[Information] Conflits dans la Mer de Chine Méridionale

La Chine continue en douceur le remblaiement dans les îlots sous son contrôle dans les Îles des Spratleys, dans la mer de Chine méridionale. C'est ce que j'appelle la stratégie du paysan...

L'îlot Hua yang, le 19 Juillet 2014

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L'îlot Dongmen

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Johnson South Reef, entre Février et Juillet 2014

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Gaven Reefs, Juillet 2014

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Fiery Cross Reef, le 29 Août 2014

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Eldad Reef, Février 2014

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Les Philippines ont réagi, comme d'habitude, mais ce sera un effort sans vain une fois de plus...

Photos confirm China reclamation; experts hit reef degradation in Spratly

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By Nikko Dizon |Philippine Daily Inquirer1:59 am | Saturday, June 7th, 2014

‘EARTHMOVING ACTIVITIES’ A backhoe attached to a Chinese vessel is apparently scooping up some filling materials in a reclamation project while at the same time harvesting endangered species, giant clams. PHOTO COURTESY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

China has reclaimed land in one of the contested reefs in the Spratly Islands, and this time, the defense department is not the only one expressing concern, but Filipino scientists as well.

They have expressed alarm over China’s activities on the contested reefs in Spratly Islands, citing environmental degradation that could adversely affect the country’s population, with “diseases, scarcity of resources and conflict.”

The military has taken photographs of China’s ongoing reclamation activity on Malvar Reef in February, with the pictures showing a backhoe attached to a Chinese vessel that, scientists said, was presumably used to gather filling materials and harvest giant clams.

On Thursday, President Benigno Aquino III said Chinese ships had been monitored moving around other reefs in the West Philippine Sea, possibly to reclaim land in Gavin Reef (Gaven Reef) and Calderon Reef (Cuarteron Reef).

Defense spokesperson Peter Galvez confirmed that China had reclaimed land on Malvar Reef (Eldad Reef), which lies northeast of Mabini Reef (Johnson South Reef), where China had previously reclaimed land.

“It’s called ‘earthmoving activities’ and there’s quite a lot going on in the [West Philippine Sea] that we are monitoring,” Galvez told the Inquirer on the phone.

The defense spokesperson said China’s reclamation activities were especially worrisome not only because of the ongoing territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea, but also because of its impact on the environment.

“The environment is an integral component of a state,” so environmental issues are considered security issues, according to professor Charithie Joaquin of the National Defense College of the Philippines.

“A state must be able to protect its territory and ensure that its citizens enjoy the benefits of the natural resources within its territory,” Joaquin told the Inquirer in an e-mail.
Environmental degradation could adversely affect the population, with “diseases, scarcity of resources and conflict,” she added.

“A sickly population impedes economic growth and drains much-needed resources. Scarce resources, such as water or strategic minerals, could also lead to conflict or exacerbate existing tensions,” Joaquin said, adding that “the consequences of nonsustainable use of natural resources could be irreversible, impacting not just the current generation but generations to come.”
“Because of interconnected ecosystems, the impact oftentimes transcends borders,” she added.

Scientists at the University of the Philippines Marine Science Institute (UP MSI) are just as alarmed at China’s relentless harvesting of giant clams, considered endangered species, and corals in the West Philippine Sea.

Fish feed on reefs

One of the country’s foremost experts in marine life conservation, professor emeritus Edgardo Gomez of UP MSI, noted that one-fifth of the fish that Filipinos consume come from the West Philippine Sea, and move around or feed on reefs. Without the reefs, depleted fish productivity is a possibility, he added.

“If you destroy everything, there won’t be any source of food [for the fish],” Gomez explained.

Based on the February 2014 photograph of Malvar Reef, MSI deputy director for research professor Perry Aliño said the backhoe apparently served a dual purpose: to get filling materials for the reclamation and to harvest giant clams.

“[China was] not only collecting the shells but the substrate as well,” he said. A substrate is the base where an organism lives.

Land reclamation effectively destroys the reef and its surroundings, which would have a long-term impact on the environment, said Aliño, who coauthored one of the most definitive books on Kalayaan Islands, a result of an in-depth research conducted by UP MSI.

Reefs play an important role in maintaining biodiversity in the West Philippine Sea, the scientist said, adding that dredging in the reefs would eventually destroy and weaken their framework.
Natural breakwaters

The destruction of the reefs near Pagasa Island in Palawan province could bring bigger waves to the only island in the Kalayaan Island Group, where a small community lives, because reefs serve as ripraps or natural breakwaters that could reduce the force of incoming waves, Gomez said.

The Philippine military has monitored Chinese poachers using dinghies to routinely harvest giant clams (Tridacna gigas), an endangered species of clams, as well as corals and other clam species.

Some 30 to 45 dinghies trawl for giant clams and corals in areas in the West Philippine Sea, like Ayungin Shoal, Pagasa Island, Tizard Bank and reefs, Union Banks and reefs and Hasa-Hasa Shoal, and store their catch in the vessels’ huge cargo hold.

The clams, used for food or decorative purposes, are reportedly sold in the black market in Hainan province in China, with clam shells fetching from
$13 (P567) to $750 (P33,000).

Aliño explained that clams grow on top of each other, such that when they are harvested by dredging, even the fossilized clams are collected.

“They are getting depleted, which would make them more valuable,” he said. “The clams need to be restocked. [But] if they are restocked clams, then they are more valuable because there is already an investment in terms of putting them back.”

Restocking program

The UP MSI has a restocking program for cultured clams for the past 30 years, a brainchild of Gomez who hand-carried the microscopic specimens of giant clams from Solomon Islands that the UP MSI laboratory used for their first cultured giant clams.

The cultured clams are then distributed to different parts of the country, although not a substantial number has been sent to Kalayaan Island Group.

Clams cultured at UP MSI Bolinao Marine Laboratory in Pangasinan province have been brought to Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc in Zambales—and most likely already harvested by the Chinese.

Gomez said it was about time that the government had a “game plan” that would not only protect the territory but also conserve natural resources.

Gomez said it was time for the government to “support blue water oceanography that will help our scientists do research on our [Exclusive Economic Zone] and show the [Philippine] flag.”
“If we have research vessels going out to [Kalayaan Island Group], Scarborough Shoal, the east coast of the Philippines … we are [at least] showing our presence,” he added.

Henri K.

Un documentaire de BBC sur les travaux entamés par les Chinois dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_8701/index.html

Le reportage fait un focus sur les travaux chinois, mais n'a pas donné d'information sur les travaux similaires des pays voisins, il serait intéressant d'avoir cette vue globale.

Henri K.

Un reportage de BBC sur les travaux de remblaiement et d'agrandissement des îlots dans la mer de Chine méridionale.



Henri K.

On sait que la Chine a démarré des travaux de remblaiement et d’agrandissement des îlots dans les Spratleys depuis quelques temps, mais à part quelques reportages spécialisés des médias étrangers, on apprend peu de ces travaux chez les médias chinois.

Un Chinois qui s'occupe des systèmes de dessalement de l'eau de mer a posté quelques photos de son passage sur Cuarteron Reef dans les Spratleys, l'un des 8 îlots contrôlés par la Chine dans la région.

Il raconte que le remblaiement était toujours en cours sur cet îlot en Juillet et la superficie était 3 fois d'un terrain de foot. La condition de vie sur Cuarteron Reef est très difficile, notamment au niveau de l'eau douce. "Je n'ai pas pris une seule douche pendant plus de 10 jours".

La situation s'est nettement améliorée quand le système de dessalement a été installé et mis en route. Jusqu'à présent l'armée demande les navires cargos passés dans la zone de ravitailler les îlots qui n'ont pas de source de l'eau douce, or parfois ce n'est pas suivi par les capitaines qui préfèrent donner de l'eau non portable du ballast au lieu de l'eau portable, surtout quand la condition météorologique est mauvaise.

A noter que, la Chine contrôle actuellement 8 des 50 îlots dans les Spratleys. Le Vietnam contrôle 28 îlots, les Philippines 7, la Malaisie 3, l'Indonésie 2, et le Taïwan 1.

Les photos que ce Chinois a posté sur un forum :















Remblaiement de sable pour agrandir un îlot.



Henri K.

La Chine continue à accélérer les travaux d'agrandissement des îlots sous son contrôle dans la Mer de Chine Méridionale.

L'évolution de Johnson South Reef dans les Spratleys

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L'évolution de Gaven Reef dans les Spratleys

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Dans le Fiery Cross Reef, en 3 mois l'îlot a atteint 0,2 km² de superficie, mais l'agrandissement est toujours en cours. La 2ème image représente le projet final.

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Un nouveau navire de travaux de remblaiement est mis en opérationnel et est parti dans les Spratleys il y a quelques jours.

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Henri K.

Un reportage de CCTV sur les îles contrôlées par la Chine dans les Paracels, dans la mer de Chine Méridionale.



Henri K.

L'envoi de la plateforme de forage mobile chinoise "Océan 981" dans les Paracels avait provoque des incidents à la fois diplomatique et paramilitaire dans la région entre la Chine et le Vietnam, mais ces forages ont porté aussi ses fruits économiques - Grâce aux données récoltés, la Chine découvre un énorme gisement de gaz naturel dans la zone.

Et contrairement au Vietnam qui n'a pas ses propres moyens d'exploitation et est obligé de s'associer avec les sociétés étrangères, principalement occidentales, la Chine est capable de l'exploiter seul, et c'est ce qu'elle a prévu de faire.

Les affaires de ce genre ne vont que se multiplier dans un futur proche.



Henri K.

The Next South China Sea Crisis: China vs. Indonesia?

Citation :

Scott Bentley
September 24, 2014

As Indonesian president-elect Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, prepares officially to begin his term later next month, there remains a degree of uncertainty regarding the future policy settings of his administration both at home and abroad. One thing, though, seems increasingly clear: momentum is building toward the realization of Indonesia’s long-dormant potential to emerge as a maritime power.

The vision of Indonesia as a “global maritime nexus” (poros maritim dunia) gained prominence during the presidential campaign and seems set to become a central focus of the upcoming Jokowi administration. While Indonesia’s emergence as a maritime power is by no means assured—it will face many challenges ahead—we may be witnessing the dawn of a new era in Indonesian history.

The precise details of that maritime vision remain a work in progress, but some preliminary observations can be made. The foundation of the “global maritime nexus” concept is primarily economic: it seeks to increase maritime connectivity and thus economic equality between the various Indonesian provinces. That argument has been convincingly advanced by Faisal Basri, a leading economist and member of Jokowi’s expert team on the economy. Yet according to Basri, the vision of Indonesia as a maritime power isn’t limited to the economic dimension alone, and can also contain a security or defense function, including the protection of state sovereignty.

While Jokowi hasn’t spoken at any length on his own vision of the concept, the vision and mission statement he submitted during the campaign prioritized the protection of Indonesia’s maritime interests. The public statements that Jokowi has made on the issue have repeatedly touched on that priority, specifically the problem of illegal fishing.

In comments made earlier this month and published in the local Indonesian press, Jokowi stated that it was necessary to act decisively against foreign fishing vessels in order to prevent the continued theft of Indonesian resources. “If we do not act decisively, our fish will be stolen by foreign ships,” Jokowi was quoted as saying. Such comments indicate that he may not be as disengaged on foreign policy matters as some have expected; in fact he may be more assertive on certain priorities.

The issue of illegal fishing by foreign vessels is likely to prove a pivotal challenge for Jokowi’s administration, and will almost certainly create tension with another emerging maritime power—China. China is hardly the only country whose fishermen are operating illegally in Indonesian waters. But it’s the only one whose fishermen are directly supported if not encouraged by the coercive power of its state security services at sea.

China’s expanded presence in disputed areas of the South China Sea is increasingly bringing its fishermen, and its maritime security organizations, into direct contact and often confrontation with those of Indonesia. While the Indonesian foreign ministry continues to maintain there’s no dispute between China and Indonesia, China’s actions suggest otherwise.

A number of incidents have occurred in the area since 2010, resulting from what ultimately proved to be unsuccessful attempts by Indonesian security forces to prosecute Chinese fishermen operating illegally within Indonesia’s claimed EEZ. Those efforts to assert Indonesian jurisdiction in its claimed EEZ are beginning to form a pattern of persistent failure, a pattern which, if left unaltered, may eventually compromise Indonesia’s military deterrent posture in those areas, as well as the legal basis for its claims.

The most recent of those incidents occurred in March of 2013. Since I first wrote about that incident late last year new details have come to light, including the apparent use of electronic-warfare capabilities by the Chinese Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) vessel Yuzheng 310. Based on the Indonesian captain’s own reporting, as well as subsequent investigation and analysis, it now appears highly likely that during that incident Yuzheng 310 jammed the communications of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) vessel Hiu Macan 001.

Consistent with the KKP captain’s description of events, Yuzheng 310 may have been disabling his ability to receive communications from his headquarters ashore, in an apparent effort to sever the vessel from its command and control (C2) loop. It appears likely Yuzheng 310 would have been calculating that—in combination with other coercive measures—the action would force the Indonesian captain to release his Chinese prisoners. The suite of measures had the desired effect, but might just as easily have proved dangerously escalatory had the KKP captain instead decided not to acquiesce.

Continued patrols in those areas by what is now the China Coast Guard may confront Jokowi with an early test of his leadership, possibly in a crisis scenario not dissimilar to that from March 2013. It remains to be seen whether or not the new administration is even aware of that potential contingency, let alone prepared to respond effectively.

Despite the obvious overlap between Jokowi’s focus on combating illegal fishing and the recent incidents with China in the South China Sea, it’s also unclear to what extent Jokowi is himself aware of that overlap, or the severity of the challenge it presents to his vision of Indonesia as a global maritime nexus. Addressing that challenge will require decisive leadership from the new president and his team, both domestically and abroad.

Henri K.

La Chine continue ses travaux de remblaiement pour agrandir les îlots sous son contrôle dans la mer de Chine méridionale. Le plus remarquable se situe à Fiery Cross Reef.

Les travaux de remblaiement sur cet îlot ont commencé en Août 2014, cet îlot de 0,0081 km² (surface au dessus de la mer) atteint rapidement, en 16 Octobre, 0,7 km². L'image satellite du 23 Novembre montre que la surface a déjà atteint 1,37 km² et les travaux ne sont pas encore terminés.

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Henri K.

La Chine continue ses travaux de remblaiement pour agrandir les îlots sous son contrôle dans la mer de Chine méridionale. Le plus remarquable se situe à Fiery Cross Reef.

Les travaux de remblaiement sur cet îlot ont commencé en Août 2014, cet îlot de 0,0081 km² (surface au dessus de la mer) atteint rapidement, en 16 Octobre, 0,7 km². L'image satellite du 23 Novembre montre que la surface a déjà atteint 1,37 km² et les travaux ne sont pas encore terminés.

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Henri K.

Une vidéo dont on ignore l'auteur et la date de prise montre 2 patrouilleurs des garde-côtes chinois poursuivaient un patrouilleur vietnamien, probablement dans la mer de Chine méridionale.



Henri K.

Un nouveau navire de transport civil, Sansha-1, est entré en service aujourd'hui. Il sera servi pour ravitailler tous les îlots sous le contrôle chinois dans les Spratleys et les Paracels.



Un ancien militaire se rappelle encore comment les îlots étaient ravitaillés autrefois.



Henri K.

Le porte-paroles du Ministère chinois de la défense indique dans la conférence de presse hebdomadaire que les travaux de remblaiement sur les îlots de la mer de Chine méridionale est tout à fait normal. Les autres pays n'ont pas à dire quoi que ce soit pour ce que la Chine fait sur son propre sol.



Henri K.

Ça remblaie, ça remblaie...

Le pire, c'est que personne ne peut rien faire contre ceci.

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Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Ça remblaie, ça remblaie... Le pire, c'est que personne ne peut rien faire contre ceci.

Même pas grinnepisse ?

C'est bien plus dangereux de s'attaquer aux chinois ou aux russes qu'aux français, ils ne s'y frottent pas

vu la monté des océans qui est prévu vau mieux si prendre de suite pour remblayer !!

Un reportage CCTV sur les gardes de la marine chinoise basés aux Paracels, dans la mer de Chine méridionale.



Henri K.

Reportage CCTV sur le nouvel an chinois aux Paracels.



Henri K.

Quelques travaux de remblaiement sur les îlots contrôles par les Chinois dans le mer de Chine méridionale.



































Henri K.

Bonjour la protection de l'écosystème :)

Bonjour la protection de l'écosystème !!

pas grave dans 50 ans sa sera sous 3 M d'eau !!!

La chaîne de télévision publique japonaise NHK a diffusé un court reportage sur les importants travaux de remblaiement que les Chinois sont en train de mener dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

Plus rien pourra les arrêter, et personne ne pourra rien faire.



Henri K.

2 nouvelles vidéos diffusées par la télévision japonaise sur les travaux de remblaiement chinois dans la mer de Chine méridionale.





Henri K.

D'après le blog du Journal de PLA, la Chine a étendu son réseau de communication 4G sur le récif Fiery Cross, situé dans la mer de Chine méridionale et à 1400km de la terre chinoise la plus proche. Le réseau 4G chinois couvrira la totalité de tous les îlots contrôlés par les Chinois en 1ère moitié de 2015.

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C'est juste sur ce récif que la Chine a entamé des travaux de remblaiement important, transformant un petit récif en une véritable île de plus de 2 km². On voit ici la partie qui pourrait être la future piste d'une base aérienne.

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Henri K.