[Information] DF-26 : IRBM & ASBM

DF-26 IRBM may have ASM variant, China reveals at 3 September parade

Citation :

Richard D Fisher Jr, Washington, DC - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
02 September 2015



One of the surprising revelations from Chinese television announcers during the 3 September military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War was that the newly revealed DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) may have an anti-ship variant.

In addition to conducting "nuclear counterattack" missions, the DF-26 could also attack "medium-size ships at sea" as part of "conventional long-range precision strike", said the announcer.

As the DF-26's estimated range is 3,000-4,000 km, this missile might enable the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to target US Navy formations in the "Second Island Chain" or out to Guam.

The parade announcer's indication that it could target "medium-size ships" may mean the missile is accurate enough to attack destroyer-size ships in addition to aircraft carriers.

The DF-26 could therefore be regarded as a second-generation anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) in addition to the DF-21D, which was also revealed on 3 September for the first time. The DF-21D has an estimated range of 1,700 km.

The DF-26's appearance in the 3 September parade indicates that it is a deployed system. The television announcer's mention of an anti-ship version could mean this variant is also deployed.

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Henri K.

2-me Artillerie construit deux nouvelles bases complètement à partir de zéro: l'un d'eux est pour DF-31A et l'autre couvre également Diego Garcia et Guam.

P.S. ... et toute l'Inde.

12 TEL IRBM/ASBM DF-26 étaient à Pékin pour le défilé, d'autres sont à l'Ouest du pays près du Désert de Gobi pour une campagne d'évaluation de mobilité et de collecte de données, selon le journal chinois "Science and technology Daily".

http://digitalpaper.stdaily.com/http_www.kjrb.com/kjrb/images/2015-09/05/01/DefPub2015090501.pdf

Henri K.

Nixy a écrit:

2-me Artillerie construit deux nouvelles bases complètement à partir de zéro: l'un d'eux est pour DF-31A et l'autre couvre également Diego Garcia et Guam.

P.S. ... et toute l'Inde.[…]

Pour l'instant, c'est une caserne avec son stade d'athlétisme bien en évidence

... et garages pour véhicules de support, 2 garages de grande hauteur pour TELs et un grand bâtiment de montage.
vous pouvez difficilement trouver une garnison de la brigade plus typique.
juste pour comparer (espère que vous savez ce qu'il est)  

Merci beaucoup Henry K.
Ce camp d'entraînement d'été est toujours plein en Juillet-Septembre (selon GE).

@ Nixy, je n'ai pas les coordonnées exactes de ces 2 dernières positions, peux-tu m'aider ?

Merci.

Henri K.

Bien sûr.

camp d'entraînement d'été Da Qaidam     37 58 00N  95 08 30E

805 Brigade, DF-31 garnison Shaoyang    27 15 11N  111 23 08E        


Est-il possible de poster un .kmz sur ce forum?

Merci. Il me semble que l'unité 96313 a plusieurs bases, pas uniquement celle de Shaoyang.

En bonus une pièce de commémoration pour célébrer le 50ème anniversaire de cette unité. C'était en 2011.





A Da Qaidam il y a, me semble-t-il, la brigade 814 du 2nd corps d'artillerie.

Pour partager les documents, il y a Free FTP ou Google Doc.

Henri K.

2011 citation:

"Formerly based in Hunan’s Tongdao (通道) County, the 805 Brigade (96313 Unit) initiated construction of new facilities in Shaoyang in 2008 and completed its relocation last year (Shaoyang Daily, August 12, 2010; shaoyangtv.com, February 11, 2010; shaoyang.gov.cn, August 12, 2010). Older facilities in Tongdao County were being dismantled in 2010 (tdsfxz.gov.cn, January 11, 2011)."

1974 US intel:



cette image peut montrer que future base 55 était initialement situé à Shaoyang.

Dans un article officiel de China News publié le jour de la parade V-day au 3 Septembre 2015, il est mentionné que les unités qui défilaient font parties de la flotte du Nord qui avait procédé aux tirs des missiles stratégique mobiles (missile balistique sur TEL) récemment, dans le paragraphe qui parle de l'adjoint commandant en chef de la flotte du Nord Geng Qun LIU (刘庚群). Le fait qu'ils utilisent le mot "stratégique" me laisse penser qu'il s'agit du missile ASBM DF-26, et non l'autre ASBM DF-21D, qui dans le vocabulaire officiel chinois est désigné souvent par le mot "Missile balistique de portée moyenne".

Il est donc intéressant de savoir quand précisément ces tirs ont eu lieu depuis les éléments qui nous sont accessibles.

http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/09-03/7504614.shtml

Jusqu'à au moins le mois Février 2015, Geng Qun LIU était encore simplement le commandant des unités de la marine basées à Dalian, j'ai commencé donc ma recherche sur toutes les indices (HYDROPAC, NOTAM, notification de navigation locale) pour la période de Q4 2014 à Août 2015, pour une direction de tir du Nord de Dalian vers le Sud, plus précisément vers la Baie de Bohai. Donc on doit rechercher les jours où les NOTAM et les notifications d'interdiction de navigation locale coïncident sur cet axe.

================================================================================

La première date qui correspond à ces critères est le 29 et le 30 Décembre 2014. Deux notifications d'interdiction de navigation de la province de Liaonin indiquent une zone large fermée pour mission militaire, et 5 notifications NOTAM sont actives pour la même période.

Citation :

辽航警0310
渤海北部，12月29日0800时至12月30日2000时，在下列连线水域内执行军事任务：
A: 38°37′00″N　120°43′00″E
B: 38°22′00″N　119°55′00″E
C: 38°32′00″N　119°12′00″E
D: 39°54′00″N　119°42′00″E
E: 39°45′00″N　120°25′00″E
F: 38°43′00″N　120°04′00″E
任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意。辽航警。

辽航警0311
渤海，12月29日0800时至30日2000时，在下列6点连线水域内执行军事任务：
1. 38°37′N　120°43′E
2. 38°22′N　119°55′E
3. 38°32′N　119°12′E
4. 39°54′N　119°42′E
5. 39°45′N　120°25′E
6. 38°43′N　120°04′E
任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意,辽航警。

A2659/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT N4601E12233 WITH RADIUS OF 20KM. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 08:56 2014

A2660/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N4426E12152-N4432E12131-N4512E12152-N4506E12214 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 08:59 2014

A2661/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N3915E12005-N3921E11938-N3947E11947-N3941E12014 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:01 2014

A2662/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED CENTERED AT N3926E11953 WITH RADIUS OF 30KM. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:05 2014

A2663/14 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N3847E11948-N3850E11934-N3922E11943-N3918E12002 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS: GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 30 DEC 00:20 2014 UNTIL 30 DEC 01:15 2014. CREATED: 29 DEC 09:07 2014

Spoiler:

Sur une carte c'est plus claire : Le missile est parti d'un pas de tir situé dans la frontière entre la province de Jilin et de la Mongolie intérieure (cercle orange en haut), avec une première zone de chute du 1er étage à 150 km Sud-Ouest du point de départ. Les autres zones jaunes sont de NOTAM, et le polygone rouge vient des notifications d'interdiction de navigation qui sont identiques.

L'axe non aligné entre les 2 premiers éléments et la zone cible (cercle orange en bas) suggère une manœuvre aérodynamique en phase d'approche. La distance parcourue est un peu moins de 800 km pour ce tir :

Spoiler:

En partant de ce pas de tir, si on trace 2 cercles de 1 700 km et de 4 000 km de diamètre, on voit des choses intéressantes :

Spoiler:

================================================================================

La 2ème date est le 17 Juillet 2015. Je pars toujours de la notification d'interdiction de navigation LIAO-0167, qui indique la fermeture de la zone pour mission militaire :

Citation :

辽航警0167
渤海北部，7月16日1200时至7月18日1800时,在下列各点顺序连线水域内执行军事任务：
1: 40°28′00″N　120°56′00″E
2: 40°20′00″N　121°08′00″E
3: 39°41′00″N　120°15′00″E
4: 38°22′00″N　120°00′00″E
5: 38°32′00″N　119°15′00″E
6: 39°42′00″N　119°36′00″E
任何船只在上述时间内不得进入该海域,希各航船注意。辽航警。

2 zones d'interdiction de vol temporaire sont actives durant cette période :

Citation :

A1959/15 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY: N442549E1215205-N443140E1213035-N451158E1215228-N450604E1221348 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 2310-2350,0510-0550, 16 JUL 23:10 2015 UNTIL 17 JUL 05:50 2015. CREATED: 16 JUL 11:38 2015

A1961/15 - A TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA ESTABLISHED BOUNDED BY:N391505E1200449-N384718E1194733-N385012E1193414-N392057E1193802- N394659E1194726-N394105E1201423 BACK TO START. VERTICAL LIMITS:GND-UNL. GND - UNL, 2310-2359,0510-0600, 16 JUL 23:10 2015 UNTIL 17 JUL 06:00 2015. CREATED: 16 JUL 11:41 2015

Et on obtient ceci :

Spoiler:

En superposant le tir du 30 Décembre 2014 (en orange) et celui du 17 Juillet 2015 (en vert), on s'aperçoit que les premières zones de chute du 1er étage sont parfaitement alignées, il s'agirait donc le même type de missile. On constate un peu près la même chose pour les zones cibles.

Spoiler:

================================================================================

On ignore pour le moment s'il s'agit des tirs d'essai, des tirs de validation ou des tirs d’échantillonnage, mais le fait que les équipements défilés sont tous opérationnels, je pencherais personnellement plus vers des tirs d’échantillonnage, donc le missile DF-26 est pleinement opérationnel.

Henri K.

Je souhaite que nous convenons tous que le plan ne fonctionne pas ou tester des missiles balistiques mobiles.
Flotte de la mer du Nord était capable d'aider à la réalisation d'essais de missiles balistiques contre des cibles de mer, comme le porte-avions et peut fournir des informations techniques nécessaires.
Ports de Huludao et Qinhuangdao ont une flotte de différentes cibles flottantes.
Huludao est le site navale de test principal.

Pintangzhen est une grande champ de test de l'Armée.
Nous pouvons voir que PLAN testé quelques missiles à partir de son site d'essai principale navale à une distance d'environ 750 km (route alternative est la mer Jaune avec le trafic de la mer occupé).

Peux tu regarder à N4601E12233 et me dire ce que tu en penses ?

Henri K.

il est l'angle nord-ouest du camp d'essai de l'armée, qui je l'ai mentionné ci-dessus.
(polygonale montré conditionnellement )

Un article de Bill GERTZ sur IRBM / ASBM chinois DF-26...

Access vs. anti-access: China, US posture in anti-ship missile face off

Citation :

BY BILL GERTZ on DECEMBER 14, 2015 in CHINA

The People’s Liberation Army last month disclosed new details about its new intermediate-range anti-ship ballistic missile known as the DF-26.

The missile can be armed with nuclear or conventional warheads and supplements the shorter range DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile that along with the DF-26 are elements of a military strategy of building arms designed to force the US military to operate further away from Chinese shores.

First displayed in September during the high-profile military parade in Beijing, the DF-26 is known by the Chinese as the “Guam killer” because it gives PLA war planners the new capability of targeting the major US military hub in the south Pacific island – out of range for most of the short- and medium-range missiles.

Two military analysts from the China Academy of Military Sciences revealed new details about the missile they described in a news article as a two-for-one weapon.

“The DF-26’s distinct characteristic of being nuclear and conventional all in one; that is, one missile body can carry a nuclear warhead for a nuclear strike against the enemy, or it can carry a conventional warhead for conventional firepower attack against the enemy,” Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming stated in the Nov. 30 issue of China Youth Daily.

“That ‘change the warhead, not the missile’ feature provides a rapid switch between nuclear and conventional.”

The conventional DF-26 system extends the striking range from the 620-mile DF-21D anti-ship missile to 2,485 miles.

The missile system also is based on a road-mobile launcher, making it difficult for U.S. intelligence assets to find and track – and counter with US sea-based Aegis missile defenses or, as on Guam, with long-range THAAD anti-missile interceptors.

“Thus it further upgrades joint land, sea, and air firepower attack capability,” the analysts said. “In particular, it can, along with forward deployed surface and underwater attack forces and ship borne, shore-based, and air war forces, execute long, medium, and short-range integrated attacks against large vessels at sea, and integrated, land, sea, and air attacks.”

The authors describe the key feature of the solid-fueled DF-26 as being fast – with the rapid switch from conventional to nuclear warheads; quick launch preparation time; and fast road withdrawal after firing.

Its modular features allow for the use of several types of warheads, including two types of nuclear re-entry vehicles, and several conventional warheads each with differing destructive capabilities, such as area attacks for use against airfields and ports, ground penetrators for buried targets, and fuel-air explosives for use against electronic targets.

The authors regard the DF-26 as a state-of-the-art missile and China’s prize possession to support what they said is the military concept of “use offense to assist defense.”

“Against time-sensitive targets such as surface ships in particular, [the DF-26] can attack at the last minute as soon as information on a ship’s movement is acquired, meaning the ship cannot get away,” Wang and Fang state.

The weapon is clearly directed at the United States, a country the authors say is taking steps to build up forces in Asia and “hype” the threat from China.

They accuse the United States of using the renamed Air Sea Battle Concept called Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons to split the region and disrupt stability.

America “has stepped up relevant preparations” for military action in the region, they say.

For these reasons, the authors argue, the DF-26 is one of the PLA’s most important weapons, despite the complexity of the its use that will require networked “combat chain” of data from numerous sensors and other systems used for targeting and attack.

China’s new weapons like the DF-26 have ended a decades-long period when the US military projected power will little or no risk. “That era is gone,” Thomas Mahnken, a US Naval War College expert on the Chinese military, said last week during a conference hosted by the Heritage Foundation.

Today, the US military is developing asymmetric responses to Chinese weapons like the DF-26 that the Pentagon calls “anti-access, area denial” arms, and that China calls “counter-intervention” weapons.

“China really has been at the forefront of pursuing some of these counter-intervention capabilities that pose a significant challenge,” Mahnken said.

“China is deploying capabilities to deter the United States and its allies from taking action close to China,” he added. “Those deployments are imposing considerable costs to us collectively and they have given Beijing momentum.”

The Pentagon’s response to these new Chinese weapons has been modest, in part due to defense budget shortfalls and demands for military support in the Middle East against Islamic State terrorism.

The US buildup in Asia so far has included the deployment of several thousand troops to Australia, the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, and an additional attack submarine and regular rotations of B-52 and B-2 bombers to Guam.

Plans call for deploying a second aircraft carrier strike group to the region in the future.

A Pentagon policymaker outlined some steps the US military is taking to assure its forces and allies can gain access to the sea lanes and ports of the Asia Pacific in the face of the Chinese missile buildup and assertiveness.

Abraham M. Denmark, deputy assistant defense secretary for East Asia, bluntly stated last week that US forces will not be forced to retreat in the face of China’s new arms.

“I want to reiterate the US commitment to the Asia Pacific region should not be underestimated,” Denmark said. “There should be no question that the United States retains a decisive military edge today, and we are taking action to preserve and enhance our conventional deterrence for the long term.”

The immediate shift to Asia includes the best and newest weapons, he said, along with bolstering allies by providing arms and intelligence support.

Denmark did not provide details of the new capabilities planned for Asia. But he asserted that US military forces are being increased both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The plans call for trumping China’s high-technology weapons with new arms and military capabilities that will nullify the growing advantages.

For the DF-26, the Pentagon plans to disrupt the missile’s complex system for long-range strike capability through such things as cyber attacks on weapons and sensor systems. The electronic and other non-kinetic attacks will be aimed at disrupting this so-called “kill chain,” — the difficult task of finding, tracking, targeting and guiding missiles – before they can strike ships and other targets.

“We’re making heavy investments in forces for military operations in the Asia Pacific, including subsurface warfare, electronic warfare, space, cyber, missile defense, and more,” he said.

How much new military power will be added to Asia will depend on China’s behavior, Denmark said.

“How China rises and relates to the principled order that has undergirded regional peace, stability and security since the end of World War II will be a defining variable of the future security architecture of the Asia Pacific,” he said.

The recent disclosures about the DF-26 and Pentagon’s planned report shows that US-China big power rivalry is showing signs of increasing, despite the close economic and trade relations between the two states.

Bill Gertz is a journalist and author who has spent decades covering defense and national security affairs. He is the author of six national security books. Contact him on Twitter at @BillGertz

(Copyright 2015 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

16 TEL de DF-26 ont défilé le 3 Septembre à la cérémonie de victoire contre l'invasion japonaise

Spoiler:

Spoiler:

Sur cette image que j'ai fait sur un essai de DF-26 qui a eu lieu fin 2014, on peut voir la portée pessimiste de DF-26 s'il est lancé depuis le Nord Est de la Chine

Spoiler:

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Un article de Bill GERTZ sur IRBM / ASBM chinois DF-26 […]
Sur cette image que j'ai fait sur un essai de DF-26 qui a eu lieu fin 2014, on peut voir la portée pessimiste de DF-26 s'il est lancé depuis le Nord Est de la Chine […].

« pessimiste […] », ça dépend de quel point de vue…

Il y a encore pas si longtemps que ça, on les considère comme du bullshit chinois, de l'épouvantail, un truc qui ne peut pas exister.

Aujourd'hui, on fait couler de plus en plus de l'encre sur "eux". En pluriels puisque ce n'est plus DF-21D seul qui est en question, mais aussi DF-26, et tout un tas de système global que rares sont les pays au monde peuvent se permettent d'en disposer.

China's 2,500 Mile-Range 'Carrier-Killer' Missile: A Nuclear Threat?

Citation :

Harry J. Kazianis
December 18, 2015

When Americans ponder the phrase “national security” they likely think of only one thing these days: the Islamic State. And considering the headlines, who can blame them? However, news out of China concerning a new generation of “carrier-killer” missiles—now sporting a 2,500 mile range—should remind Washington’s national security leaders of the long-term challenges America faces in the Pacific.

Countless ink has already been spilled when it comes to China’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D, over the last six years or so. In September, Beijing unveiled a longer-range version of the weapon, the DF-26. While countless news articles marked the debut of the system, specific information on the new weapon was scarce. However, thanks to the sleuthing skills of U.S. Naval War College Professor Andrew Erickson, we now know a little more about the weapon—and its possible uses beyond the much discussed “killing” of carriers.

But first, a recap of how both the DF-21D and DF-26 work: The missile is launched from a mobile truck-mounted launcher into the atmosphere, with over-the-horizon radar, satellite tracking and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles providing guidance. It also incorporates a maneuverable warhead (MaRV) to help find its target—and defeat an adversary's missile defenses. Such a device could be instrumental in striking a vessel in the open ocean or denying access to a potential opponent in transiting to a conflict zone (think Taiwan or in the East and South China Seas).

So now that we know how the weapon works, the next set of questions are obvious: When would Beijing use it? What is the overall strategy for its use in a potential conflict? And what are its capabilities? This is where Andrew Erickson’s discovery comes in: he has uncovered the only in-depth article that gives at least some hard information concerning the weapon. While you can read the whole article here in Mandarin, written by Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming in China Youth Daily, here are five key points from the article worth knowing (the translation was also discovered by Dr. Erickson):

Point #1 - The DF-26 has multiple uses—not just killing carriers.

“In contrast with the DF-21D is the DF-26's distinct characteristic of being nuclear and conventional all in one; that is, the one missile body can carry a nuclear warhead [singular or plural not indicated] for a nuclear strike against the enemy, or it can carry a conventional warhead [singular or plural not indicated] for a conventional firepower attack against the enemy. That “change the warhead, not the missile” feature provides a rapid switch between nuclear and conventional.”

Point #2 - It Could Help Increases the Size of China’s Nuclear Arsenal in a Crisis.

“Given that China has only a limited number of nuclear weapons, and as a medium range ballistic missile, by changing to a nuclear warhead at the last minute it [the DF-26] can as needed form up a nuclear deterrent and nuclear counterattack capability linking long and short ranges and strategic and campaign roles.”

Point #3 - Mobility matters.

“Compared with silo launched and site launched ballistic missiles, another distinct characteristic of the DF-26 is that it can be launched on the move with no support. Land-based mobile launches in the past, whether with movement by rail or by road, all required a launch site prepared in advance. Although movement over a large area could be accomplished before or during a war, the destination of the move was always a prepared launch site. Because prepared launch sites are limited in number and easily exposed, destruction of a launch site could result in the bad situation of having missiles but not being able to launch them. Also, that sort of missile requires quite a lot of time to set up and get ready in a prepared launch site, which puts it at a great disadvantage against an encroaching enemy with strong mobility and a fast tempo of operation in its “combat chain.

"But the DF-26 does not rely on a site for mobile launching. It can move fast, and it has no strict demands for where it is launched. So that is helpful to movement of missile forces all over and in concealment, and it is helpful to the rapid deployment, rapid launch, and rapid displacement of combat elements. That means a boost to the missile force's survivability and to its attack ability. Against time-sensitive targets such as surface ships in particular, it [the DF-26] can attack at the last minute as soon as information on a ship's movement is acquired, meaning the ship cannot get away.”

Point #4 - Beijing wants to “use offense to assist defense” and is working towards “joint operations.”

“With the development of anti-identification, anti-interception, and highly integrated technology, the mobility, the ability to penetrate defenses, and the precision of strategic, campaign, and tactical missiles have all improved. By way of technical upgrades and merging into integrated, joint operations networked information systems, the DF-26's overall tactical and technical performance has continually improved to where it can be considered a prized possession which “uses offense to assist defense, meets challenges.”



Point #5 - Air-Sea Battle/JAM-GC is very much on China’s mind (maybe a reason they developed the DF-26?).

“Although the United States has repackaged “Air-Sea Integrated Battle” as a “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons” in order to balance the competing interests of the services, weaken the “hot war” flavor, lower the risk of “clashes,” and seek extra credit for “morality,” the overall message shows that its original concept and plan, “based on hot war,” “split the region,” and “disrupt stability,” is essentially unchanged. On the contrary, it has stepped up relevant preparations under the flag of “protecting regional security and peace” and “ensuring that the communal right of navigation is not changed.” For example, the Pentagon is making adjustments which will have 60% of its naval forces, including aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, cruisers, destroyers, and coastal warships deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, and bring together sea-based, air-based, and space-based forces as “joint strike task forces.” It is using political coercion, economic enticement, and diplomatic pressure to consolidate its existing military alliances, and it is using military aid and joint exercises as bribes to get certain countries to become quasi-members of a military alliance.”

Want to know more? Read the whole thing.

Harry Kazianis is the outgoing Executive Editor of The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis also serves as Senior Fellow (non-resident) for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest, Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the China Policy Institute as well as a Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Potomac Foundation. He previously served as Editor of The Diplomat and as a WSD Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum: CSIS. All views are his own. You can follow him on Twitter: @GrecianFormula.

Henri K.

Henri K. a écrit:

Il y a encore pas si longtemps que ça, on les considère comme du bullshit chinois, de l'épouvantail, un truc qui ne peut pas exister.
Aujourd'hui, on fait couler de plus en plus de l'encre sur "eux". En pluriels puisque ce n'est plus DF-21D seul qui est en question, mais aussi DF-26, et tout un tas de système global que rares sont les pays au monde peuvent se permettent d'en disposer.[…].

Cela constitue en effet une menace qui ne peut en aucun cas être négligée, voire sous-estimée…

observation générale:
un seul TEL ne peut aller nulle par elle-même et de lancer un missile à partir de tout point.
il exige un tas de véhicules de soutien pour la protection, la commande, le contrôle et la communication ainsi que géopoints pré-étudiés pour position de tir.
Voilà pourquoi lancements sont généralement réalisées à partir de sites d'essai ou sur les sites de formation de terrain près des bases de missiles. aucune raison d'associer Paitcheng Army Weapons Test Range avec des tests de missiles mobiles.

Nixy a écrit:

observation générale:
un seul TEL ne peut aller nulle par elle-même et de lancer un missile à partir de tout point.
il exige un tas de véhicules de soutien pour la protection, la commande, le contrôle et la communication ainsi que géopoints pré-étudiés pour position de tir.
Voilà pourquoi lancements sont généralement réalisées à partir de sites d'essai ou sur les sites de formation de terrain près des bases de missiles. aucune raison d'associer  Paitcheng Army Weapons Test Range avec des tests de missiles mobiles.

DF-26 par exemple est conçu pour être lancé, théoriquement, depuis n'importe quel point.

c.f. sa présentation officielle le 3 Septembre dernier.

Henri K.

il est le jeu de mots

toujours idéale en théorie - mais en réalité:

vous ne serez jamais risque de laisser le système grand et coûteux à gérer sans que les gardes, ajouter un véhicule blindé pour chaque lanceur;

poids lourd du véhicule exige la qualité de la route et la surface;

grandes dimentions des courbes limites de véhicules routiers;

poids limite la capacité pont;

la conception du véhicule limite les angles verticaux des routes;

afin de frapper la cible que vous devez être sûr où vous êtes: vous devez donc choisir le bon endroit bien à l'avance en temps de paix.
vous avez besoin de beaucoup de ces endroits afin d'avoir à court et à long temps de réaction.

ces points doivent être toujours vacants et sécurisé. terrain doit être plat et supporter le poids lourd du véhicule et de l'impulsion de poussée supplémentaire.

vous avez besoin d'une commande et le véhicule de communication pour faire en sorte que toutes les commandes sont reçues et exécutées dans cette caravane.

et si vous restez dans le domaine depuis un certain temps (un jour ou une semaine), vous devez avoir un repos et quelque chose à manger: un véhicule ou deux.

Nixy a écrit:

poids lourd du véhicule exige la qualité de la route et la surface;

Observes la base du tube de lancement de DF-26.

Si ce n'est probablement pas pour autant qu'il puisse être lancé n'importe d'où, néanmoins cela assouplit les conditions d'utilisation. Vu la portée ce n'est pas non plus un ICBM qui avoisine les 100 t.

Henri K.

Nixy a écrit:

il est le jeu de mots  : lol: […]
vous ne serez jamais risque de laisser le système grand et coûteux à gérer sans que les gardes, ajouter un véhicule blindé pour chaque lanceur ;
poids lourd du véhicule exige la qualité de la route et la surface ;
grandes dimen[s]ions des courbes limites de véhicules routiers ;
poids limite la capacité pont ;
la conception du véhicule limite les angles verticaux des routes ;[…]

La pente, probablement…

Citation :

[…] et si vous restez dans le domaine depuis un certain temps (un jour ou une semaine), vous devez avoir un repos et quelque chose à manger : un véhicule ou deux.

C'est du soutien logistique bien compris…

ss-20:

Poids (missile+tel) - 80 tonnes
Fording profondeur - 1 m
La hausse maximale - 15 degrés.
Rayon de braquage - 21 m

Vu le TEL de DF-26 au défilé du 3 Septembre, c'est un HTF-5680 du groupe CASC, similaire à WS-2900 du groupe CASIC, et je crois que c'est pour le même projet.

WS-2900 peut emporter jusqu'à 55 t, pour une masse totale de 90 t.

Henri K.