[Information] Photos & Vidéos de PLA Air Force

L'exercice aérien conjoint sino-pakistanais Shaheen-IV est démarré aujourd'hui, selon le porte-paroles de l'armée de l'air chinoise.

http://kj.81.cn/content/2015-09/06/content_6666659.htm

Une série de scénarios de confrontation sera simulée. La Chine envoie les chasseurs, les chasseur-bombardiers et les AWACS pour cet exercice alors que l'armée pakistanaise participe avec ses chasseurs et les AWACS.

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Henri K.

L'armée de l'air chinoise a organisé une journée portes ouvertes à Changchun.

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Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

L'armée de l'air chinoise a organisé une journée portes ouvertes à Changchun.[…]

Ouvertes……… à tout le monde ?……  Superbes photos, en tout cas !…

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Ouvertes……… à tout le monde ?……  Superbes photos, en tout cas !…

Oui.

Henri K.

Dans la journée portes ouvertes de l'armée de l'air chinoise à Changchun...

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Henri K.

la démonstration en vol de l'équipe acrobatique 1er Août de l'armée de l'air chinoise, lors des journées portes ouvertes à Changchun









Les élèves pilotes de chasse ont également volé dans leur avions d'entrainement CJ-6



Henri K.

Le 15 Septembre 2015, les missiles PL-10 et PL-15 ont effectué leur tir de validation avec succès.

Les missiles Air-Air chinois commencent à entrer dans une nouvelle ère et dans une toute nouvelle génération.

Henri K.

Le 18 Septembre 1931, le Japon impérial a provoqué l'Incident de Mukden, l'invasion japonaise en Chine a commencé.

84 ans après jour pour jour, le secteur aéronautique chinois a envoyé aujourd'hui un signal, un signal fort même, avec 3 événements majeurs :

1) L'appareil immatriculé #2016 devient le 7ème avion J-20 qui a volé. Son vol inaugural a commencé à 15h35 heure locale.

Spoiler:

2) Le même jour, un J-10B de série, équipé d'un moteur chinois WS-10B, a effectué son vol également.

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3) L'information la plus importante du jour : D'après le journal officiel "China Aviation News", un avion hypersonique a effectué son vol d'essai depuis le CFTE (China Flight Test Establishment). Il n'y a aucune photo publiée à ce jour mais l'article a donné beaucoup de détails intéressants :

* L'engin hypersonique a décollé comme un avion, puisque l'article parle de "l'avion effectue son taxiing, décolle, et disparaît à l'horizon..."

* L'article parle d'un avion "de profil de mission très spécial, le mode vol unique, la vitesse de vol et la hauteur sont bien supérieures que tous les autres engins depuis la fondation du centre d'essais en vol".

* "Il s'agit d'un engin volant trans-génération"

* "Quelques heures après le décollage, la mission de vol est terminée. L'avion de couleur foncée s'est posé au sol en approchant la piste avec un angle élevé..."

* Cette phrase de l'article a suscité beaucoup interrogation, puisqu'elle parle de "avec l'envoi de l'instruction 'l'avion est à l'arrêt', cette mission est terminée avec succès...". Ceci laisse penser qu'il s'agit d'un drone.

* L'article s'est terminé par la phrase suivante, qui confirme le type de l'engin : "Cet essai en vol est le tout premier vol hypersonique du centre d'essai en vol...[....] Pour les jeunes du centre d'essai en vol, ici est d'un nouveau point de départ, ici est là où un rêve commence..."

Une nouvelle ère de l'aéronautique chinois a commencé. Après 60 ans d'effort et de douleur, les Chinois viennent de nous montrer qu'ils ont commencé à tracer leur propre route. Et comme ce qu'ils disent, ce n'est qu'un début...

Et, sans avoir suivi toutes ces nouvelles dans la journée, et comme par hasard, c'est aussi aujourd'hui que j'ai déposé ma demande de mutation définitive en Chine. Soit à Tianjin, soit à Hong Kong, et on m'a donné le premier avis favorable...

Henri K.

Le monde commence à tourner à l'envers... L'USAF qui cherche à disposer d'un missile Air-Air longue portée pour surpasser le missile chinois PL-15.

Les missiles Air-Air à statoréacteur, c'est déjà "outdated". D'ailleurs les Chinois comme les Américains ont tous arrêtés de développer les missiles avec ce type de propulsion et se tourner vers du dual pulse.

USAF seeks ‘interim’ CHAMP, longer-range air-to-air missiles

Citation :

16 SEPTEMBER, 2015 BY: JAMES DREW WASHINGTON DC

The US Air Force plans to introduce Boeing and Raytheon’s “CHAMP” high-power-microwave emitting cruise missile into the combat force on board the 1990s conventional air-launched cruise missile as an “interim capability” while the technology transitions to Lockheed Martin’s JASSM-ER.

Air Combat Command chief Gen Hawk Carlisle says the computer-killing capability, which knocks out electronic equipment with bursts of high-frequency electromagnetic energy, is a “great capability” that will be fielded in small numbers initially with US Global Strike Command – the air force’s nuclear combat force.

“We’ve talked about the transition of that capability for Global Strike Command, but that will probably be small numbers because what we really want to do is get CHAMP into next-generation missiles, so JASSM-ER,” Carlisle said at an Air Force Association event in Washington.

“[Global Strike commander Gen Robin Rand] and I are talking about how to transition some number, an interim capability that’s on the current [CALCM] system and then how do we move to even an improved capability into the next generation air-to-surface cruise missiles we’re producing today.”

The weapon has been in development with the Air Force Research Laboratory since 2009 and was successfully demonstrated at a test range in Utah in 2012. The technology has been deemed ready for development and fielding, and is already being improved and adapted to new platforms such as the JASSM-ER and possibly even reusable unmanned aircraft.

AFRL has been pursuing the Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) as a niche capability that is difficult and expensive to harden against.

In terms of air superiority weapons, Carlisle says the development of next-generation air-to-air missiles is also “an exceptionally high priority”.

Raytheon’s AMRAAM is the current go-to Western weapon for beyond-visual-range air combat, but new long-range missiles being fielded by Russia and China are a significant concern to the Pentagon.

Carlisle says outmatching the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missile in particular is an “exceedingly high priority”.

“The PL-15 and the range of that missile, we’ve got to be able to out-stick that missile,” he says.

The air force is currently exploring a range of next-generation weapon concepts as it also pursues a sixth-generation fighter aircraft.

Henri K.

CHINESE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE HITS TARGETS, SPOOKS USAF GENERAL

Citation :

PL-15 IS CHINA'S BEST AND BADDEST AERIAL WEAPON YET
By Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer Posted September 22, 2015

Beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) are long-range missiles used by fighters to knock out enemy fighters, bombers, tankers, drones and other aircraft from ranges beyond 30km. On September 15, 2015, China successfully test fired its latest iteration, the PL-15, firing from a fighter to destroy a target drone.

The PL-15 is developed by the 607 Institute. It is the replacement for China's current BVRAAM, the radar guided, PL-12, which reportedly has a range of approximately 100km. Compared to the PL-12, the PL-15 has an improved active radar seeker and jam-resistant datalinks, along with a dual pulse rocket motor to extend its range.

Even in the prototype stage, the PL-15 is already an international star. Speaking at the 2015 Air Force Association conference the same week as the test, USAF Air Combatant Commander General Hawk Carlisle cited the PL-15 as the reason for Congress to fund a new missile to replace the American AMRAAM. His reasons for concern is the PL-15's range. By incorporating a ramjet engine, its range could reach 150-200km, was well as its terminal maneuverability. That would out-range existing American air-to-air missiles, making the PL-15 not just a threat to fighters like the F-35, but also to US bombers and aerial tankers critical to American air operations across the vast Pacific. General Carlisle called "out-sticking" the PL-15 a high priority for the USAF.

As the PL-15 moves to deployment stage, it will equip Chinese stealth fighter jets, such as the J-20 and J-31, as well as the older J-10, J-11, J-15 and J-16 fighters. This makes keeping up with the PL-15 an important part of American efforts to out-do an innovative and improving Chinese military system.

Henri K.

Les jeunes recrues de l'armée parachutiste effectuent un entrainement de saut.



L'entrainement d'une unité d'attaque Air-Sol avec les Q-5.



Henri K.

Le risque est de plus en plus élevé pour les forces aériennes des Etats Unis d'intervenir près de la Chine, au Taïwan et dans la mer de Chine méridionale notamment, estime le think tank RAND Corporation dans son nouveau rapport.

Par exemple, il a fallu seulement 2 Air Wings (brigade aérienne) pour assurer la supériorité aérienne au dessus du Taïwan en 1996, il en faudrait 30 en 2017, soit 2/3 de toutes les forces aériennes des Etats Unis actuellement.

U.S. and Chinese Air Superiority Capabilities

Citation :

An Assessment of Relative Advantage, 1996–2017

by Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki, Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris

Over the past two decades, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. A RAND Project AIR FORCE report assesses trends in the relative capabilities of U.S. and Chinese forces in diverse operational areas, and at varying distances from the Chinese mainland, between 1996 and 2017. The overall conclusion is that although China continues to lag behind the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware and operational skills, it has improved its capabilities relative to those of the United States in many critical areas. Moreover, the report finds that China does not need to catch up fully to the United States to challenge the U.S. ability to conduct effective military operations near the Chinese mainland. To be clear, the goal is to avoid war, which the authors do not anticipate and which would be disastrous for both countries. Rather, this research provides an open-source assessment of trends that could affect U.S. defense and deterrence efforts and establishes a baseline for future analysis.

Focus on Air Superiority

This brief focuses on one area in which China has made rapid relative improvements: the ability to contest U.S. air superiority in an Asian conflict. Historically, PLA air forces have not posed much threat to neighboring countries. In the past two decades, however, China has rapidly modernized its airpower. Whereas in 1996 China had just taken delivery of its first batch of 24 fourth-generation fighters, it now operates more than 700. The United States, in the meantime, has added fifth-generation fighters to its inventory, and its fleet remains both more advanced and larger than China's. Balanced against the aggregate U.S. advantage, however, are geographic and situational factors: China would enjoy the advantages of proximity in most Asian conflict scenarios. It would be able to operate from far more bases, allowing it to bring more aircraft to bear in a conflict, and its vital assets would be both dispersed over much greater areas and hardened against attack. Moreover, the few U.S. air bases within close proximity would likely face Chinese missile attack, degrading their ability to support operations.

How would the evolution of Chinese and U.S. forces interact with other situational factors to affect the air superiority battle? To assess this question, the researchers modeled air combat in four snapshot years between 1996 and 2017, in two scenarios at different distances from the Chinese coast: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a campaign over the Spratly Islands. For each scenario, they calculated the size of the U.S. force (in 72-aircraft wings) required in theater to achieve two possible U.S. objectives. The first and more demanding objective would be to maintain a continuous presence in allied airspace sufficient to defeat a surge of attacking Chinese aircraft. The second would be to destroy, over time, enough Chinese aircraft to convince PLA leaders to abandon the air campaign — a threshold set for analytical purposes at 50 percent of the Chinese air forces involved in the campaign. In the latter case, the researchers examined the requirements associated with gaining air superiority within seven days and 21 days.

Model inputs included publicly available performance parameters for different types of aircraft; the total number and type of aircraft involved; the effectiveness of the air-to-air weapons employed; the number, types, and locations of bases; estimated aircraft and crew availability rates; and flight times to and from combat areas. Some allowance was also made for U.S. advantages in pilot training. The results are not intended to predict the precise outcomes of a conflict. Rather, they offer a picture of the evolving balance of airpower, indicating the general scale of effort that would have been required in each of the snapshot years, as well as the direction and speed of change.

Assessing Sufficiency in Taiwan Scenario

China's geographic advantages would be most pronounced in a Taiwan scenario, in which Chinese basing options are plentiful and close to the likely combat areas and U.S. forces must operate over long distances from a more limited set of locations. This disparity would have been less relevant in 1996, when China operated a small force of antiquated aircraft, but it has become more important as China improves its air and missile forces.



Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the evolving balance of airpower. As shown in the light-shaded bars, only two U.S. wings would have been required in theater to maintain 24/7 air dominance from the outset of a conflict over Taiwan in 1996. By 2010, improvements in Chinese air forces and missile capabilities increase this requirement to between nine and 20 wings (depending on how far away U.S. forces must be based). The higher requirement exceeds the total number of U.S. fighter wings, and basing within range of operational areas would almost certainly have been insufficient to support even the smaller number (especially given the significant requirements for tanker basing). By 2010, achieving 24/7 air dominance at the outset of a conflict was, and remains, unsustainable.

The United States would have better prospects of prevailing in an attrition campaign designed to defeat a Chinese air offensive over time. Nevertheless, PLA Air Force modernization has made such a campaign more challenging. The number of wings required is shown as medium-shaded bars (seven days) and dark-shaded bars (21 days) in Figure 1. Even in the attrition case, the United States would face increasing difficulty meeting its objectives in 2017, as more aircraft would be required, and there would be fewer bases to offer safety from Chinese missiles.

The results should be understood in context. China cannot achieve air superiority in any of these cases, and U.S. fighters achieve high kill ratios throughout. Relaxing the 21-day time requirement would reduce U.S. in-theater force requirements to levels that might be supported more easily by the available basing infrastructure. However, until U.S. forces achieve air superiority, the PLA air forces would largely have a free hand in attacking targets in Taiwan. A ground campaign in Taiwan would likely be decided relatively quickly, and the inability of U.S. air forces to achieve air superiority during that time would deprive U.S. and friendly forces of much-needed air support.

Assessing Sufficiency in the Spratly Islands Scenario

The challenge to U.S. air superiority is less pronounced in the Spratly Islands scenario. While the modernization of China's air capability has progressively increased the U.S. forces required to prevail in such a contest, the islands are considerably farther from China than Taiwan. Geography would, therefore, largely work against China. Few Chinese fighters would have the range to conduct operations over the Spratly Islands without refueling in the 1996 and 2003 snapshot years.[1] By 2017, China could field a more substantial force of fighters and strike aircraft (including Su-27s, Su-30MKKs, and JH-7s, as well as H-6 bombers) against targets in this area, though most of these aircraft would still be operating near the limit of their range, and the total number would be restricted by the small (but growing) number of bases in the Guangzhou Military Region capable of supporting such operations.



The modeling results, shown in Figure 2, suggest that, as in the Taiwan case, it would have been virtually impossible for the United States to maintain a decisive 24/7 presence from the outset of a conflict after 2010. However, the results also suggest that the United States would be able to achieve attrition-based air superiority in a relevant time frame even in the 2017 case, though the required in-theater force structure grows over time.

Conclusions

The United States continues to maintain unparalleled air-to-air capabilities. Even in the most challenging cases examined, the United States does not "lose" the war in the air. However, continuous improvements to Chinese air capabilities make it increasingly difficult for the United States to achieve air superiority within a politically and operationally effective time frame, especially in a scenario close to the Chinese mainland. These developments also raise the probable cost of a war in terms of lives and equipment. In both scenarios examined, the United States could improve its results and reduce force requirements by attacking Chinese air bases, thereby reducing the number of adversary aircraft that can reach the fight. However, the decision to launch such attacks would require executive approval and, depending on circumstances, permission might not be forthcoming. Certainly, such attacks would be potentially escalatory. Regardless of U.S. action, China may also pursue a similar strategy against U.S. air bases, employing its large and sophisticated force of conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles. Overall, the results indicate that, in the face of PLA Air Force modernization, achieving air superiority early in a conflict is becoming increasingly difficult. Consequently, U.S. and partner ground and naval forces may have to operate with only limited air support for some period after the commencement of hostilities, should a conflict occur.

Henri K.

Reportages CCTV du crash d'un J-10A il y a quelques jours :





Le moteur AL-31FN est arrêté alors que l'appareil est en entrainement nocturne à 3 500 m d'altitude. Le pilote a tenté en vain de rallumer plusieurs fois le moteur et s'est éjecté 198 seconds après l'incident à 351 m d'altitude, après avoir piloté l'avion d'éviter 2 zones résidentielles.

Bien que les reportages ne précisent pas l'unité à laquelle appartient le J-10A, il s'agit du 2ème régiment de la 1ère division de chasse basé à Chifeng, dans le Nord Est du pays.

On remarque également que le mouvement de l'avion est suivi en temps réel dans le système ECATS de l'armée de l'air chinoise.

On voit également dans l'écran au sol l'HUD et les 3 MFTs du cockpit du J-10A. On entend aussi la voie féminine synthétique de l'ordinateur de bord qui répète : "Descendre le train, descendre le train, descendre le train...". L'appareil devrait avoir passé en dessous de 500 m d'altitude.

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Henri K.

Selon une annonce officielle, le plan de fusion et de restructuration des 3 entités de motorisation du groupe AVIC est en cours d'élaboration. La cotation en bourse de ces 3 entités a été suspendue depuis le 30 Septembre.

http://finance.china.com.cn/stock/20151014/3379871.shtml

Il est donc possible qu'après la fusion un géant de motorisation soit formé.

Henri K.

Le développement du moteur de double impulsion à ergol solide est dans un état avancé chez le groupe CASIC, 7 essais au sol ont eu lieu avec succès.

http://www.dljs.casic.cn/n1605875/n1605911/c2405824/content.html

Henri K.

Étrange zone NOTAM, active pendant 2h le matin du 17 Octobre et pour toute altitude au dessus de 5 000 m...

Citation :

A2963/15 NOTAMN
Q) ZXXX/QRTCA/IV/BO/W/000/999/4311N11651E204
A) ZBPE ZYSH B) 1510170100 C) 1510170300
E) A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:
N421644E1123144-N422305E1130513-N441308E1170100-N442725E1175556-
N440513E1202552-N442309E1202515-N442620E1210838-N435145E1211019-
N434527E1202642-N440955E1175715-N440241E1170720-N415913E1131200
N415517E1123342BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-5000M(AMSL).
F) SFC G) 5000M AMSL

Spoiler:

La zone est longue de 500 km puis 250 km.

Pour le moment je ne sais pas ce que c'est, enfin si, peut-être une petite idée mais vraiment pas sûr...

Henri K.

Avec ses multiples avancées technologiques et les programmes de recherche pour l'aéronautique chinois, l'Institut 611 de Chengdu, qui est le bureau d'études de J-10, J-20, les divers MALE et HALE ainsi que les drones hypersoniques et l'avion aérospatial, est devenu ces dernières années la cible d'attaque et d'espionnage des pays étrangers.

4 personnels de l'Institut ont été arrêtés pour avoir été corrompus par les services étrangers - des plans, des détails techniques, des informations sur les jalons importants des programmes...etc ont été vendus.



Henri K.

WTF...

Spoiler:

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

WTF...

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[…].

Joli zinc !

DahliaBleue a écrit:

Henri K. a écrit:

WTF...

Spoiler:

[…].

Joli zinc !

MoiMoi a écrit:

DahliaBleue a écrit:

[…] Joli zinc ! : thumleft:

: eek:

   Bon, d'accord, je me sens un peu incomprise dans mon appréciation esthétique…

DahliaBleue a écrit:

MoiMoi a écrit:

DahliaBleue a écrit:

[…] Joli zinc ! : thumleft:

: eek:

   Bon, d'accord, je me sens un peu incomprise dans mon appréciation esthétique…

Non non, ce n'est pas ça: je le trouve sympa !
C'est surtout que cela va sans doute au delà d'un changement au niveau des plans canards: c'est sans doute un tout nouvel avion !

MoiMoi a écrit:

[…] Non non, ce n'est pas ça: je le trouve sympa !
C'est surtout que cela va sans doute au delà d'un changement au niveau des plans canards: c'est sans doute un tout nouvel avion !

Au temps pour moi… je n'avais pas compris le sens de l’émoticône…
Mais de là à qualifier ce zinc de "WTF" ( ), il y a un pas que je ne saurais franchir…

Henri K. a écrit:

Avec ses multiples avancées technologiques et les programmes de recherche pour l'aéronautique chinois, l'Institut 611 de Chengdu […] est devenu ces dernières années la cible d'attaque et d'espionnage des pays étrangers.
4 personnels de l'Institut ont été arrêtés pour avoir été corrompus par les services étrangers - des plans, des détails techniques, des informations sur les jalons importants des programmes… etc ont été vendus.[…]

Je sens que ça va leur coûter très cher, cette trahison ! Et sait-on quels sont les pays étrangers qui se sont rendu coupables de telles infamies ?

La force aérienne de l'armée de l'air et de la marine sous la région militaire de Guangzhou ont mené un exercice conjoint. Les chasseurs, les AWACS, les ravitailleurs et les bombardiers ont participé aux manœuvres



Henri K.