[Information] Forces des Fusées (ex 2nd Corps d'Artillerie)

Nouvel essai balistique chinois, distance au sol environ 2000km, on ignore s'il s'agit d'une trajectoire en cloche.

Citation :

A0986/14 (Issued for ZLHW ZWUQ) -
A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N403930E0940201-N403851E0943728-N401717E0943647-N401756E0940119-N402429E0931641-N403516E0931654 BACK TO START.
VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.
GND - UNL, 29 JUN 03:50 2014 UNTIL 29 JUN 04:32 2014.
CREATED: 27 JUN 03:03 2014

Henri K.

Exercice de confrontation entre 2 unités du 2nd corps d'artillerie, on voit dans la vidéo les TEL de DF-11A, DF-21A et DF-21C.



Henri K.

Exercice de confrontation entre 2 brigades balistiques du 2nd corps d'artillerie. On constate que le 2nd corps d'artillerie utilise les missiles de croisière et les forces aériennes de l'armée de l'air pour détruire les unités balistiques d'ennemi, en s'appuyant sur le 2ème plus grand réseau d'observation espace-sol du monde, en outre.





Henri K.

Exercice nocturne d'une unité du 2nd corps d'artillerie, on peut apercevoir les DF-21A à la fin.



Henri K.

Le 9 Juillet 2014 autour de 21h00, de la province de Shandong à l'Est jusqu'à la province de la Mongolie intérieure à l'Ouest, nombreuses personnes ou équipage de vol civil ont rapporté d'avoir vu un OVNI qui part de l'Est à l'Ouest et un autre de l'Ouest à l'Est.

Si on regroupe ces photos et ces vidéos avec 2 notifications d'interdiction de vol NOTAMs A1067/14 et A1076/14, il s'avère qu'il s'agit d'un essai de missile. Il existe actuellement 2 suppositions, soit il s'agit d'un essai balistique de missile SLBM JL-2, ou d'un essai anti-balistique à mi-course entre un intercepteur et un JL-2.

Les 2 NOTAMS et la zone associées -

Citation :

A1067/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N404100E1015512-N401152E1045504- N394016E1044540-N400911E1014709 BACK TO START.VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 09 JUL 12:45 2014 UNTIL 09 JUL 13:25 2014. CREATED: 08 JUL 01:28 2014

Citation :

A1076/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1. A596: YABRAI VOR'YBL'-DENGKOU VOR 'DKO'. 2. B330: GOBIN-YABRAI VOR 'YBL'. FL000 - FL999, 09 JUL12:40 2014 UNTIL 09 JUL 13:25 2014. CREATED: 08 JUL 14:51 2014

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Les photos prises de l'Est à L'Ouest par plusieurs internautes

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4 vidéos dont une prise par l'équipage d'un vol civil au dessus de la ville de Dalian, ce vol partait de Séoul vers Zhengzhou









Aucune annonce officielle n'est publiée à ce jour.

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

J'ouvre un fil dédié à la force de frappe stratégique de la Chine, comprenant donc les missiles SLBM comme JL-1, JL-2...etc

Henri,
c'est bien de donner des news sur les exercices récents des forces stratégiques nucléaires chinoises.
Mais ce serait mieux de donner des infos et schémas techniques sur les systèmes eux-mêmes !
Au delà des simples missiles (tu pourrais mettre schémas et données techniques tel que historique de chaque missile, données techniques, ect...)

As-tu des détails/éléments sur les charges nucléaires et thermonucléaires chinoises ?

ICBM:
DF5A : Charge thermonucléaire (2 stage) de 4/5 MT, poids: 3200kg. Charge prototype testée en novembre 1976 dans le Lob-Nor.

DF 31A: charge de 90 kt ou 200/300 Kt ? (des charges prototypes de 20 à 90 Kt auraient été testées entre octobre 1993-juin 1996 sur le site d’essai de Lob-Nor).

IRBM:
DF 31: charge de 90 kt ou 200/300 Kt ? (des charges prototypes de 20 à 90 Kt auraient été testées entre octobre 1993-juin 1996 sur le site d’essai de Lob-Nor).

DF 21: 1 charge de 200/300 Kt

SRBM:
DF 15: charge de ?

Il semblerait que les charges thermonucléaires chinoises de 90-300 Kt seraient lourdement influencées par les technologies américaines (dans les années 1980, les chinois avaient réussit à pirater les plans des W88 américaines si ma mémoire est bonne   ).

Certains systèmes plus anciens seraient déjà retirés du service (DF-3, DF-11) ?

SLBM:
Ju-Lang 1
Il embarquerait (selon les sources), soit une charge de 2 Mt, soit une charge de 200/300 Kt ?
Il me semble que la douzaine de JL-1 devraient bientôt être retirés du service (=> en même temps que le SSBN vieillissant type 092 "Xia/Shangzheng 6" en service depuis 1983)

Ju-Lang 2
Il embarquerait (selon les sources), soit une charge de 2,5 Mt, soit une charge de 200/300 Kt, soit 3 MIRV de 90 Kt ?
Plusieurs douzaines seraient prévues ou déjà construits (assez pour équiper 3 ou 4 SSBN type 094)

AVIATION:
- Les bombardiers H6 Hong 6 embarquent-ils des bombes A ou H à gravités ou peuvent-ils être équipés de missiles à ogives nucléaire/thermonucléaires ?
- Les différents types de chasseurs-bombardiers (Q-5, JH-7, J-8, Su-30, J-10, J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20, J-31) peuvent embarquer quel type d'armes nucléaires (bombes/missiles) ?

Les infos sont rares sur les bombes A tactiques chinoises: Le 05 (ou 07) janvier 1972 sur le site d’essai de Lob-Nor, un Q-5 avait largué une bombe A tactique de 5 à 10 Kt (8Kt, charge à fission avec du Pu-239).

Sur les nouveaux missiles de croisières (DH-10/CJ-10, DH-20/CJ-20), quelle type de charge peuvent-ils embarquer ?

TERRESTRE/TACTIQUE:
Dans les années 1980, les chinois ont effectués plusieurs tirs de bombes à neutrons, ont-ils réussit à concevoir des obus (calibre 152/155mm) ou des mines à charge nucléaires ?

NAVAL/TACTIQUE:
Les chinois ont-ils conçus des torpilles ou mines à charge nucléaires ?

Exercice d'une unité du 2nd corps d'artillerie qui exploite des vieux DF-3A à ergol liquide.



Henri K.

Réforme dans une brigade de missile de croisière du 2nd corps d'artillerie



Henri K.

Quand les Indiens parlent du capacité anti-balistique de la Chine...

'Star Wars' - China strikes back

Citation :

Submitted by Saurav Shukla on Mon, 07/14/2014 - 07:08 Featured India

Sometime in the next few months, India will conduct the first canister-based trial of its blue-ribbon intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Agni-V, at Wheeler Island. Able to reach targets anywhere in China thanks to its 5,500 km range, this missile is hugely important to India's nuclear deterrence strategy.

"Agni-V is in final induction configuration... The missile will be ready for induction in the armed forces in the next couple of years after three to four more successful test firings from canisters," declared Avinash Chander , chief of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Canister-launched missiles are preferable because their survivability against enemy attack increases; road-based launchers can quickly change location. Furthermore, the addition of a canister launch ability gives the Agni-V a true quick-reaction capacity.

The Agni-V is a three-stage solid-propellant missile that has already achieved two successful test-firings. It builds upon existing family members, the Agni-I (with 700 km range), Agni-II (2,500 km), Agni-III (3,000 km) and Agni-IV (3,500 km).

The chief purpose of the Agni-V is obviously to target China. However, Beijing has been greatly improving its ability at targeting incoming ballistic missiles. In a report entitled 'Space Invaders - China's Space Warfare Capabilities', published recently by Jane's Intelligence Review, its authors explore the enormous investment Beijing is funneling into space warfare.

China has long been developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system that will have dramatic implications for the deterrence threat posed by India's missile force. If China can effectively negate the threat posed by Agni missiles, it has less to fear from India.

Indeed, the report concluded: "A limited ABM force is capable of protecting the industrial and population centers in eastern China from attack by longer-range Indian systems that are currently under development... One regional impact may be that it [China] feels emboldened to greater assist its own allies or Indian adversaries, such as Pakistan, in times of regional tension."

ABM systems have the potential to critically alter strategic balances because they nullify an adversary's attack capability. Currently only the USA and Russia have operational ABM networks, although China is fast closing in on one, and India is pursuing such a system. China's efforts to create an ABM capability began as early as 1964 due to fears about American and Soviet missiles.

If China has the ability to destroy incoming Indian missiles, Delhi will be forced to produce greater numbers, more destructive warheads or more sophisticated countermeasures to achieve the same effect. Thus, India will almost assuredly develop multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV) for the Agni-V, which will give each missile 2-10 separate nuclear warheads.

The same is true of Russian and US ICBMs, where a limited strike with a small number of missiles will no longer be guaranteed success. Instead, a larger barrage will be required.

Another aspect of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) program, and complementary to its ABM project, is the ability to target 'enemy' assets in space. Key among them are anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons such as the SC-19 missile produced by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). It carries a 35 kg kinetic kill vehicle that can be used for both ASAT and ABM purposes.

China controversially tested an SC-19 in 2007 when it destroyed a defunct weather satellite and created 150,000 pieces of space debris. The SC-19 has since been used in two other confirmed tests, one in January 2010 and another in January 2013.

However, the SC-19 is not the only trick in China's bag. The HQ-9 air defense missile, copied from Russian technology, has been developed into an HQ-9B anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) variant. The US Department of Defense (DoD) also claims China has developed the HQ-19, an equivalent of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, of which the US Army currently has a battery deployed on Guam.

The Jane's report gave a bold warning: "Chinese ABM development is on par with US efforts technologically, only lagging behind in deployment." However, Chinese investment will rapidly turn this situation around, with the authors stating "China could meet or exceed US ABM deployment levels within the next decade".

Large phased-array radars (LPAR) are key to conducting space-based intercepts. They can be used offensively or defensively, supporting either anti-satellite attacks or a ballistic-missile early-warning function. China has four known LPAR sites at Huian, Korla, Longgangzhen and Shuangyashan that provide coverage of most of Russia, Central Asia, India and Taiwan/Southeast Asia.

It is suspected the Huian site near the Taiwan Strait may be an electronic attack device able to target the strategically important AN/FPS-115 Pave Paws long-range early-warning radar atop a mountain in Taiwan. Indeed, the Jane's report estimated, "Despite the potential to negate US missile threats, few capabilities offer a substantial threat to US forces, and the largest impact will be felt regionally through the potential interference with Taiwanese ballistic-missile early-warning systems, or the increasing Chinese assertion over shipping lanes."

Not content with current progress, China is constantly fishing for new technologies. For example, in June the US security technology group Crowd strike accused the clandestine hacker group Unit 61398, with close links to the PLA, of systematically attacking computer systems belonging to space/satellite partners of US and European governments to glean top-secret information. Just a few weeks earlier, the US Department of Justice indicted five PLA members of Unit 61398 for cybercrimes.

China is also pursuing high-energy laser weapons that can dazzle, blind or destroy enemy systems such as imaging satellites. This is an acute threat for a country like the USA that is so dependent on space-based sensors. It was reported in September 2006 that China fired a laser at a US spy satellite. The DoD regularly reports that China continues to pursue laser weapons for ASAT and ABM roles.

That is not all. China may be developing co-orbital weapons, or 'assassin satellites', that quietly orbit in space awaiting an order to assault hostile satellites. In September 2013, China tested a dual-use co-orbital 'assassin' or repair satellite with a robotic arm. It made contact with a target satellite, thus demonstrating a Chinese ability to maneuver and damage other satellites.

Russian sources revealed China tested a Shenlong small space plane in late 2011 or early 2012. Similar in size to the USA's X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, the Shenlong "could be developed into a slightly larger space plane that could carry passive or active military payloads," the Jane's report predicted.

China is clearly developing major capabilities so it can both strike first and strike back against any nation with satellites or missiles aimed at it. China has well and truly cemented its position in the 'star wars' era.

By Gordon Arthur(ANI)

Henri K.

Entrainement d'une brigade du 2nd corps d'artillerie qui exploite les DF-21A et les DF-21C.



Exercice logistique d'une unité du 2nd corps d'artillerie.



Henri K.

D'après un communiqué du Ministère chinois de la défense, la Chine a procédé un autre essai anti-balistique au sol le 23 Juillet 2014, qui a "atteint les objectifs attendus".

http://news.mod.gov.cn/headlines/2014-07/23/content_4524047.htm

Un professeur de l'université, qui est également un blogueur chinois connu en la matière, a publié ce soir une rapide analyse de ce 3ème essai ABM chinois :

http://liuqiankktt.blog.163.com/blog/static/121264211201462392846910/

Bien que le communiqué du MoD chinois n'a pas donné plus de détail, on peut néanmoins remarquer la différence par rapport aux communiqués des 2 derniers essais du 11 Janvier 2010 et du 27 Janvier 2013, à savoir le mot "à mi-course". Cela pourrait signifier que la Chine n'a pas procédé le même type d'essai ABM aujourd'hui.

Le blogueur a également trouvé les 7 notifications NOTAMs de cet essai -

Citation :

A1193/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZWUQ/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4132N08622E005
A) ZWUQ
B) 1407231131
C) 1407231146
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT N413216
E0862219 WITH RADIUS OF 10KM.VERTICAL LIMITS:SFC-UNL.
F) GND
G) UNL

A1194/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZXXX/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3859N09030E025
A) ZWUQ ZLHW
B) 1407231132
C) 1407231154
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:
N383901E0904901-N384712 E0905806-N391854E0901047-N391055E0900158
BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL.
F) GND
G) UNL

A1195/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZPKM/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3120N09952E027
A) ZPKM
B) 1407231133
C) 1407231201
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:
N305423E1000205-N310851 E1002048-N314459E0994240-N313033E0992406
BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL.
F) GND
G) UNL

A1196/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZPKM/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/3147N10041E032
A) ZPKM
B) 1407231137
C) 1407231202
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT
N314640E1004043 WITH RADIUS OF 60KM.VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL.
F) GND
G) UNL

A1201/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZLHW/QARLC/IV/NBO/E/000/999/
A) ZLHW
B) 1407231110
C) 1407231210
E) THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD:
1.B215: NUKTI-N4027.9E09724.1.
2.G470:BIKNO- DUNHUANG VOR 'DNH'.

A1202/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZLHW/QARLC/IV/NBO/E/000/999/
A) ZLHW
B) 1407231130
C) 1407231200
E) THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD:
1.Y1:MAGOD-DUMIN.
2.W112:ADMUX-TUSLI.

A1206/14 NOTAMN
Q) ZWUQ/QARLT/IV/NBO/E/000/999/
A) ZWUQ
B) 1407231130
C) 1407231200
E) THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD:
1.ALL ACFT ARE PROHIBITED TO FLY INTO AN AREA CENTERED AT N413559
E0860707 WITH RADIUS OF 55KM.
2.W112:QIEMO VOR 'QIM'-ADMUX.
3.Y1: SADAN-MAGOD.
F) FL000
G) FL999

En traçant ces notifications sur Google Earth, on a une carte comme suite -



Les 4 zones en jaune représentent les zones d'interdiction de vol, et les lignes rouges les couloirs aériens fermés. On constate que cet essai s'étale sur plusieurs milliers de km, et l'heure de l'essai se situait entre 19h30 et 20h00 heure locale. La localisation de ces zones d'interdiction de vol et l'heure de l'essai sont similaires aux 2 premiers essais chinois en 2010 et en 2013, cela suggère fortement que le missile cible et l'intercepteur pourraient être les mêmes pour ces 3 essais, à savoir le MRBM DF-16 et l'intercepteur HQ-19.

Etant donné le fait que le communiqué d'aujourd'hui n'a pas mentionné le mot "mi-course", il est fort probable que l'essai a eu lieu en haut endo-atmosphérique, et non à mi-course en exo-atmosphérique comme les 2 premières fois. Cela signifierait donc que HQ-19 dispose non seulement la capacité d'intercepter à mi-course mais également en haut endo-atmosphérique, tout comme le THAAD américain.

Image Google Earth de la zone des NOTAMs A1206/14 et A1193/14, on retrouve dans cette zone le radar ESA d'alerte avancée de Korla (en haut) :



Images Google Earth datant du 5 Mai dernier de ce qui pourrait être la base de lancement de l'intercepteur, localisée grâce à la notification NOTAM A1193/14 :



Dans cette base de lancement de l'intercepteur, on peut apercevoir un véhicule long de 12m et 2 autres long de 11,3m :



Une image qui illustrerait le déroulement de cet essai :



Le missile cible serait donc tiré depuis le centre de lancement spatial JSLC, la zone verte représente la zone possible couverte par la trajectoire du missile balistique. L'intercepteur HQ-19 serait tiré près de Korla, en haut à gauche de l'image, qui intercepte le missile cible dans la zone en bleu. Ces trajectoires justifient donc parfaitement la fermeture des couloirs aériens civils (en ligne rouge). Les 2 autres zones en jaune en bas à droit représentent la zone de chute de l'intercepteur.

D'autres remarques intéressantes -

Depuis le site de lancement de l'intercepteur jusqu'aux zones de chute, il y a environ 1600 à 1700km de distance, cela se traduit par une vitesse post-boost minimum de l'intercepteur à 3,3km/s (Mach 9,7).

Supposons que le missile cible est toujours le DF-16 comme pour les 2 premiers essais et est lancé depuis JSLC, alors la zone d'interception se situe à entre 170 à 370 km du site de lancement de l'intercepteur, près de Korla en province de Xinjiang. Dans cette zone, le missile cible est déjà en phase de re-entry alors que l'intercepteur est toujours en phase d'ascension. Si l'interception est à mi-course alors la distance entre la zone d'interception et le site de lancement de l'intercepteur est de 580 km.

Les calculs du blogueur démontrent que la distance de combat de HQ-19 est plus longue que celle de THAAD et est équivalent à ETI, qui est une version rallongée de THAAD avec un étage de booster supplémentaire.

La suite du développement mérite d'être suivi.

Henri K.

Rien de neuf. Pas de réaction occidentale encore.

China Conducts Third Anti-Missile Test

Citation :

China’s military conducted a successful land-based anti-missile test this week, following similar ones in 2010 and 2013.

By Zachary Keck
July 24, 2014

China’s military has conducted its third anti-missile test, according to state-run media.

On Wednesday the People’s Liberation Army conducted a “land-based anti-missile technology experiment,” Xinhua reported, citing China’s Ministry of Defense. The report said that the Defense Ministry also said that the test “achieved the desired objectives,” without providing any additional details.

This is the third test of its kind that China has announced. In January 2013, state media cited the PLA as saying that it had successfully conducted a “land-based mid-course missile interception test.” The reports at the time said that the test had involved highly sensitive technologies used for “detecting, tracking and destroying a ballistic missile flying in the outer space.”

Chinese state media reported the same thing in January 2010 following China’s first test. At the time, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson had assured the world that “The test was defensive in nature and targeted at no country.” Xinhua also clarified that the test “would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft.”

According to Global Security, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that the first anti-ballistic missile test in 2010 had used a SC-19 missile launched from the Korla Missile Test Complex in western China to successfully intercept a CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile that was launched from the Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center approximately 1,100 kilometers away from Korla.

Global Security also noted that the SC-19 missile had also acted as the “payload booster” for many of China’s direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) tests, including the one in 2007 in which China shot down one of its own weather satellites.

Similarly, following the 2010 test, Jeffrey Lewis noted that while China is trying to separate its anti-satellite and missile defense systems, “the technology is fundamentally the same: the development of kinetic energy interceptors — so called ‘hit-to-kill’ technologies that use a bullet to hit a bullet.” Notably, the 2007 ASAT test and the first ballistic missile defense test were both conducted on the same day—January 11. The second missile defense test was also conducted in the month of January.

Lewis also noted in the same analysis the different ways China has publicized its ASAT and missile defense testing. Despite the similarities in the technologies used, Beijing has clouded its ASAT missile tests in ambiguity. It usually fails to acknowledge the tests or mischaracterizes them publicly.

By contrast, China usually announces its missile defense tests nearly immediately. At the same time, the U.S. has said in the past that China has failed to notify it of upcoming tests beforehand, and Beijing provides almost no exact details about its missile defense tests, instead speaking only in very general terms. The Xinhua report on this most recent test was even more succinct than previous ones, although it may be expanded upon in the coming days.

The anti-missile test comes just days after China ordered 12 major airports in the eastern part of the country to cut a quarter of their daily flights through the middle of August. The restrictions were imposed, according to state media, because the PLA is conducting “high frequency exercises” in the areas affected. The exact nature of the drills were unclear from the reports. However, state media had previously said that starting on July 15, the PLA would be conducting three months of live-fire drills in six regional military commands. The anti-ballistic missile test was likely a part of these exercises.

Henri K.

US Says China Tested Anti-Satellite Missile

Citation :

WASHINGTON — Jul 25, 2014, 3:48 PM ET

The U.S. says China has tested a missile designed to destroy satellites and is urging Beijing to refrain from destabilizing actions.

State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said the "non-destructive" test occurred Wednesday. She said a previous destructive test of the system in 2007 created thousands of pieces of dangerous debris in space.

Harf said Friday that the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems threaten the long-term security and sustainability of the outer-space environment that all nations depend upon.

China's state-run Xinhua (shihn-wah) news agency, citing a Defense Ministry statement, reported a successful missile interception test conducted from land within Chinese territory late Wednesday.

Xinhua did not refer to it as an anti-satellite system. It said such tests could strengthen Chinese air defense against ballistic missiles.

Henri K.

Exercices de 2 brigades du 2nd corps d'artillerie





Henri K.

Le 31 Juillet dans la matinée, un nouvel essai balistique a eu lieu depuis le centre de lancement spatial TSLC, on ignore quel type de missile qu'il s'agit. La zone de cible se situe à Qiemo dans la province de Xinjiang.

3 couloirs aériens ont été fermés d'après les notifications NOTAMs, et ce sont les mêmes qui ont été fermés lors de l'essai hypersonique de la tête Boost-Glide du 9 Janvier dernier.

Citation :

A1257/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.Y1:MEPEP-MAGOD. 2.Y3:TUSLI-DUMIN. 3.W112:ADMUX-TUSLI. 4.L888:TONAX-LEBAK. FL000 - FL999, 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 11:22 2014

Citation :

A1249/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.L888:SADAN-TONAX. 2.W112: QIEMO VOR 'QIM'-ADMUX. 3.Y1:SADAN-MAGOD. 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 29 JUL 13:21 2014

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Henri K.

Parfois les informations sur les armements sensibles pourraient venir des sources tout à fait atypiques, c'est ce qu'il rend ce jeu de puzzle très intéressant.

Sur le site du Centre de surveillance de l'environnement de la province Shaanxi, des informations sur les SAM HQ-19 et HQ-26, ainsi que les missiles balistiques DF-26 et DF-41, ont été publiées.

Dans son rapport d'activités hebdomadaire du 3 au 7 Mars, le centre dit avoir -

* Terminé le rapport de diagnostic de la construction de soutien logistique, pour le développement du système LGSIMU (Laser Strapdown Inertial Measurement Unit) pour le MRBM DF-26

* Participé au projet de construction de soutien logistique pour xx-19 et xx-26 (xx = HQ, il n'y a pas d'autres explications possibles)

* Participé au Comité de certification écologique du projet de construction de soutien logistique pour l'ICBM DF-41

De la même manière, dans son rapport d'activités hebdomadaire du 6 au 13 Juin, le centre dit avoir -

* Terminé la certification des conditions logistiques pour le développement de DF-41 de Xi'an Aerospace Composite Materials Research Center, du groupe CASC. On sait que cet Institut de recherche s'occupe du développement des matériaux composites de la coque des moteurs à ergol solide, les tuyères et les tubes de lancement.

DF-26 est un MRBM chinois de nouvelle génération, le premier chiffre de sa référence officielle, 2, indique que le missile comporte 2 étages. C'est un MRBM mobile de portée > 4000km pour une masse de projection > 1t développé par le groupe CASC. Il est développé pour remplacer les vieux DF-4 et sa cible prioritaire est le Guam. Le vol inaugural a eu lieu le 25 Septembre 2010 et s'est terminé avec succès. Doté d'une coque en fibre de carbone, le missile devrait mesurer dans les 15,5m de long avec une diamètre d'environ 1,7m, la masse totale au décollage de 30t environ.

Le TEL de DF-26 (??) -

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Le site Free Beacon en a parlé récemment -

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-fields-new-intermediate-range-nuclear-missile/

HQ-19 est un ABM THAAD-like développé par le groupe CASIC et qui a déjà procédé à au moins 2 à 3 essais avec succès. HQ-26 est un ABM similaire à RIM 161 Standard Missile-3, développé par SAST du groupe CASC.

DF-41, quant à lui, est un ICBM mobile disposant de MiRV. Son PBS et les MiRV ont été testés pour la première fois en Avril 2011 avec succès. On a enregistré au moins 2 essais de ce nouveau missile chinois, au 24 Juillet 2012 et au 13 Décembre 2013.

Henri K.

Ce qu'il suppose d'être le TEL ou le camion de transport du nouvel ICBM mobile chinois DF-41.



Henri K.

Les Américains disent que les Chinois ont testé 2 missiles ICBM le 31 Juillet. Les éléments de mon côté indiquent que les 2 tirs ont bien eu lieu et sont espacés de 30 min.

L'un est un DF-5, variant inconnu (Soit -A en portée rallongée, soit -B en version MiRV), l'autre est DF-31A de 11 200km de portée maximale.

A noter que c'est le 4ème essai de DF-31A reporté par le média américain en espace de 2 ans. Les 3 autres essais reportés par les Américains ont eu lieu le 30 Août 2012, le 30 Novembre 2012, et le 24 Juillet 2013.

Inside the Ring: Chinese missiles tested

Citation :

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Wednesday, August 6, 2014

China’s military last week conducted flight tests of two intercontinental ballistic missiles, including one of its newest road-mobile DF-31As that can reach the United States with a nuclear warhead, according to U.S. officials.

The test firings of both a DF-31A and a silo-based CSS-4 ICBM were monitored by U.S. intelligence satellites and other intelligence sensors in Asia, said officials familiar with reports of the tests.

The Chinese ICBM flight tests, as in earlier tests, were carried out in secret and took place days after what the Chinese government said was the July 23 flight test of a missile defense interceptor.

Recent military activities by the Chinese military have resulted in massive commercial flight delays in several parts of the country. Other Chinese military exercises are ongoing.

The DF-31A is the front-line strategic missile of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, as China’s nuclear and conventional missile forces are called.

“China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world,” said a report published recently by the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

“It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses,” the report said, noting that Chinese missile forces are “expanding in both size and types of missiles.”

On the DF-31A, the report said the missile is being deployed and “future ICBMs could utilize multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).”

Les notifications NOTAMs de ces 2 essais -

Premier essai :

Citation :

A1249/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.L888:SADAN-TONAX. 2.W112: QIEMO VOR 'QIM'-ADMUX. 3.Y1:SADAN-MAGOD. 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 29 JUL 13:21 2014

A1257/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.Y1:MEPEP-MAGOD. 2.Y3:TUSLI-DUMIN. 3.W112:ADMUX-TUSLI. 4.L888:TONAX-LEBAK. FL000 - FL999, 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 11:22 2014

Deuxième essai :

Citation :

A1259/14 - THE SEGMENT QIEMO VOR'QIM'-ADMUX OF ATS RTE W112 CLSD AT 9500M AND BELOW. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:30 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 04:50 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:38 2014

A1260/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD AT 9,500M AND BELOW: 1.L888:SADAN-NOLEP. 2.Y1:SADAN-MAGOD. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:30 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 08:00 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:40 2014

A1261/14 - THE SEGMENT IPMUN- RUSDI OF ATS RTE Y3 CLSD AT 9500M AND BELOW. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 23:50 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:30 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:43 2014

A1262/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD AT 9,500M AND BELOW: 1.L888:SADAN-TONAX. 2.W112: QIEMO VOR'QIM'-NOLEP. 3.CENTERED AT 380834N0853143E WITH RADIUS OF 70KM. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:00 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 07:30 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:48 2014

Henri K.

Les Américains disent que les Chinois ont testé 2 missiles ICBM le 31 Juillet. Les éléments de mon côté indiquent que les 2 tirs ont bien eu lieu et sont espacés de 30 min.

L'un est un DF-5, variant inconnu (Soit -A en portée rallongée, soit -B en version MiRV), l'autre est DF-31A de 11 200km de portée maximale.

Inside the Ring: Chinese missiles tested

Citation :

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Wednesday, August 6, 2014

China’s military last week conducted flight tests of two intercontinental ballistic missiles, including one of its newest road-mobile DF-31As that can reach the United States with a nuclear warhead, according to U.S. officials.

The test firings of both a DF-31A and a silo-based CSS-4 ICBM were monitored by U.S. intelligence satellites and other intelligence sensors in Asia, said officials familiar with reports of the tests.

The Chinese ICBM flight tests, as in earlier tests, were carried out in secret and took place days after what the Chinese government said was the July 23 flight test of a missile defense interceptor.

Recent military activities by the Chinese military have resulted in massive commercial flight delays in several parts of the country. Other Chinese military exercises are ongoing.

The DF-31A is the front-line strategic missile of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Corps, as China’s nuclear and conventional missile forces are called.

“China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world,” said a report published recently by the Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).

“It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses,” the report said, noting that Chinese missile forces are “expanding in both size and types of missiles.”

On the DF-31A, the report said the missile is being deployed and “future ICBMs could utilize multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).”

Les notifications NOTAMs de ces 2 essais -

Premier essai :

Citation :

A1249/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.L888:SADAN-TONAX. 2.W112: QIEMO VOR 'QIM'-ADMUX. 3.Y1:SADAN-MAGOD. 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 29 JUL 13:21 2014

A1257/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD: 1.Y1:MEPEP-MAGOD. 2.Y3:TUSLI-DUMIN. 3.W112:ADMUX-TUSLI. 4.L888:TONAX-LEBAK. FL000 - FL999, 31 JUL 01:15 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:20 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 11:22 2014

Deuxième essai :

Citation :

A1259/14 - THE SEGMENT QIEMO VOR'QIM'-ADMUX OF ATS RTE W112 CLSD AT 9500M AND BELOW. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:30 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 04:50 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:38 2014

A1260/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD AT 9,500M AND BELOW: 1.L888:SADAN-NOLEP. 2.Y1:SADAN-MAGOD. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:30 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 08:00 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:40 2014

A1261/14 - THE SEGMENT IPMUN- RUSDI OF ATS RTE Y3 CLSD AT 9500M AND BELOW. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 23:50 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 03:30 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:43 2014

A1262/14 - THE FLW SEGMENTS OF ATS RTE CLSD AT 9,500M AND BELOW: 1.L888:SADAN-TONAX. 2.W112: QIEMO VOR'QIM'-NOLEP. 3.CENTERED AT 380834N0853143E WITH RADIUS OF 70KM. FL000 - FL311, 30 JUL 22:00 2014 UNTIL 31 JUL 07:30 2014. CREATED: 30 JUL 16:48 2014

Henri K.

Missiles, laser, satellites capables de capturer les autres, tous au moins testés une fois - a Chine commence à être complète dans ses capacités anti-satellites.

Bien que les Américains continuent de parler de l'essai ASAT pour l'essai du 23 Juillet, j'obstine à penser qu'il s'agit d'un test ABM d'après les notifications NOTAMs et les reportages civils. Après tout, parler de l'ASAT est toujours plus "sensationnel" que de parler de l'ABM, c'est plus facile à diaboliser médiatiquement car il s'agit d'une capacité offensive et non défensive comme la 2ème.

Stratcom: China Continuing to Weaponize Space with Latest Anti-Satellite Missile Shot

Citation :

July 23 test 'concerning,' 'problematic'

BY: Bill Gertz
August 13, 2014 2:00 pm

OMAHA—China last month conducted another test of a satellite-killing missile that reflects Chinese efforts to weaponize space, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said Wednesday.

“It’s very problematic to see China working to weaponize space in tests like this one they just had, and so [it’s] very concerning to me as the U.S. Strategic Command commander, and to our nation at large, given our dependency on that capability,” said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, Strategic Command chief.

Haney, speaking to reporters after remarks to a Stratcom-sponsored conference on nuclear deterrence, also voiced worries about the recent increase in Russian strategic nuclear bomber incursions into U.S. air defense identification zones near Alaska and close to U.S. territory.

“I will say that the business of them coming close to the United States of America, we take very seriously,” said the four-star admiral who is in charge of U.S. nuclear warfighting forces.

The blunt comments about Chinese weaponization of space are unusual and followed the July 23 test of what U.S. officials said was China’s low-earth orbit DN-1 anti-satellite interceptor. It was the latest ASAT test by China that both Pentagon and State Department spokesmen described as a “non-destructive” prototype.

China, for its part, did not identify the July 23 test as an ASAT weapon. Instead, China said it involved a missile defense system. The Chinese Defense Ministry dubbed the test “a land-based anti-missile technology experiment.”


Graphic of a Chinese kinetic kill interceptor

Frank Rose, deputy assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, said during the conference that the recent Chinese ASAT missile was “designed to destroy satellites in low-earth orbit.”

“Despite China’s claims that this was not an ASAT test, let me assure you the United States has high confidence in its assessment that the event was indeed an ASAT test,” he said.

Rose said the development and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons “are both destabilizing and threaten the long term security and sustainability of the space environment.”

The latest ASAT test followed the highly destructive January 2007 test missile attack against a Chinese weather satellite, and a May 2013 test of a more capable high-earth orbit satellite killing interceptor, known as the DN-2.

“As a country we depend on space, and the nations around the world, not just the United States, also have a significant dependency on that capability,” Haney said. “Militarily, and how we fight, clearly we depend on that capability as well. But we would want, quite frankly, to maintain space as a peaceful environment.”

Haney said China’s 2007 ASAT test that destroyed a weather satellite “created an ungodly amount of debris” that still threatens both manned and unmanned spacecraft.

Stratcom currently operates a space center that “spends a lot of time working to try to follow all of the things that are up in space, including space debris, so that we can make aware, not just the military, [but] commercial entities, other nations, of any potential for that stuff running into each other, and having collisions, creating more debris as well as taking out capability,” he said.

China’s development of space warfare systems also includes ground-based lasers and small maneuvering satellites. Both also have been tested in recent years.

The ASAT weapons are part of Beijing’s large-scale military buildup that includes numerous weapons systems that provide asymmetric strategic advantages designed to give China’s military the capability to defeat stronger U.S. forces in conflict. Other niche weapons include anti-ship ballistic missiles and cyber warfare capabilities.

Army Lt. Col. Valerie Henderson, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said in an email that “the United States has concluded that the People’s Republic of China conducted a non-destructive test of a missile designed to destroy satellites on 23 July.” She declined to elaborate.

State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said July 25 that the January 2007 ASAT test “created thousands of pieces of debris, which continue to present an on-going danger to the space systems of all nations, including China.”

“We call on China to refrain from destabilizing actions—such as the continued development and testing of destructive anti-satellite systems—that threaten the long term security and sustainability of the outer space environment, on which all nations depend,” Harf said. “The United States continuously looks to ensure its space systems are safe and resilient against emerging space threats.”

China’s ASAT weapons remain shrouded in secrecy. A Chinese defense research paper published in 2012 states that “kinetic energy antisatellite refers to the mode of attack in which a non-explosive high-speed warhead directly hits a satellite with great energy, to damage the functions of the satellite or incapacitate it.”

A kinetic kill vehicle must “arrive at a certain location at a certain time to accomplish a precise rendezvous with the target satellite in space,” the paper stated. “In order to accomplish the precision rendezvous and destroy the target satellite, there must be a precise attack chain centered on discovery, lock-on, tracking, aiming, attack, and damage assessment.”

Rick Fisher, a China military affairs expert, said China’s weaponization of space should be a top concern for U.S. defense planners.

“China has two ground-based ASAT systems, the DN-1 and DN-2, advanced ground based laser ASAT systems and is developing dual-use co-orbital satellites that can monitor or attack U.S. satellites,” said Fisher, an analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.

“Washington cannot wait for China to agree to any future verifiable space weapon control agreement and the likelihood is very high that any diplomatic exercise will be used to buy time for China’s space weapon development,” Fisher said. “As China develops space weapons we can also be assured that Russia will soon enter this competition.”

Fisher said in response the United States should actively develop military space capabilities to deter Chinese attacks in space.

“In the near-term, the U.S. requires jet fighter launched ASATs as they provide great tactical flexibility,” he said. “In addition, the X-37B experimental small space plane should be developed into a combat/military surveillance capable platform.”

The Washington Free Beacon first disclosed in October 2012 that China was developing a DN-2 ASAT interceptor for use against satellites in geosynchronous orbit, around 22,000 miles high.

Fisher also said: “By the early 2020s China will have high-orbit ASATs targeting U.S. early warning satellites and a significantly larger nuclear missile force defended by active missile defenses. If the U.S. continues to reduce its nuclear warhead numbers, as is being sought by the Obama administration, Americans could be facing a period of great strategic nuclear vulnerability.”

Mark Stokes, a former Pentagon specialist on the Chinese military, said the most recent ASAT test was designed to “demonstrate potential intent to deny freedom of space flight” over Chinese territory.

A key question is whether the July 23 test was conducted by China’s state-run aerospace industry or its Second Artillery Corps, the People’s Liberation Army unit in charge of strategic missile and nuclear forces.

“If it was the aerospace industry, it means the system is still in R&D,” said Stokes, an expert at the Project 2049 Institute. “If it was Air Force or Second Artillery conducting a live fire test, it means the system is already operationally available.”

Stokes said China’s ASAT missiles are similar to missile defense interceptors.

The designation “DN” for the ASAT weapons may refer to “dongneng,” the Chinese term for kinetic.

“There have been authoritative references to a dongneng (kinetic) ASAT program, which began in 2006,” he said.

Additionally, the DN-1 and DN-2 may be fired from two interceptors, the HQ-19 and the HQ-26.

“The HQ-19 could use a single stage and the HQ-26, if this is the true designation, could use two stages that would give it a higher reach,” Stokes said.

“There have been authoritative references to a new solid motor under development since early last year that could be relevant.”

A kinetic kill vehicle for disabling satellites may employ infrared imaging and other advanced guidance technologies, he said.

On the Russian strategic nuclear bomber incursions, Haney said he was also troubled by Russian strategic nuclear forces conducting large-scale exercises during the recent crisis over Ukraine.

The Free Beacon first disclosed earlier this month that Russian bombers conducted at least 16 aerial incursions near Alaska in what officials said appeared to indicate testing of U.S. strategic air defenses.

Asked if the bombers were testing defenses, Haney said: “Well, I would say over our history, this isn’t the first time Russia has done this sort of thing.”

“But I will not try to say what’s in the leadership of Russia, Putin’s mind, in terms of why he picked the time and place that he did to do the number of excursions that he did here a week ago,” he said.

Henri K.

2 exercices du 2nd corps d'artillerie, ici principalement les unités de DF-3A et de DF-21A





Henri K.

2 unités du 2nd corps d'artillerie s'affrontent. L'unité jouant le rôle de l'OPFOR a réussit d'empêcher l'autre unité de tirer des missiles balistiques.



Henri K.

Exercice de soutien logistique du 2nd corps d'artillerie en haute altitude.



Henri K.

Le 23 Septembre 2014, le 2nd corps d'artillerie, la marine et l'armée de l'air ont mené un exercice conjoint dans la mer de Chine méridionale.

http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2014/09/23/7551s4703548.htm

L'objectif de l'exercice est d'évaluer la capacité du commandement conjoint, la frappe coordonnée trans-armées, et l'attaque contre les cibles en mer...etc. Les avions de combat, les chasseur-bombardiers, les bombardiers, les destroyers, les frégates, les sous-marins ainsi que les missiles balistiques ont participé aux manœuvres.

D'après l'article et la vidéo de CCTV, les 3 armées ont partagé la même plateforme C4IR.



Henri K.

Exercice d'une unité du 2nd corps d'artille qui simule le tir des vieux missiles balistiques à ergol liquide sous la surveillance des satellites d'ennemi.



Henri K.