and time as well, and there’s enough tension right now in the South China Sea over these disputed claims that we continue to believe militarization of – whether they’re manmade or natural features – is not conducive to lowering the tensions. And it certainly has no role in what we believe should be the solution, which is work these things out – these claims – diplomatically and through international law, through an international process.

So whether it’s manmade or not, whether it’s – whether there have been in the past years systems – weapon systems put on these features or not – again, irrelevant. You have to consider it in place and time now.

QUESTION: John --

MR KIRBY: And so we have an obligation – back to your question about the Navy – we have an obligation, as we do everywhere around the world, to exercise freedom of navigation in accordance with international law. And every mission that we have conducted thus far in the South China Sea has been in accordance with those international obligations.

QUESTION: Regardless if --

QUESTION: John, are --

QUESTION: -- China have the sovereignty and the administration rights on the island or not?

MR KIRBY: You have to put it in place and time. And in so many of these cases, the sovereignty is an issue of dispute. But let’s just say hypothetically that the sovereignty wasn’t in dispute. You still have to put the militarization in context of the tensions which are going on right now.

QUESTION: John.

MR KIRBY: Yeah.

QUESTION: One other thing the Secretary said yesterday was they’re going to have high-level discussions with the Chinese. Are you aware if those have happened? And regardless if they have or haven’t, are you aware of any Chinese officials telling Americans that – American officials that, indeed, yes, that this missile system is in place and has been in place on this island?

MR KIRBY: I’m not aware of either. I’m not aware of either.

QUESTION: So the premise in the question is that the Chinese have said, yeah, they’re there. You’re not aware if the Chinese --

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: -- have said that to you?

MR KIRBY: I’m not.

QUESTION: Okay. But the other thing is, is that you can make the argument that your sailing – that the U.S. sailing military ships and flying military planes into this region/area is simply an exercise of – is an exercise of U.S. national interest and promoting or protecting freedom of navigation. But surely, you can understand that from the Chinese perspective, it raises tensions, no?

MR KIRBY: I was waiting. I thought there was more to your question.

QUESTION: Surely you can understand, yes or no, that from the Chinese perspective, that is also militarization and it raises tensions?

MR KIRBY: It’s not militarization, and the Chinese have expressed their concerns about it, but our answer to it is simply that these are --

QUESTION: “We’re right and you’re wrong.”

MR KIRBY: No.

QUESTION: That’s – well, no, that literally --

MR KIRBY: No, no, no.

QUESTION: This is the part – it may very well be that the U.S. military, when it goes and it sails around these islands in a time of heightened tensions is acting --

MR KIRBY: Which are heightened why? Which are heightened why, Matt?

QUESTION: Well, what – it doesn’t matter why they’re heightened.

MR KIRBY: Yes, it does matter why they’re heightened.

QUESTION: Look, it may very well be the case that this is purely innocent and not military, but that’s not the way it is seen --

MR KIRBY: I never said it was innocent.

QUESTION: -- by the other side.

MR KIRBY: Never said it was innocent. The United States has --

QUESTION: It’s not a threat?

MR KIRBY: -- five of seven – five of seven of our security treaties are in the Pacific – five of seven.

QUESTION: Mm-hmm. And none of them cover this specific area.

MR KIRBY: And we have – well, I think --

QUESTION: They could if sovereignty ever was – was ever decided over these places.

MR KIRBY: We have serious treaty obligations and security commitments in the Asia Pacific region. The situation is growing tense. I don’t disagree with your analysis there. And the chief reason is because of the fabrication of manmade features --

QUESTION: Okay.

MR KIRBY: -- by China and the militarization of them. That’s the chief reason. So let’s be clear about why things are getting tense or not. And we have significant obligations – obligations that, because they’re security treaties, must be backed up with a robust and healthy military presence.

QUESTION: Well, that’s fine, but --

MR KIRBY: And that is what – and that is what the military is doing.

QUESTION: Your treaty obligations to the Philippines, to whoever else, do not include areas that are not under their sovereignty. They don’t include the area – these kinds of areas.

MR KIRBY: Whoa, whoa, whoa. No, no, no.

QUESTION: And unless I’m mistaken, the United States has never ratified the Law of the Sea – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

MR KIRBY: But we still act in accordance with it, even though it hasn’t been ratified. We still live up to it. And Matt, the obligations that we have – the treaty obligations – they’re not defined by geographic – specific geographic GPS coordinates, okay? We have an obligation to the Philippines, we have an obligation to Japan, we have an obligation to South Korea. Yes, those are nation-states and yes, they have geography, but the treaties themselves don’t say that you’re only going to defend them in this part of the water and not another part of the water.

QUESTION: Okay. But I guess my question is, though, is that if – it may – you’re demanding that the Chinese accept your explanation on this, just as you demand that other countries, like Russia, demand – accept your explanation for NATO moving towards the East as not being a threat. But they perceive it as such, and that – and because they perceive it as such, that raises tensions. So I don’t understand how it is you can – they’re – tensions are not just being raised because of Chinese militarization or the reclamation of land there. They’re also being raised by the response.

Now, chicken-or-egg question it is not, yes. But the fact of the matter is the tensions are rising, and when you sail military ships or put military aircraft in there, it doesn’t reduce the tension. It just makes the tension rise more. And I don’t see why --

MR KIRBY: The tension with China I think (inaudible) --

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Right.

MR KIRBY: -- because our allies and partners, I think, find pretty comforting and reassuring U.S. military presence in the region, which will continue, okay?

QUESTION: Okay. But you don’t have tensions with that.

MR KIRBY: So let’s talk about whose tensions we’re talking about, and I think it’s great that you feel comfortable speaking for the Chinese Government. I don’t, so I won’t – I won’t – I won’t --

QUESTION: (Laughter.) I’m not speaking for the Chinese Government.

MR KIRBY: I’m not going to characterize how they’re viewing each and every flight or navy ship that sails through the South China Sea. But you said it’s, “You want them to accept your explanation.” It’s not just the United States’ explanation. It’s the explanation, it’s the view of the – much of the rest of the international community about what the prime source of tension is there, and that is the further reclamation of features and the militarization that we’ve seen on many of them. That’s the prime mover here.

QUESTION: But these are new missiles that were putting – were they? I thought my colleagues at the back said it was not --

MR KIRBY: I don’t have – I mean, I don’t --

QUESTION: -- that they had been there for a long time, so I’m a little curious, because I thought they were new.

MR KIRBY: I think – well, I – look, I’m not going to speak for what --

QUESTION: No, are they new? I mean --

MR KIRBY: -- Chinese officials have said about how long. I don’t know --

QUESTION: Okay.

MR KIRBY: -- how long this particular island had had systems put on it and taken – I don’t know. I’ve not seen it. All I can tell you is we’ve seen imagery that certainly suggests the very recent placement of surface-to-air missile systems. I’m not an expert on Chinese weaponry so I wouldn’t be able to tell you exactly, like, what model or make they are or how new they are – again, not the point. The point is that militarization of these features does nothing to reduce tensions.

And look, this is a relationship that’s too important. We’ve got to – we want to see and welcome a peaceful, prosperous rise of China. They’re a regional leader and a global leader in a rapidly growing economy. And they have and can exert positive leadership and influence. And you know we talked a lot about North Korea and a role that China can play there – a very useful role that, frankly, no other nation in the region can play. And that’s what we want to focus on, is working through these tensions and trying to strengthen what could be a very strong relationship with a very powerful nation. And these kinds of activities aren’t doing anything to help us get to that end, and that’s what we really want to focus on.

I’ve really got to go. I got to --

Henri K.

L'aéroport sur le récif Mischief est bientôt opérationnel.

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

Cette carte que j'ai fait dans Google Earth montre la localisation du récif Mischief. A noter que l'aéroport sur le récif Fiery Cross est déjà opérationnel et permet d'y opérer des Boeing 737 et des Airbus 320, et l'aéroport sur le récif de Subi est actuellement en cours de terminaison aussi. Ces 3 aéroports ont des pistes d'au moins 2 700 m de longue.

Spoiler:

Henri K.

Une émission un peu fun de 2 frères qui débarquent sur une plateforme pétrolière chinoise dans la mer de Chine méridionale







Henri K.

Sur l'île de Yongxing, aux Paracels...

Spoiler:

Henri K.